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The OR MILTON

# ROYAL COMMISSION

ON

# TRANSPORTATION

HEARINGS

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VOLUME No.:

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
Statement re Maximum rate Schedules 13781

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Statement comparing representative agreed charge freight rates from eastern Canada to Vancouver, B.C., with rates to Winnipeg, Manitoba, on the same commodities.



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#### ROYAL COMMISSION ON TRANSPORTATION

Proceedings of hearings held in the Convention Hall, Chateau Laurier, Ottawa, Ontario, on the 8th day of June, 1960.

#### COMMISSION

Mr. M. A. McPherson, Q.C.

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Mr. H. Anscomb Member

Mr. A. H. Balch

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Mr. G. S. Cumming


Mr. H. W. Ellicott Adviser

Mr. F. W. Anderson

Secretary

Major N. Lafrance

Assistant Secretary



cost

# ERRATA

## VOLUME 78

Page 13778, line 14: after "You can get" insert "rid of"

line 15 delete "your" substitute "our"

after "would" insert "not"


# Volume 78

Volume 79

constant cost

"things like that do most of the subsidizing of the burden" "expenses with high labour costs in the east" "It would be higher than out-of-pocket" "Saint Thomas Aquinas" "natural monopoly" "that the person should be" maritimes America 

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Ottawa, Ontario, Wednesday, June 8, 1960.

--- On commencing at 10.00 a.m.

THE CHAIRMAN: Order, please. Mr. Hume?

MR. HUME: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

## WILLIAM HUGHES, continued


## CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. HUME:

Q. Mr. Hughes, I have about six points that I would just like to discuss with you somewhat briefly, and as I see my learned friend Mr. Frawley isn't here -- he left early last night and he is probably over in the Court Room of the Board of Transport Commissioners -- I will hold the fort until he gets here.

I wonder if you would be good enough, Mr.

Hughes, to turn to Part I, page 24, where you develop
your submission that British Columbia is dependent upon
rail. I only have a few points I would like to ask
you about. First of all, did you in your preparation
of this brief make any comparative study as to the growth
of rail-truck competition in and out of British Columbia,
say, since the date of the Turgeon Royal Commission
about ten years ago?

A. The position in British Columbia is very hard to get at. I studied the truck registrations in British Columbia, but there is no breakdown



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
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
before the 1956 study by the DBS, and it is very scanty indeed. I can't get the trend except in truck registrations. But I have had a look at the Canadian position in the Lessard Report; we get quite a lot there. Q. Would your investigations indicate that

- there is an important growth in the movement of freight by truck in and out of British Columbia and intra-British Columbia during the period to which you have just referred?
- Yes. I think trucking competition is coming to British Columbia, but it depends very largely on the state of the roads we get, and road building is very expensive, especially to get into the small communities, and the only development we have is in the south and in the lower mainland region, and our natural links are in north-south direction and there is a great deal of trucking down to Seattle and down to Portland. There is not much goes beyond that, and these are the trading links that the railway doesn't serve as well as the truck does. There may be a little in the Okanagan Valley, but I am not too sure about that.
- Q. First of all, may I ask you: ten years ago, when your province made its submission to the Turgeon Commission were you involved in that submission at that time?
- Q. I can recall that one of the problems in British Columbia at that time was that there was a ban



on trucking through the parks and the trucks moving from the prairies had to go via the United States. Now, that isn't the case now, I understand; there is a road link between the prairies and British Columbia?

- A. Yes. Whether it is used in winter I can't say, with snow, ice, and so on.
- Q. In your submission on this page 24, second column, you refer to the fact that there are no reciprocal licensing arrangements between British Columbia and the several states or provinces. Have you any reason for the lack of these reciprocal arrangements?
- A. I am not too sure of the cause of it at all, but one of the reasons, I think, is that we are not a bridge province. A bridge province in a reciprocity arrangement gets a great deal of benefit from the trucks going back and forth. With the province at the end of the line, there is not so much benefit from reciprocity.
- Q. Now, Mr. Hughes, if you haven't studied this or you don't know about this, just indicate and I will go on to something else, but instructions are that this is one of the reasons that a great many of the transcontinental trucking firms are based in Alberta, because Alberta has been very aggressive in finding reciprocal arrangements. Would you know anything about that?
- A. One of the reasons for Alberta's aggressiveness in the growth of trucking in Alberta is because they have no trucking regulation as we know it




in British Columbia. There is a very limited entry control and rate control, and I wouldn't put it all down to reciprocity at all. I think it may be a factor, but there are many other factors in Alberta besides.

- Q. I understand there is a considerable amount of transfer freight that is taken to Alberta because of reciprocity arrangements?
  - A. I wouldn't know about that, no.
- Q. Would you look at your Table XIII-A?

  This was the interleaf that you filed, opposite page 24, in which you set out the annual licences paid by British Columbia on trucks, and you show there a total of \$7,405. I want to ask you one point about that.

  This federal use tax, \$90, what is that? Is that federal use tax or a Canadian use tax? What federal government are you referring to there?
- A. This is the federal government tax in the United States.
  - Q. It is an American tax?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. And you show there a truck operating, say, between Vancouver and Toronto, will pay the various fees in British Columbia, Washington, Idaho. I would suggest to you that if British Columbia had been aggressive and made these reciprocal arrangements, this Table XIII-A would show a considerably less cost to move the vehicle in a year?
- A. That is true, of course; but there may be a great deal of licence fees for British Columbia because




A. Yes.

it is a terminal province.

Q. But British Columbia not being a bridge province isn't required by its geography to make many similar concessions to other provinces. After all, I think you will agree there are not many Minnesota trucks travelling through British Columbia. What would be the loss to British Columbia?

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- A. Any bridge province gets all the trucks going right across all the time, and if the trucks have reciprocity there they get a great deal of benefit and the state gets a lot of revenue from it, and trucks coming into British Columbia under reciprocity ---
- Q. I don't want to interrupt you, but reciprocity is a two-way street, and if British Columbia gives reciprocity, say, to North Dakota it may help British Columbia a great deal more than North Dakota, because there are not many North Dakota trucks travelling to, say, Alaska?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. Between Vancouver and Toronto you have at the present time three main operators: Gill, intraprovincial lines, D.S. Scott and Torvan. Are these names familiar to you?
- A. These names are familiar. I believe there are other operators, too.
- Q. And they either operate by a piggyback or they move through the United States, as you indicate in your Table XIII?



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Q. And do you have a system where the tractor pulls the trailer to about halfway and then meets the trailer load coming from Toronto and the tractor going back?


- A. No, they don't actually do that. Because there is reciprocity they just carry the trailer through and have the tractor licensed in each state.
- Q. May I make this suggestion also, that there might be more interprovincial trucking between Vancouver and central Canada were it not for the fact that British Columbia enjoys certain competitive rates and agreed charges which mitigates against truck competition. Would you agree with that?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. My next point is to ask you if you would be good enough in Part I to look at page 31 where you develop the -- page 31, the penultimate paragraph, the last sentence:

"However, 'normal' traffic which takes the full amount of any increase is concentrated in the west."

By "normal" traffic do you mean traffic moving at class and commodity rates?

- A. Yes, non-competitive.
- Q. By "concentrated", you indicate, I think, at page 35 in your brief that 20.5 per cent of your traffic goes to central Canada and 79.5 goes to the prairies?

A. Yes.



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Q. How much of the 79.5 per cent -- let's say 80 per cent -- of that traffic going into the central and prairie provinces of Canada is normal traffic?

- A. I don't know until -- I will have to have a look at that and let you know. I don't know offhand.
- Q. Could the figures given to the Standing Committee on Railways, Canals and Telegraph Lines on April 14th by Mr. L. J. Knowles seem to be reasonably correct, when Mr. Knowles, in answering a question, pointed out that 56.7 per cent is located in what he called the western region. Would that be a reasonable amount of this 79 per cent?
  - A. I couldn't really say, Mr. Hume.
- Q. By the word "concentrated" in the west you mean the figures Mr. Knowles has indicated here?
  - Yes. Well, the west is a big place.
- Is your belief that more of this normal traffic is concentrated in British Columbia than in other parts of the west?
- A. I think if you look at table XVI, there are some comparative figures there, and you see that our normal traffic -- if you take the percentages of the traffic there, I think -- it is subject to checking -that we in British Columbia have normal traffic of 67.4 per cent ---
- Q. Are these percentages that you have developed?
- A. Yes. Other traffic is 32.6 per cent, making 100 per cent.




Q. Now, Mr. Hughes, my third point comes up with respect to your comment on page 39 under the heading "Effects of unremunerative services". It is a very small point, but I am afraid I don't quite understand, I don't think, what you are saying. It seems to me that the comments on this page and in the second column about halfway down the paragraph where you say:

"The raising of rates above costs encourages, say, trucking whose costs may be higher than rail but whose rates are lower. Thus a misallocation of resources occurs -- traffic is hauled by the high cost medium and Canadians as a whole are not economizing in their use of transportation."

I understand that, sir, but it seems to me that here and elsewhere in your submission you place a complete emphasis on cost, and I was wondering whether or not I am misunderstanding you, whether that cost emphasis that you have takes into consideration service factors where service is sometimes considered to be as important as costs?

A. Yes, this statement here, all other things being equal and I realize service factors are as important as costs, and I realize it doesn't necessarily mean that a trucker will be out of business if the rail rates are less because of all these service factors, that the shipper is using the truck because of




lower costs.

yesterday that there are very few circumstances in which, all other things being equal -- and I am wondering whether or not I am misunderstanding your reference to the misallocation of resources. If a shipper decides, for one reason or another, he is not as concerned with cost as he is, for example, with maybe an overnight service where an alternative means of transport is physically not able to provide that service, is that a misallocation of resources?

A. No, that is not a misallocation of resources, because the shipper himself is minimizing his total costs, and I am saying that the transportation agency should also do that and we will have to provide allocation of resources.

(Page 13687 follows)



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Q. May I just then recapitulate so that I understand it, that throughout this brief where you are referring to cost and mis-allocation of resources, that this takes into consideration a situation where cost is not even perhaps an element at all where a man has a production system under which he has to have a service that, say for example, only a truck can give him where he uses his own truck or somebody else's, that this is then not a misallocation of resources, for service is as important as the actual cost?

A. That is true. Of course, in service that is a cost factor to the shipper. Because he wants to get his goods somewhere in a hurry, he may use trucks or he may use air transport, but there is always a cost reason behind it. He wants to minimize his cost.

I say that we in the transportation agencies should also minimize our costs and then the trucker, the shipper, should I say, is using the form of transportation which is least costly in overall terms including the service factors.

Q. Thank you, sir. I understand that.

Now, this is a very small point, but I read at the last sentence on page 39 and over to page 40 where you say,

"But also for the remaining captive traffic

"for which competition in transport facilities
"will probably never come."

That rather surprises me, Mr. Hughes. Are you suggesting



Q. I think the tenor of your evidence, Mr. Hughes is, and this is on page 13496, that whatever is

that, looking into the future, there is any traffic for which competition might never come?

A. Yes, I can think of some kinds of lumber in some places, I can think of minerals, mineral traffic, and I cannot see that competition will come in some areas.

Now, there are very small spots, I will admit, as you look into the future, and none of us can say what is going to happen, but as you look at things now I can see that there will be some traffic that is pretty well always captive.

Q. Now, Mr. Hughes, this is not strictly speaking my business and I am just curious. Would you look at page 54. In answer to your discussion with Mr. Cooper which occurs at page 13494 and 5 of the transcript, Volume 76, you were discussing your fourth recommendation at the bottom of page 54 that the inequities suffered by other shippers as a result of the statutory rates be adjusted from subsidies received by the railways.

MR. BRAZIER: What was that page again, Mr. Hume? I haven't got it.

MR. HUME: 13494, and Mr. Cooper was questioning Mr. Hughes as to whether or not, whatever subsidy is paid, as to what happens to it, and Mr. Hughes was giving evidence with respect to the use of that proposed subsidy.



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to be paid with respect to this matter will go for the entire benefit of the shippers -- I presume will be sometimes to the benefit of those shippers who are paying what you call normal rates or class of commodity rates.

- A. The shippers that have had the percentage increases, such a great percentage increase in recent years, have been paying the burden for the statutory grain and other unremunerative service, yes.
- Q. Just so that I understand the position of this brief, I presume you are not giving your own views but the province's views, and am I correct in assuming that any moneys paid to the railways who compete with my clients will be in your submission, should be tied down to benefiting the shippers, and that the railways will not get any benefit at all to assist their income, their dividend position or any requirement they had, any financial requirements they had.
- The railways will probably get some of the subsidy if it is shown that they have a burden as well as the shippers, so there would be a splitting of any subsidy if there was one on the Crow grain, between the shippers and the railways, depending on what burden each has borne.
- So that in paragraph 4 on page 54, where you say that 'the inequities suffered by other shippers as the result of the statutory rates be adjusted from subsidies received by the railways" it is your position that there would be some allocation of those as between



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the shippers of normal traffic and the railways, depending on where the burden falls, is that the position?

- A. Yes, I do not envisage the payment out of subsidy. I am thinking of reduction in tariffs as much as anything.
- Q. Now, Mr. Hughes, my next point deals with what you develop on pages 59 and 60, and as I read that chapter, which is entitled the one and one-third rule, I get the impression that you seek there to indicate how much better Alberta is off for trucking service than British Columbia, to develop your argument that Alberta really are not suffering as the result of the agreed charge not applying to the one and one-third rule, if I interpret your whole chapter correctly.
  - A. Yes.
  - Q. Is that the tenor of your chapter?
  - A. That is one of the points.
- Q. I am rather surprised at the statement which appears at page 59 under the heading "Competition at Intermediate Points" where in the last sentence of this first paragraph you say,

"In this latter respect, Alberta holds a

"great advantage over British Columbia where

"rail-truck competition is practically non"existent."


Then you develop a series of tables, and as I read those tables it shows that British Columbia is no worse than fourth in the provinces of Canada. How do you reconcile that with your comment that it is



practically non-existent? I might just say as an addition to my question, that my instructions are considerably otherwise, and my recollection of the evidence in Vancouver indicates that it is not practically non-existent.

For example, if you look at Table XXVII, which is your ton-miles and total mileage, I see that British Columbia is fourth in Canada.

- A. Yes, I would say that is an overstatement Mr. Hume.
  - Q. It is an overstatement.
  - A. That it is practically non-existent, yes.
- Q. It perhaps should be amended somewhat to indicate that it is -- I am not going to put words into your mouth -- but could you indicate what the competitive picture is? It appears to be fourth in Canada, Mr. Hughes, and if you look at Table XXVIII where you are showing the average for-hire truck population in Canada by province on page 60, I notice that in the large vehicles -- and would you agree with me, sir, that it is the large vehicles that are most competitive with the railways?
  - A. Yes, I would agree with that.
- Q. That in large vehicles, B.C. has more than Alberta, for example, and in Canada B.C. is second.
- A. Well, there is a reason for the large trucks in British Columbia. We have greater weights can operate down the West Coast than in other provinces.



Q. Mr. Commissioner Mann interjected in connection with some questioning by Mr. Mauro dealing with the question of your proposed amendment of the

Q. I don't think I want to labour the point. This is in your brief and I think you will agree with me now, you have agreed with me, that it is an overstatement and that there is, you indicated earlier, a growing competition in British Columbia.

Now, if you would be good enough to turn to Part 2, I have one or two points with respect to that. Yesterday in discussing the western incentive rate case, Mr. Commissioner Mann indicated that it was his understanding and it is mine too, that some of the rates were 72 per cent lower than truck rates and that that had been held by the Board of Transport Commissioners as being no lower than necessary to meet competition. You indicate your reasons why, because to compensate for maybe service factor. Then you made this statement, that even at the reduction of 72 per cent, trucks are still making the traffic. May I ask whether that is based upon any studies you have made, because my instructions are somewhat to the contrary and I just wondered what your basis is.

A. I will just find what I said.

MR. BRAZIER: Will you tell us what page that is on?

MR. HUME: Well, I just got the transcript this morning. I think, Mr. Hughes, do you remember ---

A. What was the statement I made then?



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section of the Railway Act. Page 13640, Mr. Commissioner Mann says,

"You have heard Mr. Mauro refer to the

"western incentive case, and the percentage

"there was given as 50. I recollect that some

"of these western incentive rates were up to

"72 per cent below the truck rates and that

"that was found reasonable by the Board."

And the answer,

"Yes, and the trucks are still moving the
"traffic because the rates were not put
"lower than necessary to meet the competition.
"The trucks are still competing and they are
"sharing the traffic."

I just wondered, sir, the basis upon which you made this statement.


A. This is what I generally understand from the situation as I am talking to traffic people pretty well all the time in Vancouver and sometimes here in Ottawa, and this is the best of my understanding, that truckers are still sharing the traffic.

Q. Now, sir, if you would be good enough to turn to page 24 of Part 2 of your Submission, I just want to see if I understand something. The interest, I may say, Mr. Hughes, of the Canadian trucking industry in this submission of yours is, of course, considerable, because of the fact that it proposes something new and will be, I think you will agree, somewhat of a disturbance of the present rate structure;



am I correct?

- A. Yes, it certainly will be.
- Q. And because the railway rate structure was historically in existence before the trucks began to run, it is, I suppose you will agree as an economist, normal that truck rates would be related to the existing price structure.
- A. Yes, in fact they use the existing Canadian freight classification No. 20.
- Q. Do I correctly understand that this proposal which is outlined in paragraph 85 provides that the minimum is stated as a long-range average out-of-pocket costs?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. Do I also correctly interpret this that if all traffic -- this is purely hypothetical -- if all traffic moved at that minimum for one reason or another, that there would be no profit to the carrier at all?
  - A. You are quite right, yes.
- Q. Now, my question to you, sir, is:
  Why does your province think it is necessary to set
  this minimum unless you believe that railway management
  are not carrying out the job of trying to maximize their
  earnings, profits?



I stated yesterday in answering the


where railway management was not recovering out-of-
pocket costs, and that is one of the reasons why we
do not want the burden placed on the so-called captive
shippers, because the railways may feel it necessary
in one way or another to reduce rates below the out-
of-pocket costs, or, maybe, because they do not do
anything about it they may just have to carry the
traffic at less than out-of-pocket costs. We want
to have this in the regulations so that it would no
longer be legal.

first question, I think it was, and I went on from the

night before, that there were several suspect areas

- Q. This would be, as I understand this particular aspect of it, in addition to the railway management's own duties and responsibilities to the shareholders or to the public, as the case may be?

  This would be an additional regulation that would sort of police them?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. Then, if the maximum, which I understand is to be set for the captive traffic, is to be a fully allocated cost -- is that correct?
  - A. Yes.
  - Q. --- who decides the fully allocated costs?
  - A. The railways themselves in the first instance would give the figures to the Board of Transport Commissioners for approval in the maximum



rate schedule which they would file, and I am hoping that there will be a cost section at some time in the Board of Transport Commissioners, or any other board or department, so that these costs can be looked at by somebody in the regulatory body.

- Q. But to determine fully allocated costs

  -- I say to you quite frankly, Mr. Hughes, that I am not
  an economist and I may be out of my depth here -- do
  you not have to get rid of subsidies and all payments
  resembling subsidies? Do you not have to do that in
  order to be able to determine fully allocated costs?
- A. No. In the grain study a figure of fully allocated cost was given. The effects of subsidies, and so on, can be worked out of the figures.
  - Q. It can be worked out of the figures?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. Now, at page 11, paragraph 38, you make this point:

"To make certain that the low-cost resources are employed (which may be trucks vs. railways), the community must know what the relative costs of the services are."

And then you make this statement:

"Obviously, the existence of subsidies and value of service and value of commodity rate making will not indicate this."

In reading those two sentences together it seems to me



that you are making the point that in order to determine the fully allocated costs you have to get rid of all subsidies?


- A. No. To determine fully allocated costs you have to take into account the effect of the subsidies. You would have to do this in the calculations, as was done in the Crow study.
- Q. Then, my second hypothetical case is this, if all the traffic moved on the railways as your maximum -- that is, if all the traffic was normal traffic moving at the maximum -- does the carrier then make a standard normal profit?

MR. BRAZIER: Mr. Chairman and Mr. Hume, Mr. Hughes has prepared a rather lengthy statement of this very problem about which you are asking in your question. Although his memorandum might not be exactly responsive to your question, with the Chairman's permission and with your permission, Mr. Hume, I think it would be as well for him to put it on the record at this stage.

THE WITNESS: I have not it here right now.

MR. BRAZIER: I am sorry, I thought Mr. Hughes had it with him. He has it in his room. Maybe we can have it later.

MR. HUME: Q. You can introduce it at any time you like, but I had hoped to make my point, and I wonder whether or not -- I am sure that the memorandum will be very useful to the Commission, but I wonder whether Mr. Hughes could indicate now in a word whether my assumption is correct, namely, that if all the traffic




is normal traffic moving at its maximum, as is require	Ċ
in your formula, that will envisage a normal profit	
for the carrier? In other words, in determining	
fully allocated costs is the determination based upon	
the fact that all the traffic moves at that rate?	

- A. If all the traffic moved at the fully allocated cost there would be a normal profit.
- Q. So if some of the traffic moves at below that then the carrier is making less than a normal profit?
- A. If some of the traffic is carried at less than fully allocated costs then you are quite right; the railways would not make a normal profit.
- Q. At page 13660 of yesterday's volume you make a statement which I interpret as indicating that your competitive traffic will always be below its maximum. I will read from about line 13 where you are talking to Mr. Mauro about the sky being the limit with respect to this competitive traffic; you said:

"A. No, the sky is not the limit. The competition is the limit.


- "Q. All right, we will go back to what the traffic will bear. You used those words.
- "A. If the traffic becomes competitive it is pretty automatic that the
  rate is going to be less than it would be
  if it was captive traffic. . . ."

Would not that be less than your maximum where you have



most of your traffic moving in an area where the carrier makes less than a normal profit?

- A. I was talking about traffic moving from the competitive classes to the captive classes. In the United States burden study, in the manufacturing and miscellaneous class, which is probably the most competitive of all, you will find competitive items there that carry two and a half times their fully distributed costs. It does not necessarily mean that because a traffic is competitive it cannot bear its fully allocated cost. It depends largely on the costs of the railroad and the costs of the competitor those will determine the rate at which it will travel, and from then on it is above the fully allocated cost.
- Q. I think you will agree with the situation here that the normal traffic, or the traffic which will be at its maximum, is in a shrinking area, and that by far the larger per cent is competitive traffic which would, therefore, be in that area. Am I misinterpreting what you are saying?
- A. The point is that we do not know what the fully allocated costs are. I agree with you; the traffic is becoming more and more competitive, and as competition grows there will not be any need for this maximum. If we had no captive traffic at all I do not think there would be any need for a maximum.
- Q. May I just ask you, as a layman, a very simple question: If this was put into effect the way you propose it, what would happen? Would some of the



normal traffic come down? Would that be your expectation? Would the rates on some of the normal traffic come down?

A. Some of them might come down and, on the other hand, the maximum rate schedules, as I see it, might be actually above the rates at which traffic is actually moving today. If you take coal, for example, and I always have to speak from the United States studies because we do not have any in Canada -- if you take the maximum rate schedule on the fully distributed cost then the maximum rate schedule would be above the present rate, and the same thing would occur for wheat in the United States, and it would occur for fertilizers, I believe -- quite a few commodities.

Lumber is another one.


MR. SINCLAIR: Did you say wheat in the United States?

pardon. There is lumber in Appendix A which Mr.

Frawley introduced, and coal. They are the two big items that I can think of where the maximum rate schedule would be above the present rate so I do not envisage that rates on normal traffic will go down.

I think there will be a movement the other way, and that the maximum rate schedule would be above the present rate.

MR. HUME: Q. So that your lumber to which you referred yesterday as having too high a rate as between Vancouver and Toronto -- that would go up?



A. Yes, the maximum rate schedule could easily go up.

Q. And, as a matter of fact, it is one of the things that the Turgeon Royal Commission worried about when they did not see fit to adopt this cost of service principle, notwithstanding the remarks of my learned friend Mr. Brazier. At page 119 under the heading "Conclusions and Recommendations," the report says this:

"The proposal submitted by British Columbia has not been shown to be a practical one. The amendment is expressed in terms which might have a more farreaching effect than appeared to be in contemplation by counsel. It might, indeed, lead to much higher rates than at present being charged on low-valued primary commodities."

That is the thing they were referring to, and you agree now that that is one of the things that might happen?

A. There is nothing different. In that respect the present maximum rates are the class rates, and the class rates on lumber are much higher than fully allocated cost, so there is nothing now to stop the rates going right up to the class rates. Our proposal would bring, I think, the maximum rate schedules down below the present cost schedules as a maximum, so Commissioner Turgeon would have less to worry about now than he did have then, because now




the rates will only be able to go up to the fully allocated costs.

- Q. As I understand it, the maximum which you envisage would result in those rates going higher than the present class rates?
- A. I do not know which will go higher.

  I think the railway is probably maximizing its revenues now, and that there is no need to put the rate up, but there would be a ceiling, and this ceiling would be cost-oriented.
- Q. What do you envisage would happen to the rates on captive traffic? Would they go up or down, on the average?
- A. It depends very much on the competition.

  If there are any rates below the out-of-pocket costs than those rates will go up.
- Q. I was thinking of the captive traffic, using your phraseology, as being traffic for which there is no reasonable competition?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. Would those rates go up or down on the average, under your proposal?
  - A. That would be impossible to say.
- Q. Would the competitive rates have to move in order to compensate -- if you have a rate going down on your captive traffic the carrier would earn that revenue somewhere. I am trying to figure out, if I can -- and no doubt it is me who is to blame here in not being able to understand this properly, but I want



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to know what is going to happen to the rate structure.

A. If rates on competitive traffic are below out-of-pocket costs, then those rates will go up.

THE CHAIRMAN: Would you think that sand and gravel, for instance, would go up?

THE WITNESS: You are thinking of it as a captive traffic?

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

THE WITNESS: No, I cannot see that any captive traffic rates would go up because the railways are maximizing their revenues now. All I am asking for is a ceiling on the captive traffic rates. I am asking that as a ceiling, and not as an actual rate.

COMMISSIONER GOBEIL: That would be another class rate?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

MR. HUME: Q. Could I sum it up this
way; I think I understand what ou say now, that if this
proposal is adopted there will emerge a new set of
rates. Some of the normal rates will be higher than
they are now, and some will be lower, and there will be
a sort of a completely new rate schedule that will bear
no or little relationship to the present rate schedule?

- A. We have said that this will take place over a long period of time, and I cannot see any chaos, or anything like that, occurring.
- Q. With respect to my next point I will ask
  you to turn to page 26 of Part 2 and as an introduction




to my point I just want to read you paragraph 94 where you make this point:

"The motor carrier industry in Canada is in no position to stand any railway onslaught of selective price cutting, and the loss of even one route by a motor carrier could have serious consequences for his entire business and body of customers."

As I read this statement I take it that the Province of British Columbia agrees that what you call predatory price cutting is not in the interests of the public of Canada?

A. By predatory price cutting I mean setting rates by the railways at less than out-of-pocket costs.



y/ld

Q. And in order to accomplish that you have indicated to my learned friend, Mr. Cooper, at page 13557 of the transcript that you would amend Section 334 of the Railway Act, paragraph 2, subsection (c), with respect to the fact that rates are not lower than necessary to meet competition. If it is the view of your province that the elimination of part of the trucking competition is not in the public interest, what safeguard would you put in the Railway Act to ensure that competition would continue in Canada?

anything other than to say that rates shall not go below out-of-pocket costs. On this very question, if the whole Railway Act was altered to get this scheme into effect, then, in fact, the trucking business would benefit very greatly, especially in the short-haul fields. We have terminal expenses which are very high. The short-haul field would be left open for the trucker. On the medium-haul field, I can't see any decline, especially in those fields in which the truckers have a natural advantage. I don't think the railway needs anything further than to say the railway rates shall not go below cost.


Q. You want to remove from the Railway Act that provision which provides that rates should not go any lower than necessary to meet competition, and your proposal indicates that rates shall not be lower than out-of-pocket costs. Now, who determines what are the out-of-pocket costs -- or, to put it the other way, who



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determines whether the level has gone lower than necessary to meet your standard?

- A. Again, this depends on a cost-finding section of a regulatory body.
- Q. And it would be somebody's opinion -the judgment of somebody as to whether or not the
  rates were lower than to meet out-of-pocket costs?
- A. It is a little bit more than opinion,
  I think. It would be a statistical calculation. I
  know these things are always open to question.
- Q. Well, if I havepaid any attention to what has gone on before this Commission, it seems to me the determination of costs is largely a matter of somebody's opinion.
- A. Under the present set-up, it shall not be lower than necessary to meet competition; it is always a matter of opinion whether they shall be the same or what the service factors are -- what are the rates of the competitor, and they don't know much about that. There is an awful lot of judgment and common sense used to make sure the traffic is shared by both agencies.
- Q. If the decision as to whether or not the rate has gone below your out-of-pocket costs -- and this is to be decided judicially by the Board or some section of the Board -- would you permit the competitive agency -- in this case the trucking industry -- to appear before the Board and have some say in the finding as to whether or not they are lower



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than out-of-pocket costs? Would you permit the trucking industry the right, under the Railway Act or the Transport Act, to appear on a proceeding if there was some question as to whether the rates were lower than out-of-pocket costs?

- I am not sure of the legal position now. A.
- Well, they can't do it now. In determining whether rates are lower than necessary to meet competition, the Board extends the courtesy.
- A. I would not see any reason for that if the cost-finding section was made up of men who knew their job.
- Q. So you could have the situation at a hearing of the cost-finding section concerning the trucking industry between A and B, that they would not have the right to appear in the proceedings?
- A. I am sure these men would know their job, but by the same token the trucking agencies between C and D would benefit from this, because it would price the railways right out of the short-haul field -- and often out of the medium-haul field too.
- Q. I am not so concerned with those people who are not going to be adversely affected by your proposal. I am concerned with your proposal and the effect it may have on certain areas in Canada on the trucking industry which, by your formula, by your cost of service principle, might be eliminated?
- A. You say, yourself, the service considerations are a great factor, and that being so, there are



30 THE WITNE

many reasons, probably, why people should use trucks between Vancouver and Toronto. They do, and the rate is much higher, but they use them because all the service considerations enter into it. I can't see any reason for the trucking industry to worry unduly, and I can see a growth of traffic on the short-hauls on the branch lines, and so on.

stand from what you have said to Mr. Hume that you consider it essential that questions concerning differences of opinion on out-of-pocket costs must be settled by judicial proceedings before the Board, much as we conduct a case before the Board today? Is that essential to the success of your scheme?

THE WITNESS: I don't anticipate any
hearings before the Board on out-of-pocket costs.

I would hope this would be done internally in the Board.

commissioner mann: Your idea is that these matters are going to be handled in much the same fashion as they are handled in Britain, where a road hauler can claim that he thinks the rate is below cost, and then the tribunal looks into the matter, or someone does -- or no-one does? What is the situation?

THE WITNESS: I really don't know what happens in England.

COMMISSIONER MANN: There are no legal proceedings before the tribunal.

THE WITNESS: There are if anybody thinks



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the rate is unreasonable on captive traffic.

COMMISSIONER MANN: Oh, that is on captive traffic only.


THE WITNESS: There are no other proceedings for meeting rates, I am quite sure.

MR. HUME: Q. On page 30 of your submission, part 2, and in your discussions with Mr. Mauro yesterday at page 13660 of the transcript, Mr. Mauro suggested it would be to the railways' benefit to move to have the present non-competitive traffic competitive, because as non-competitive traffic they could only charge for the distributed costs, but if the traffic becomes competitive, the sky is the limit. You corrected it by saying,


"No, the sky is not the limit. The competi"tion is the limit."

My question is, who decides whether traffic is competitive or otherwise? You use the word "no reasonable competition". It seems to me to involve somebody's decision as to whether there is sporadic, constant, reasonable or unreasonable competition. Who is going to decide whether a particular segment of traffic is competitive or not to bring it out of this maximum limit that you have set?

- A. The railways would apply to the Board to bring any traffic out of the captive segment into the competitive segment.
- Q. If the railways own a truck line paralleling to A and B, could they provide their own



- competition and thus move it -- under your proposal?
- A. Under my proposal, that would seem to be so.
- Q. Finally, at page 35 of your submission, and at page 13586 of the transcript, you were explaining the system in the United Kingdom, and you said they were not doing well. My information indicates that they are losing millions.
  - A. I don't know how many millions.
- Q. And we are talking about pounds, not dollars?
  - A. Millions of pounds, yes.
- Q. Isn't one of the differences between transportation problems in the United Kingdom and here the fact that in the United Kingdom all traffic is virtually short-haul traffic?
- A. If you look at long-haul from the British point of view, then you look at traffic of about 150 or 200 miles; but, there is quite a bit of trucking up to 400 miles which is about the limit. There is a lot of short-haul trucking and railroading.
- Q. Yes. I think you would agree with me, coming from the Province of British Columbia, and by reason of the fact that you are where you are geographically, that this situation, and one of the reasons why this Commission is sitting now, just does not exist in the United Kingdom. There are very few shippers in the United Kingdom who could not move their own goods in their own trucks overnight?



- A. Yes, and I said also in the transcript yesterday that our scheme was nothing like the scheme in England. It is just put there to show how one or two other countries do it in Europe. But, I am not suggesting it is the same as the British scheme.
- A. In your submission you do indicate how rate-making is carried on in other countries, in order to be helpful and informative to the Commission, but arising out of this exchange in yesterday's transcript, and recalling the evidence presented by Mr. Creery before the Royal Commission on agreed charges. I want to know if you agree with me that in addition to the problems of overcapitalization and so on, there are other problems that do not exist in Canada, and in rate-making in the United Kingdom you have to look at it from a completely different point of view?
- A. The situation is not parallel at all.

  One rate system for one country is not a good standard

  for another country unless the conditions are the same.
- Q. Mr. Hughes, thank you very much for your help. As I read your submission, I have one final question to put to you: I understand your background is that you are at the University in economics and interested in transportation. Is this scheme of yours, in your opinion, an interesting academic exercise in rate-making, or do you feel this is a practical matter for Canada?
- A. I certainly didn't write this as an academic exercise. I think it is a real, practical





scheme, and it is something we have wanted for a long time in British Columbia, looking at the interests of Canada as a whole. As I said, we may get higher rates in some areas, and lower rates in other areas, but it is certainly not an academic exercise.

MR. HUME: Thank you.

--- A short recess.

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Mr. Frawley?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. FRAWLEY:


Q. Mr. Hughes, I suppose you would agree with me that, particularly since Section 334 of the Railway Act was enacted, now there is an attempt to police rather carefully the competitive rate structure.

THE CHAIRMAN: Order, please.

- A. I don't know how effective that policing is, Mr. Frawley. I am just trying to remember the number of cases that have been up, and I don't think it is very many.
- Q. As a matter of fact, I don't think it changed the law; it seemed to spell out in some paragraphs what probably has been the law before. In the jurisdiction of the Board, a competitive rate should reflect the competition. That is perhaps a wrong way of stating what the position was and still is.
  - A. Yes.
- Q. And a rate that doesn't reflect the competition can be complained again. If a competitive rate remains in force after competition has disappeared, then it can be made the subject of a complaint or a request for it before the Board under Section 334.

THE CHAIRMAN: I don't want to interrupt the proceedings, but I understand that we can resume at two o'clock in our old home at the Board of Transport.

THE WITNESS: Under Section 334, they can't do that, Mr. Frawley. Nobody can complain to the Board when there is no competition, can they? I am not



a lawyer; I am just reading it.

MR. FRAWLEY: Q. Did you say that under Section 334 you can or cannot complain?

- A. I don't think you can complain and have a rate put up if there is no competition there. I don't know if I understood your question correctly.
- Q. I put it to you that, having in mind Section 334 -- now, I am quite aware that there is no sanction, it is simply a section conferring certain powers of investigation on the Board, which I suggest they probably always had -- but surely, looking at that statute, it is there so that interested parties can call certain situations to the attention of the Board so that the Board then can put into operation the machinery set out in Section 334. You would agree with that?
- A. Well, it may be so, but maybe the Board itself on its own motion can act under Section 334.
- Q. Quite, quite. Then if you want to read Section 33 along with Section 334, you find there, Section 33, subsection 1, subparagraph (a), that the Board has a jurisdiction and a duty, I would say, concomitantly, to investigate any matter which is the subject of complaint by any person that a company, a railway company, has failed to do anything required. I am only putting it to you, as you already agreed with me, that it is the spirit, at least, if not the letter, and, indeed, perhaps the letter, of Section 334 that a competitive rate should reflect the competitive



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
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situation. Would you agree with that?

- Yes, I would agree with that.
- Q. I take it from that that if I am a receiver of freight anywhere I can and I ordinarily do demand and receive from the railway a rate, a competitive rail rate because there is available to me an alternative form of transport.
  - A. Oh, yes.
- And that the railway endeavours to match the price of the competitive form of transport when they publish for me and for the whole shipping world the competitive rate in question.
  - A. Yes.
- Q. Now, that applies, I take it, to the City of Vancouver as well as the City of Toronto and every other place where freight is received on the lines of the railways in Canada.
  - Α. Yes
- That being so, I am wondering just what you mean when you say on page 56 of Part 1 of your submission under the general and intriguing caption of "Inequities of the One and One-Third Rule": "The rule burdens the transcontinental shipper by reason of the long-haul rates being higher than they would be otherwise."

And continuing on with what appears to be the same thought:

> "The rule burdens shippers and receivers in "British Columbia in that they are deprived



up by 98 cents

"of potentially favourable railway rates."

Now, will you tell me, please, how the fact that the railway -- let's assume that the railway decided to increase the rates to the Coast, the competitive rates to the Coast. I am going back to 1951 when the one and one-third rule came into effect. Assuming that the railway desired to increase the rate to the West Coast because they did not choose to suffer what they call an invasion of their revenues at the intermediate points, would you tell me how that would require the shipper, the receiver in Vancouver to pay any more?

- A. If there is competition there, if there is effective competition and this competition is coming in, then the shipper would not have to pay -- the receiver would not have to pay any more. If it was potential competition, maybe he would have to pay some more, and quite a few rates went up after the one and one-third rule came in.
- Q. The competitive rate was there because there was an alternative form of transport to the receiver?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. Assume that the railways said to the shipper: "Oh, we are going to put your rate up by a dollar". Surely the shipper in Vancouver would say: "I am going back to the boat".
- A. The boat would say we will put our rate up by 98 cents.




- Q. Assuming they put their rates up because they said they didn't like the situation at Edmonton and Calgary, I am putting it to you that that would not require the Vancouver receiver to pay any more freight rates.
- A. I don't agree, because the alternative form of transport rates would move up in sympathy if they were competitive in the first place.
- Q. Surely the railways wouldn't have put it in in the first place if that was the situation.
- A. Well, there must have been competition there, because otherwise the rate wouldn't be there.
- Q. That's fine. If the competition was there and the shipper is in the driver's seat, he can say: "You will not put up my rate, because I will go to the alternative form of transport".

MR. BRAZIER: Is that a question you are putting to the witness, Mr.Frawley?

MR. FRAWLEY: I am inviting the witness's comment on that. I am sure the witness isn't timid; he certainly shouldn't be after having lived with my friend, Mr. Brazier, for a long time.

- Q. I am putting the proposition to you, and if you have any comment to make, this is the time to make it.
- A. I don't think I can make any comments on it, Mr. Frawley.
  - Q. What did you say?
  - A. I don't think I can make any comments on



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it.	I	can't	see	the	question	in	it.	It	seemed	like
a st	ater	ment.								

- Q. I simply put it to you that if the rate was justified in the first place, it was justified because there was competition there, an alternative form of transport.
  - A. Yes.
- Then I put it to you that a shipper does not have to pay the increased rate that the railway puts against him because he can turn to the alternative form of transport.
- A. He can turn to the alternative form of transport because the rate can go up against the railway. He can turn to competitors, sure, but the competitor now has no competition at that point and he can now put the rate up.
- Q. I put it to you that if the railways, by reason of the one and one-third rule, or, indeed, any other rule, can increase the transcontinental competitive rate, then the only reason that can be shown for that is that the transcontinental rate was too low in the first place.
  - I can't agree with you.
- Q. Isn't that basic to the making of a competitive rate; it is not justified unless there is an alternative form of transport.
- A. The reason the transcontinental rates go up is because of the one and one-third rule, not because the rate was too low in the first place. The



A. Yes.

rate was there to make the competition in the first place, and now if the one and one-third rule goes up and the rate goes up, it goes up because of the one and one-third rule.


- Q. It couldn't go up because of the one and one-third rule or any other rule, because they go to the shipper and say: "We are putting up the rate", and the shipper doesn't care whether it is going up on instructions from Montreal; he says: "You are not putting up my rate. I am going to the alternative form of transport."
- A. If the railway puts up its rate not because of the one and one-third rule and the man says:

  "All right, I will now go to the competitor", what is to say that the competitor's rate is not now the same as the rail rate, because it is a water-compelled rate, otherwise it would not have been a competitive rate in the first place.
- Q. If the rate goes up because the railway is afraid or has knowledge that the price of alternative transport has gone up, that is one matter, and they would automatically increase their rate if the alternative form of transport went up. But I am talking about a managerial decision that they will not permit parity rates and they decide that they will increase the rate to the Coast because that will remove the loss of revenue at the intermediate points. We are agreed on that.



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
- Q. And say there was a rate there of a dollar to Vancouver, and they say: "We will put that up to a dollar and a quarter and we then charge Alberta \$1.35 plus one-third and that will take care of the revenue situation."
  - A. Yes, you are describing the situation.
- Q. Now, whether or not the receiver in Vancouver has to pay the increased rate depends entirely on the position of that shipper vis-a-vis the alternative form of transport. That surely is true, isn't it?
- A. I would qualify that and say again that if he goes to the competitor, then the competitor's rates have, in all likelihood, gone up in sympathy with the increased railway rates.
- Q. You may not intend to be unresponsive, but I put it to you that you are not responsive to my question. What the alternative form of transport may do may be something else. I am talking about a shipper who has a rate which was given him because there was an alternative form of transport or alternative market available to him, and I put it to you that as long as that market competitive force or carrier competitive force remains, it is going to determine the shipper whether he goes by railway or not.
- A. I am not responsive to your question, probably, in the way you want me to be responsive; but I think if the railway rate goes up and the shipper goes to the competitor, there is nothing to guarantee that the competitor's rate is down where it was. As soon as



the railway rate goes up, then the competitor's rate will go up because they were competitive rates in the first place, and will remain so.

- Q. It is not a very honest -- I am not using the word offensively -- it wasn't very honest bargaining between the railway when the rate went up in the first place.
  - A. Between what?
- Q. When the rate went up between the shipper and the railway. The shipper knew there was an alternative form of transport which would bring his goods in at X dollars, and the railway said: "We will meet the rate that was quoted to you by the alternative form of transport", and that is the sort of bargaining that precedes the alternative form of rate.
  - A. I don't know.
- Q. Now, take the rate we hear a great deal about, the rate that was given to the Steel Company, rate-making, agreed charge on steel sheets and plates out to the West Coast at a rate that will shut out the steel sheets and plates coming from Montana,

  California. That was the sort of competitive situation to meet and take care of the steel sheets and plates coming from Hamilton to Vancouver. Were you aware of that situation?
- A. I don't know why exactly the low rate was put in, but I do know that we have some low per ton-mile rates into Vancouver.
  - Q. You didn't know that market competition






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entered into the quoting of the low agreed charges on steel sheets and plates from Hamilton, Algoma, or maybe even Sydney, to Vancouver.

- A. I don't know. It is a great factor in skelp; market competition helps to keep the rates down.
- Q. And if the railways a month or six months after they quoted the rates turned around and said to the steel company: "We are going to put that rate up by 40 cents or 50 cents", don't you think the steel company would say: "No, you are not, because it will come in from Montana".
- A. Yes, if you are talking about market competition, I can quite see that situation.
- Q. What is the difference between the justification for a competitive rate between market competition and carrier competition?
- A. In the first place, if the carrier is in competition and one of them puts the rate up, then the other one does. The market competition would be different, it would seem to me.




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Q. If a rate is put in to meet water competition through the Panama Canal, and I mean carrier competition, the rate that is put in is intended to reflect the rate of the alternative form of transportation through the canal? That is basic, must be so?

A. Yes.

- Q. All right, I want to understand you. If you say that the railways for some reason best known to themselves, and we will take the dislike of the reduction of their revenues in intermediate territories, because of the application of the one and one-third rule, let us take that as a reason: they go to the shipper in Vancouver and say: "We are going to put your rate up by 50 cents," and it has been put down by reason of the traffic through the Panama Canal. What is that that you are saying, that the rate through the Panama Canal is going to go right up?
- A. I know that the last 17 per cent increase in railway rates, I was talking to a trucker in Alberta and he came and he was rubbing his hands and said, "Good, the railways put up their rates by 17 per cent. I am going to put mine up by 15 per cent."

  And there is no reason why the ships should not do the same.
- Q. Mr. Hughes, I just want to ask you one thing about your Exhibit A. If you read this Exhibit A, this being a list of rate changes, cancellations and increases which were brought about solely by virtue of



A. No.

Q. Well, I commend a reading of the transcript

the application of the one and one-third rule ---


A. This is as it was put in by the Canadian National Railways at the time, yes, before the Royal Commission on Agreed Charges.

- Q. That is what you understand?
- A. Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: Appendix A.

MR. FRAWLEY: Appendix A.

- Q. Well, Mr. Hughes, if you understand that you will probably be surprised when I tell you that there are 80 rates, 80 pieces of traffic listed in Exhibit A. Did you read the transcript during the second Turgeon Commission?
  - A. Yes.
  - Q. You say you did?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. Did you happen to read Mr. Edsforth's cross-examination?
- A. I would have done. I cannot remember about 1t now.
- Q. Well, if you did read it, then I think you will have to agree with me that after many hours of searching through that Appendix A for instances where the increase had been made as a direct result of the one and one-third rule, Mr. Edsforth was able to turn up 13 out of 80. Were you aware of that?




or benefits us. It is an artificiality in the rate structure. It is one of those things in the rate structure that we are trying to get straightened up.

to you, because I put it to you, and I will ask you
if I am right or not: I put it to you that the vast
majority of the rate changes that you find in Appendix
A and which are to be found in Exhibit 15, the photostat of the original of which I have in my hand, were
due to just a housecleaning by the Canadian Freight
Association and the two railways in which they increased
a lot, took out a lot of deadwood in the transcontinental freight rate structure. Did you never hear that?


- A. No, there are still a lot of those rates in effect now today, in Appendix A; there are still a lot, I would say there are more than 13 in effect.
- am going to ask you. You say that notwithstanding the fact that now, due to a Judgment of the Board of Transport Commissioners with respect to the conflict between Section 32 of the Transport Act and Section 337 of the Railway Act, that notwithstanding the fact that due to that conflict the one and one-third rule does not now apply to agreed charges, are you telling the Commission that now the fact that the one and one-third rule still does apply to a transcontinental competitive rate, that that is a serious matter to the Province of British Columbia and industry in the Province of

A. It does not matter whether it harms us



You have been talking about this for a long time yourself, Mr. Frawley -- get the rate structure put on some reasonable basis. It is a distortion, I think, in the rate structure, whether it is right or wrong.

- Q. Mr. Hughes, are you here just advocating a tidying up of the freight rate structure?
  - A. No, I am not.
- Q. Or are you here presenting the grievances of the Province of British Columbia with reference to the Canadian freight rate structure?
- A. I am saying in the brief that the Province of British Columbia has suffered needlessly from the one and one-third rule.
  - Q. Has suffered, you say?
  - A. Yes, needlessly.
- Q. If you have finished, I would like to ask you to be good enough to tell me -- and you can take all the time you need -- I would like you now to tell me the names and addresses of the industries in the Province of British Columbia that are now disadvantages as a result of the application today of the one and one-third rule?
- A. I can't do that obviously because they are not getting the low rates that they should be, and this is a very hypothetical thing to go out and get the names and addresses of somebody who does not get the rate that he could have if the rule was not there.
- Q. I am sorry, I cannot hear. It is certainly the fault of the room. Would you mind repeating



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
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what you said? Can you do that or not?

- No, I cannot do it.
- You cannot do it. I put it to you. Mr. Hughes, and it is an obvious thing I put to you, that you cannot do it because there is no industry which, because of the situation with regard to agreed charges, that is suffering because of the application of the one and one-third rule in your province?
  - A. I do not agree with you at all.
- Then will you please put on this record now or at some later date the names and addresses -- I don't care about the addresses because I can look them up myself -- the names of the industries in British Columbia that are suffering. It may be a joking matter for the Province of British Columbia, but we regard very resentfully what you have done here, and I would like Mr. Brazier to know that too, that you should go to the trouble to spread yourself over all these pages, but you have such a serious job to do to advance your cost of service principle, that you would flog this dead horse of the one and one-third rule through twenty-five pages.

Would you just tell me where in the Province of British Columbia today the one and one-third rule is doing five cents of harm, just five cents?

We can't go out and get the names and addresses of firms who do not get a tariff that they would get if the one and one-third rule was not there.



Q. It does not apply to agreed charges.

All a fellow has to do is to get an agreed charge?

- A. He will not always go out and get an agreed charge.
- Q. Would you be surprised if I tell you, and I am sure the gentleman would not mind being quoted, what a very high officer of the Canadian Pacific Railway told me after they had succeeded in getting rid of the one and one-third rule as far as its application to agreed charges was concerned, he told me there are no more transcontinental competitive rates quoted -- if they want low rates to the west coast, they will get them on the basis of agreed charges and that is all.

  That is a reasonable thing for the gentleman to say, is it not? That was a question, was it not, Mr. Brazier?

  MR. BRAZIER: I think he is trying to get

THE WITNESS: Not everybody can enter into an agreed charge because he does not have the traffic, he does not have the kind of traffic, and the right kind of thing that the railway will put an agreed charge in. An agreed charge cannot be extended to

everybody.

MR. FRAWLEY:

an answer for you, if you don't mind.

Q. You know, of course, that the technique of the fixed charge also applies to the new regime, the new world of agreed charge that we went into after the one and one-third rule was made non-applicable; you know that the technique of the fixed charge is still in force. You know what I mean by that, Mr. Hughes?





A. Yes.

Q. I mean that there are provisions in the Transport Act which enable other shippers other than the original contracting parties to obtain just the same charge, if they will comply with the same terms and conditions. I am aware of that. If there is any limitation of that -- well, it is there, it is apparent -- it is because of that that I want you to tell me these industries in British Columbia that are now suffering because of the fact that there still is this hollow, nominal operation of the one and one-third rule.


A. Well, I say I cannot do it because it is an impractical thing to do.

MR. BRAZIER: I would like to say at this time, Mr. Chairman, of course, that Mr. Frawley has not yet disclosed his hand, what his submission is going to be to this Commission. It may be that he is going to suggest that the one and one-third rule be applied to agreed charges, as he did before the second Turgeon Commission.

MR. SINCLAIR: Oh, he wouldn't do that.

MR. BRAZIER: We certainly want to point out to the Commission at this time, since we are making the first substantial submission of the provinces, that there is danger in this rule. We think it is artificial, and, if anything, it should be taken out of the freight rates structure.

Certainly we are looking to the position that



may be taken by Alberta, which they have talked a great deal about, that it should be also applied to agreed charges, which would be of assistance to the Province of British Columbia.

THE CHAIRMAN: I do not think anybody has ever accused Mr. Frawley of being timid, and I do not think he is being timid now. He will make his position clear.

MR. FRAWLEY: If my friend will possess his soul in patience, he will learn in due course what I propose to do in so far as I am able to remove this discrimination from the Canadian freight rates structure in as far as it affects the province of Alberta.

Q. Mr. Hughes, could you look at page 61, because there is something there that I think has got to be straightened out a bit. At page 61 you have a sentence there at the bottom of the page starting:

"Yes, these inland points ---"
and I suppose I can take them to be my cities of
Calgary and Edmonton.

"Yes, these inland points expect the railways to give up their opportunities to effectively compete at the competitive points and the long-haul shipper is deprived of low rates."

What do you mean by that? Has anybody in Alberta ever suggested that anything should happen to the rates in Vancouver, that Vancouver should pay any higher rates?

A. They might not have explicitly asked for



that, but, as I say, when the one and one-third rule went into effect, quite a lot of rates went up and they are still in effect, those higher rates are still in effect. But even though Alberta may not have asked for them, then this is certainly what has happened.

Q. But after all this is a Province of
British Columbia brief, it is not the Canadian Pacific
Railway brief, is it? To be perfectly frank, as I
read through it I was quite confused as to whether
this was Mr. Sinclair's case or Mr. Brazier's case.


MR. SINCLAIR: What section were you thinking of?

THE WITNESS: We hope Mr. Sinclair thinks so in the cross-examination.

MR. FRAWLEY: Q. Mr. Hughes, was it not basic to our case that the Vancouver rate should remain as it was, and then we should not pay more than one-third more. Was not that basic to our case?

A. You may have been under a misconception as to what would happen if the one and one-third rule went in. What did in fact happen, you got a one and one-third rule and at the same time our rates went up, so you were not benefited at all because you got the same rate as you had before.

Q. I am confining my cross-examination to the spokesman for the Province of British Columbia, and I simply put it to you than ever at any time did we expect Vancouver to be deprived of one cent of a rate as a result of our advocacy of parity rates or something



more than parity.


- A. Well, it was very nice of you to think that, and we know you thought kindly of us, but what has in fact happened, you have still got the same rate and we have got a higher rate as a result.
- Q. That is as the result of the determination of the railways to not go along with the idea that we should be freed from long and short haul discrimination.

I am simply wanting to put on record that never at any time did we seek to interfere with the rates which British Columbia was getting. In fact, quite the contrary. We said that if there is a low rate to Vancouver, we want that rate plus one-third. We want the effect of the low rate to Vancouver to be spread back over the intermediate territory, just as it has done through the states of Washington and Idaho, Utah, Oregon, California and the rest of the American states.

I just wanted it to be made clear and I thought this was the right time to do it. If the witness does not agree with me on such an obvious thing as that, I turn to the Commission and make the statement so that there will be no possible question about it.

I only want to give you cases -- there are many of them -- where you have now benefited through the medium of agreed charges and you now have much better rates. Perhaps I can put that to you.

Do you know, MR. Hughes, is it a fact that




through the medium of low agreed charges to the west coast from eastern Canada, that you now enjoy much lower rates than you did in 1951?

- A. I do not agree that we do, Mr. Frawley. Very often these agreed charges are exactly the same rate as the old competitive rate was. Even though we have an agreed charge in now, the agreed charge does not mean to say it is going to be any lower. It is very often just the same as it always was.
- Q. Well, my understanding is that on iron and steel plates, for example, you have had a rate of 129 in 1951, and I think you will find that on page 7 of Exhibit 15 in the Agreed Charges Royal Commission case -- and you will find it in your Appendix A because it is just a reprint -- you have a rate of 129 from Groups A and B to Vancouver; is not that right?
  - A. That is right, yes.
- Q. And I put it to you that now in the year 1960, notwithstanding all of these increased costs, wages, material, everything else, that Mr. Sinclair and Mr. McDonald have been entertaining us with over the years, you now enjoy a rate through an agreed charge of \$1.20; is that not right?

MR. BRAZIER: Can you tell me, Mr. Frawley, whether the minimum is the same? I have not got the complete charge here.

MR. FRAWLEY: Well, there was a minimum in 1951 of 100,000.



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MR. BRAZIER: Eighty thousand is included in Appendix A.

MR. FRAWLEY: No, Appendix A. I am looking at the original Exhibit 15, but Appendix A must be the same. I do not know whether all the information is there.

MR. BRAZIER: Page 69 shows groups A and B, \$1.29, the minimum rate 80,000 pounds.

MR. FRAWLEY: I am looking at page 69, the second item from the top, iron and steel plates from groups A and B. This is from Hamilton and Algoma.


MR. BRAZIER: Eighty thousand pounds.

MR. FRAWLEY: Yes, 80,000 pounds.

MR. BRAZIER: I don't know what it is under the agreed charge.

MR. FRAWLEY: Do you know what that means, Mr. That means that I will now offer -- and there Brazier? once again I am offering or filing a 12-page exhibit that I am going to have to go and reproduce some place, I have to do that at my own expense, I suppose, but I will have to read for you, Mr. Brazier, what the original entry was.

Please do not understand that I think that this was a specially prepared exhibit or appendix --I would not think that for a moment -- but the full story of iron and steel bars and rods is this. On iron and steel bars and rods from groups A and B the rate is 129.



ld

see.

MR. BRAZIER: That is not the item we are talking about. We are talking about iron and steel plate.

MR. FRAWLEY: Iron and steel bars and rod.

MR. BRAZIER: That is a different item, you

MR. SINCLAIR: Page 68, the last one.

MR. BRAZIER: Yes, on iron and steel bars and rods there was a minimum of 100,000 lbs. You were talking about iron and steel plate.

MR. FRAWLEY: Iron and steel bars and rods. Now, with the kind help of my friend, Mr. Sinclair, I have the item on page 68 of your Part 1, and it is the last item on page 68, and it has a rate of 129 from groups A and B, and the minimum weight is 100,000 lbs.

MR. BRAZIER: That is correct.

MR. FRAWLEY: And I put it to you that you are now getting that same material for \$1.20, which is 9 cents less. I have not got the agreed charge -- yes, I think I can probably give you that from something else. Yes, you will find that it is 100,000 lbs. Mr. Brazier and Mr. Hughes -- I do not think there is any doubt about that.

MR. BRAZIER: If you would give us the number of the agreed charge, we can check it.

MR. FRAWLEY: The number of the agreed charge is 71 and 73. However, I apologize for taking up so much time on this digression. I simply put it to you that through the medium of the agreed charge you





ANGUS, STONEHOUSE & CO. LTD.

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are now much better off than you were back in 1951, notwithstanding the rate increase. I have just one more for you, and I will leave that. Calcium carbide; the rate in 1951 was \$2.12, and in 1960, through agreed charge No. 115, you are paying \$1.59. I put it to you that that sort of thing runs all through these, and that it is what you would expect.

THE WITNESS: I do not agree with you, Mr. Frawley.


MR. FRAWLEY: Q. You do not agree that calcium carbide ---

A. I do not agree that it runs through the whole lot. You are taking out one or two odd ones.

Q. You are going to show me what industry has been disadvantaged today through the application of the one and one-third rule. Whether or not British Columbia has been advantaged through the application of agreed charges, which I am told now reach 1,000; the railways have reached the 1,000 mark -- you will find that a substantial portion of those are on transcontinental routes, and you are telling me that you have not been advantaged by the agreed charge?

The overall situation, I think, is shown in Table XI-A. You are picking out one or two instances, but I think the whole picture is shown in Table XI-A, where the agreed charges for British Columbia are much higher than those for Alberta -on competitive rates, even.

Q. What is this, now? What are you drawing



my attention to now?

- A. Table XI-A. I think that gives us the situation where British Columbia has \$34 for the agreed charges, and Alberta \$19.60.
- Q. Now, of course, Mr. Hughes, that \$34 would cover a great many agreed charges moving from the West Coast -- moving from groups A and B out of Vancouver, and transcontinental agreed charges?
- A. If it does show anything, it shows that the rates are very high, does it not?
- Q. Yes, what it shows -- you are making a comparison, and you are showing that my agreed charges average out at \$19.60, and yours average out at \$34.01. That means that I have got very few long-haul agreed charges compared to what you have. You have got to pay something for transportation, I suppose. That is what it shows, does it not, Mr. Hughes? It shows that you have a vast amount of stuff moving out every day under low agreed charges from the Coast -- and I say "low" as compared with the commodity rates which have been displaced. That is what this \$34 is. You do not expect to get from Toronto to Vancouver at the same rate as you would expect to get from Lethbridge to Edmonton, do you?
  - A. No.
- Q. And I put it to you that all that \$19.60 means is that I am not anywhere in your world when it comes to transcontinental agreed charges. It proves that point. Of course, there is a lot of intra-Alberta



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traffic, and traffic between Saskatchewan and Alberta, moving on agreed charges, and there are also agreed charges between British Columbia and Alberta, and with respect to those, of course, the rate per hundredweight would be down. Do you want to make any more out of that?

MR. BRAZIER: We will not put a number on them, but there are some in groups A and B from Alberta, too. They are not all between Alberta and Saskatchewan, and Alberta and British Columbia.

MR. FRAWLEY: Yes, there are some, and the Trans-Canada Highway will probably make more. I suppose Alberta will have to wait for that day before it gets a fair rate structure, and I will put it to the witness -- well, I have put it to the witness quite sufficiently.

enough to ask you a couple of questions with respect to your Part 2. I want to know just where you are going, and I want a little education. I would like you to compare the rates on sand and gravel, on the one hand, with the rates on boots and shoes, on the other. The boots and shoes, I take it -- and I am only using them illustratively, and thanks to the attitude of the Canadian Pacific Railway and the Canadian National, we have not got a burden study today so that we can check, but I am putting it to you that the boots and shoes would probably move at -- what?



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
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distributed costs, would you say?

- A. I could not say at all, Mr. Frawley.
- Q. I know you cannot say, but you have given this thing some thought, and being the student that you are of these matters, and having been examining this rate structure for some time, would you not say that boots and shoes are paying more than their fully distributed costs?
- A. How would I know? The rate may be high, but the costs may also be high. Until I know something about the costs, I could not say.
- Q. Do we not have to simply look at the basic philosophy behind this freight rate structure?


  There is no doubt that differential pricing is practised by the Canadian Railways in the Canadian freight rate structure?
- A. I do not think there is any doubt about that.
- Q. And is not a part of that, as some
  economists call it, discrimination in the Camadian freight
  rate structure? It is the same thing?
- A. Differential charging and discrimination

  -- I do not know if you are taking them as an economist's
  term or as a lawyer's term.
- Q. Now, I am foolish enough to be trying to use the term of the economists, namely, that discrimination in the freight rate structure means differential pricing. For the purpose of my question, they mean the same thing.



A. Differential pricing?

- Q. Is not differential pricing practised so that the higher rated commodities will provide a margin over overall distributed costs, and so that some of the lowervalued commodities can move more freely? Is that not what the railways say is behind differential pricing?
- A. The railways may say that, but there is a lot of traffic with high rates that does not do that, because the costs are so high. Again, I have to come back to your Appendix A which you introduced when you were cross-examining Dr. Edwards. You will see the basic commodities such as coal and fertilizers and things like that that do no subsidizing of the burden, but so far as this particular situation is concerned, I do not know.
- Q. I am putting to you that I can see the relationship between sand and gravel, being a low-valued commodity, and a volume commodity -- I can see that the relationship between sand and gravel and boots and shoes or drugs and chemicals, or some of those other high-valued commodities, has a relationship to cross subsidies or intra-subsidization -- is not that so?
- A. It all depends on the relationship of the revenues to the cost, and I cannot tell at all offhand until I know what the relative costs are and what the relative revenues are.
  - Q. So you say you do not know whether boots



and shoes today are being carried over the same representative distances, say, from Eastern Canada to Regina or Saskatoon -- you do not know whether they are moving at fully distributed costs, less than rull costs, or several multiples of full costs; you just do not know?

- A. I know that if boots and shoes were subsidizing the sand and gravel you are talking about, then a lot of boots and shoes would be going by truck and they would not be on the railway at all -- that is, if they were carrying not only their own costs but those of the sand and gravel as well.
- Q. Very well, so much for boots and shoes. Would you venture an opinion? Without the benefit of a study which would show the relationship of revenue to cost of sand and gravel, would you say that sand and gravel was moving at fully distributed costs?
- A. No, I would not say it was moving at fully distributed cost.
- Q. Would you say it was moving at something over out-of-pocket cost?
- A. No, I would not say it was moving at less than out-of-pocket cost. It does in the United States, but I do not know about Canada.
- Q. I am talking about Canada. Would you say that sand and gravel is -- well, I have put the question to you, and you do not say that sand and gravel is moving at less than out-of-pocket costs in Canada.



A. I do not say that; I do not know, but

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
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I know that in the United States sand and gravel moves at less than out-of-pocket cost. Q. But have we not got to assume that it

- is not moving at less than out-of-pocket cost, otherwise it could be made the subject of an investigation under Section 334?
- A. Yes, if it was a competitive rate it could be under Section 334, but as far as I know you cannot complain about a class rate being less than out-of-pocket cost.
- Q. That is not my understanding. I put it to you, Mr. Hughes, that if I had reason to believe that sand and gravel, or anything else, was moving today at less than out-of-pocket cost, plus something -- and that word "something" is an important word -- then it is not a compensatory rate, and I can move to have it disallowed?
- A. You may be right. I am not a lawyer, and I do not know.
- Q. It is not so much a matter of being a lawyer, but it is a matter of knowing what the Board's rulings, and what the Act, say about rates which are not compensatory.
- I thought you were talking about competitive rates.
- Q. No, any rate at all that is suspected of moving traffic at less than out-of-pocket cost. I put it to you that it can be the subject of a complaint,



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and if that were established by the Board the Board would then disallow it.

- Can you tell me which section that is in, because I do not know it?
- I will just refer you to your very well-Q. informed counsel, and I think he will bear me out. Whether it is there word for word in the statute, or whether it has been drawn up as a result of the jurisprudence of the Board, I am not prepared to say. However, passing from that, from your understanding of the Railway Act and the Board's directions, you do not know whether sand and gravel is moving at out-of-pocket cost plus something more?
  - A. That is right, I do not know.


THE CHAIRMAN: We will adjourn now until two o'clock, and we will resume in the courtroom of the Board of Transport Commissioners.

MR. FRAWLEY: Not that it matters very much, sir, but it would certainly accommodate me if you would allow me something like five minutes more.

THE CHAIRMAN: Very well.

MR. FRAWLEY: If I find that I have asked something that is going to produce a long answer, then I will cry "Kamarad", and we will adjourn.

Q. What would you do, Mr. Hughes, in the next scheme you are proposing -- the cost of service scheme -- what would you do with this cross-subsidization, if there be one as between sand and gravel and boots and shoes?



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
30 wanted to?

- A. I did not say there was any cross-subsidization.
- Q. Perhaps you did not, but what would be the controlling cost factors for sand and gravel?
- A. Out-of-pocket costs would form the minimum rate, and over that, if it was competitive traffic, the railways could put the rate where they wanted.
  - Q. And if it was not competitive traffic?
- A. Well, subject to the maximum, which is fully distributed cost -- between these two the railways could put the rate wherever they wanted.
- Q. The bottom would be the out-of-pocket cost and the top would be the fully distributed cost, on sand and gravel?
  - A. Yes, if it was captive traffic.
- Q. Let us assume, then, that it is.

  I do not know whether I have selected a good one, or

  not. Let us assume that sand and gravel is a captive

  traffic.
- A. Yes. I assume it is captive traffic, and the maximum is the fully distributed cost.
- Q. And if it were not captive traffic, the maximum rate would be what?
  - A. There would be no maximum rate.
  - Q. There would be no maximum rate?
  - A. Yes.
  - Q. The railways could charge whatever they



- A. Yes, and the competition is the ceiling.
- Now, what would be the cost factors entering into the pricing of the boots and shoes?
- The cost factors entering there would be the out-of-pocket costs, and the pricing factor would be whatever the traffic could bear.

MR. FRAWLEY: Mr. Chairman, I will accept your invitation to adjourn.

Luncheon adjournment.



Frawley?

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THE CHAIRMAN: Order, please, Mr.

--- On resuming at 2.00 p.m. in the Court Room, Board


THE CHAIRMAN: Order, please. Mr.

## CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. FRAWLEY (Cont'd):

of Transport Commissioners Office.

- Q. Mr. Hughes, at page 68 of your report you are quoting some remarks of Mr. Cronkite, counsel for the Government of Saskatchewan, in the second Turgeon Commission.
  - A. What page again?
- Q. Page 63 of your Part 1, and I was
  just wondering whether you were reading those remarks
  as being opposed to the proposition that I had put on
  behalf of Alberta to the second Turgeon Commission with
  respect to the desirability of having the one and onethird rule apply to agreed charges?
- A. Is the question: Are not these remarks opposed to the one and one-third rule?
- Q. Yes. I was asking whether you were quoting Mr. Cronkite to indicate that he was opposing my proposition to the Royal Commission?
- A. Well, do you mind if I just have a look at it?
  - Q. Yes.
- A. I haven't got very far down it, Mr. Frawley, but I think it is quite plain that what he says --

"That the application of the one and one-third rule to agreed charges would



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adversely affect British Columbia without any compensating advantage to Alberta."


And from that and from the other remarks I assume that what he had in mind was that he was opposed to the extension of the one and one-third rule to agreed charges.

Q. Yes. I am sure you certainly want the record straight, and you will find, if you look at the report of the Royal Commission on Agreed Charges, the matter was gone into very fully, starting at the bottom of page 42, extending all through page 43 and page 44. I certainly don't want to read it all, but the Commissioner, after citing some, at least, of what you have quoted on page 63 of your brief, went on to say at page 42:

"I asked counsel for Saskatchewan
to prepare a draft amendment incorporating
the views of Saskatchewan and a proposal
for a new subsection 10a to follow the
present subsection 10 of section 32 of
the Transport Act was submitted . . ."

And then follows Dean Cronkite's proposed draft amendment. Then the Commissioner goes on at page 43 to refer to what I said, and without reading all of that and turning to page 44, I will just read what the Commissioner said, about quarter of the way down page 44:

"The Commissioner: I understand



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you now, Mr. Frawley. You say that what Dean Cronkite expressed is what you always intended.

"Mr. Frawley: That is right, my lord. That is his subsections

(a) and (b) of 10a."

I am only quoting that because I want to put people in the right camp, and the fact is, and I am putting it to you, that counsel for Saskatchewan supported, counsel for Alberta agreed, on the nature of the amendment which we would like to have to the Transport Act which would have made agreed charges subject to the one and one-third rule. I am sure you don't mind that I should put the record right in that regard.


Now, Mr. Hughes, I would like to show you a couple of rate statements. Here is a statement comparing representative agreed charge freight rates from eastern Canada to Vancouver, British Columbia, and to Lethbridge, Alberta, on the same commodities as of January, 1960, and I would like to have that as the next exhibit, whatever that number is.

MR. CUMMING: I think it will be 146, Mr. Chairman.

---EXHIBIT NO. 146:

Statement comparing representative agreed charge freight rates from eastern Canada to Vancouver, British Columbia, and to Lethbridge, Alberta.

MR. SINCLAIR: Is it my friend's position that all of this traffic does, in fact, move to



has recently changed ownership.

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Lethbridge, Alberta? -- bottle caps, for instance?

MR. FRAWLEY: I am told there is a brewery;

it has been there for many, many years, although it

Q. Now, I would like to show you a further rate statement, which is entitled "Statement comparing representative agreed charge freight rates from eastern Canada to Vancouver, British Columbia, with rates to Winnipeg, Manitoba, on the same commodities", and that would be Exhibit 147.

--- EXHIBIT NO. 147:

Statement comparing representative agreed charge freight rates from eastern Canada to Vancouver, B.C., with rates to Winnipeg, Manitoba, on the same commodities.

MR. FRAWLEY: Q. Now, Mr. Hughes, those statements, I may say, are statements which go along with Exhibits 81 and 89. Exhibit 81 is a statement of the same kind, comparing the agreed charges to Vancouver with the rates to Calgary and Edmonton on the same commodities as of December 29th, 1959.

That is Exhibit 81. Exhibit 89 is a similar statement which compares agreed charges to Vancouver with the rates to Regina, Saskatchewan, and now with Exhibits 81, 89, 146 and 147 the Commission has a series of statements which compares the agreed charges to Vancouver with rates to the intermediate points.

A. May I ask a question, Mr. Frawley?



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
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You say it is representative agreed charges, and I wonder what the total number of agreed charges was and just how representative they are.

Q. By way of answering your question -- I don't really know. That might be an interesting analysis to take off. I could file -- and that is not a threat, that is just a promise -- I have a statement which runs to forty pages covering every agreed charge, and I was told this morning on reliable authority that the last filed number is now something over 1,000, and it would be interesting to know the number of transcontinental agreed charges in that 1,000. is not a difficult thing to do. I think I might ask my office in Edmonton to make up such a statement, just to be informative about it.

What I would like to see is the statement which indicates the growth of the number of agreed charges that have gone into the transcontinental tariffs since the railways found the anomaly in the legislation which permitted them to free agreed charges from this rule which was some approach to the United States situation, namely, parity of rates, where the coast rate is controlling and cannot be exceeded at any intermediate points, and the Commission knows that that means that the rate at Spokane cannot be more than the rate at Seattle, and so on.

Now, what I want to say about those exhibits, though, you being the ardent advocate that you are against not only the reintroduction of the one and



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
one-third rule so that it would apply to agreed charges but even concerned with the application of the rule to the transcontinental open published rates, how would you say, then, looking at these exhibits that I have shown you today, 146, that there is nothing extraordinary in charging a rate to Lethbridge on boards and sheets from Port Union, Ontario, which is 139 per cent of the rate to Vancouver, and that there is nothing wrong about charging Lethbridge a rate on canned goods from eastern Canada which runs out at 111.1 per cent of the rate to Vancouver?

THE CHAIRMAN: We understand you claim it is an inequity.

MR. FRAWLEY: I certainly claim this is a vicious discrimination against the whole intermediate territory extending from the Rocky Mountains back to the lakehead, by reason of the geography and economy falling most heavily on the province of Alberta and falling on Saskatchewan as well.

- But coming to a question, Mr. Hughes -and I am not deliberately wishing to open up a long statement, but let's have it if you must -- you find nothing wrong with the situation disclosed in Exhibit 146?
  - You mean I don't think it is iniquitous? Α.
- Nothing morally wrong about it, nothing wrong in the sense of violating the Criminal Code, just that it is a discrimination?

MR. SINCLAIR: The words don't mean the



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same thing, with all due respect.

THE WITNESS: It is differential pricing, as I mentioned this morning, but it is not an inequity.

(Page 13764 follows)



Q.

I see, it is just differential pricing.

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A. Yes, and the proper method to do something about this, it would seem to me, for you to accept a cost of service principle.


Q. I want to ask you something about that.

Now, the same thing goes for Exhibit 147, which seems to me to be just an extraordinary situation with the Canadian freight rate structure, having in mind the distance between Winnipeg and Vancouver and having in mind that the origins are all origins in Ontario and Quebec, I put it to you again, looking at all of them, when you find that cast iron pipe for pressurized water systems, the last item on the Winnipeg statement 147, moving from Toronto and Trois Rivieres will go to Vancouver for 1.10 and 1.18 under agreed charge No. 57; whereas Winnipeg -- not taking now Edmonton or Calgary, but Winnipeg -- will pay 169 or 153 per cent of the rate to Vancouver.

MR. BRAZIER: I think, Mr. Frawley, you should point out too there is a very considerable difference in the minimum weights. For this one it is 80,000 lbs., the one to Vancouver; whereas the one to Winnipeg is only a 36,000 minimum car.

MR. FRAWLEY: Mr. Chairman, my friend,
Mr. Brazier, has mentioned the minimum charge now for
the second time today as if that itself was a justification.

I certainly have no authority to speak for the Winnipeg receiver, but I feel certain that if the



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Winnipeg receiver was offered a rate of 1.10, he would say: "Give it to me in the same minimum weights.

We accept the same minimum car weights as you are giving to the man in Vancouver who gets it for \$1.10."

That has always been the answer that we have in Alberta.


We say we will accept the same minimum, as we must. As a matter of fact, that was the point that was discussed by Chief Justice Turgeon in the agreed charge case, and we made it very clear.

But, of course, if we won't be content with the same minimum and if the minimum is 100,000 lbs. on cast iron pipe to obtain the rate of \$1.10 as against our rate in Edmonton on the same cast iron pipe, on our rate of 2.54 to Edmonton and \$1.10 to Vancouver: I have not come to sum up the case for British Columbia but it is always expounding this exhibit and this exhibit I have just quoted from, the 2.54 on this cast iron pipe to Alberta points against \$1.10 to Vancouver, it is already in operation.—
Exhibit 81 filed some time ago.

What we say to you is that it is a rank discrimination against Alberta, and if we are getting a more favourable minimum loading, minimum weight, then of course we will sacrifice that and we will accept the larger loading.

All right, so much for the situation in Winnipeg and in Lethbridge.

MR. BRAZIER: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Frawley is making quite a long statement about this, and I



MR. FRAWLEY: No, no, I am not skilful in that at all.


would like to point out, since there has been no formal witness proving these particular exhibits, and taking the one back to Exhibit 147, cast iron pipe: I would point out to the Commission that on the shipment to Vancouver at the \$1.18 rate, the railway receives \$944 in revenue on that shipment, whereas to Winnipeg on the 36,000 they receive\$544 in revenue.

MR. FRAWLEY: My friend is saying exactly what he said four minutes ago, that that is because of the minimum weight, but you apply 80,000 minimum on Winnipeg on a Winnipeg shipment and you are charging now 169, and how much are you getting?

MR. SINCLAIR: Of course, Mr. Chairman, this has been argued. There was a special Royal Commission on it. With great respect to my friend, Mr. Frawley, I think it may well be that he will wish to argue this at some other time, but there are a number of other reasons for these matters that have been stated before and can be stated again. I suggest that this is not the time to do it, because we do not accept Mr. Frawley's statement as the fact.

It was noticeable, sir, that, as counsel sometimes has to do -- and I know Mr. Frawley has great skill in that regard -- he turned his back on your question, bowed to you and kept on going. He has not answered you.

THE CHAIRMAN: Anyway you claim this is one



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do it?

of the inequities that we have to inquire into.

MR. FRAWLEY: Which under your terms of reference you are bound to inquire into and report to the Governor General-in-Council. There is not any question about that at all.

MR. SINCLAIR: With great respect, Mr. Chairman, in answer to your question, he said it was a discrimination, and not an inequity.

MR. FRAWLEY: Well, I called it long and short-haul discrimination.

MR. SINCLAIR: It is not an inequity.

MR. FRAWLEY: We certainly will have a course in semantics. That is a separate endeavour to straighten out the language. It is discrimination, it is inequity, it is wrong. Now, what does it matter about the adjectives or the words?

MR. SINCLAIR: It just happens that counsel tells this Commission what it is to inquire into.

MR. FRAWLEY: They are to inquire into inequities. It is the most obvious inequity in the world to charge Alberta 2.54 on a shipment of cast iron pipe and Vancouver \$1.10.

MR. SINCLAIR: Then, of course, it would be up to Vancouver to call such evidence as is necessary to prove it.

MR. FRAWLEY: Are you sort of urging me to

MR. SINCLAIR: I certainly am. You have



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involved.

tried before and have not succeeded, and I suggest the same thing will happen.

MR. FRAWLEY: Do you think I am going to run away from calling evidence? Just bide your time to September and we will see about it.

MR. SINCLAIR: Then we look forward to it.

MR. FRAWLEY: Q. Mr. Hughes, that brings me to the end of my cross-examination, because I wanted to take you and you have already taken me there, to page 64, and we will use these exhibits as examples of what you are talking about. On page 64:

"In conclusion, it is submitted that

"Section 337 of the Railway Act be repealed

"in entirety and thereafter railway rates

"to intermediate territory follow the 'cost

"of service' principle expounded else
"where in this brief."

"Elsewhere" meaning in the yellow book, Part 2.

A. Yes.

Q. Now, I want to see how much benefaction there is in this, Mr. Hughes, and would you just tell me then, looking at my Exhibits 81, 89, 146 and 147 -- you only have 147 and 146 there. I will show you my copy of Exhibit 81, which is the comparison affecting Calgary and Edmonton, but they are all of the same piece. I don't suppose you are interested in the particular examples.

THE CHAIRMAN: The same principle is



MR. FRAWLEY: Yes, the same principle.

- Q. Now, will you tell me what we are to look forward to in so far as your scheme is concerned? I am quite serious about that, Mr. Hughes, and I really would like to know what you would have by way of hope to us in that regard.
- A. If the costs were less to intermediate territory than to Vancouver, then there is a very good chance that the rates to intermediate territory would be reduced. If you can prove that this is captive traffic, if you go along to the Board and this is captive, and you say you have no competition, and if you go to the Board, well, the rates would be reduced to fully allocated costs.
- Q. First of all, on the question of costs, there would not be any doubt about it at all, if you have two cars in a train with cast iron pipe, one destined to Vancouver and the other car next to it destined to Calgary, and when the train arrived at Calgary one car is dropped off and it then took the other car to Vancouver: there is not any question that it costs more to deliver the car to Vancouver than it did to deliver the car to Calgary, that more or less necessarily follows.
  - A. That follows, yes.
- Q. Now, that being so, you say that we should not have to pay as much as Vancouver on that basis?
  - A. No, probably you would find that our



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
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rates were higher than yours on the cost of service basis. You don't know until we look at the costs.

- I see. Does it depend now on the kind of rate, where we find it in the tariffs, whether or not we would have our car at Calgary dropped off at a lesser rate than the car that went on to Vancouver?
- A. Well, it would really depend on the type of traffic it was. It would depend on the costs. That would be all. It would depend on the route it followed and it would seem to me, if that were the case, you would have lower costs than taking the same car to Vancouver.
  - You would have lower costs.
- If you had lower costs, taking the cars on to Vancouver, then you would get a lower rate if it was captive traffic.
- Wait, you have two thoughts in there. If the cost of moving the car, just the out-of-pocket costs with a share of the overhead distributed properly.
  - Yes.
- Q. According to some formula, in every case of the kind I was citing to you that goes moving from the same origin, passing over the same line, one destined to Vancouver and one destined to Calgary, you would have a lower cost for the car that was dropped off at Calgary in each and every case, wouldn't you?
- I should imagine so, but I am not a railway cost expert.



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- Q. Well, you have got 700 miles. A. It seems sensible.
- Q. That has to be paid for.
- It seems common sense to me it would be less cost.
- Q. Just assume for the sake of my next question, there is a less cost. Now, if it were the ordinary class rate, let us say, in each case, then you would expect that our rate would be lower on a cost basis than the Vancouver rate.

## A. Yes.

MR. BRAZIER: I think that is the situation today, is it not, that class rates are certainly lower than the Vancouver class rates.

## MR. FRAWLEY: That is right.

- Q. Even today, as Mr. Brazier points out, the railways when the distance factor is allowed to apply, where the distance factor is allowed to apply, then Vancouver pays more than Calgary because the distance is more than 700 miles more.
- This applies to non-competitive rates. It also applies to competitive rates, but Vancouver rates are higher than they are to Calgary.
- I was going to work them class by class. Q. We have disposed of class rates. Would it be reasonable to expect that the rate to Calgary would be less than the rate to Vancouver and, as Mr. Brazier points out, that is the situation today.

Going to the commodity rates, to the special



commodity rates -- and there are some of them -- what would you expect to find with regard to that, with the cost again being less?

A. Let us take some specific instances

- A. Let us take some specific instances here. Manufacturing and miscellaneous in 1957 out of the waybill study, commodity non-competitive, and we are talking about the trans-continental traffic, Ontario to Alberta -- 48.20 per ton, Ontario to B.C. \$52.6.
  - Q. Those are the rates ---
  - A. These are the charges per ton.
- Q. Charges per ton. Wherever there are rates then, we can expect to pay less than Vancouver?
- A. Yes, and in these figures you get the bridge subsidy, don't forget, and we do not get it at all -- yes, we do get it on that. We both get the bridge subsidy on that, and the competitive we do not get the bridge subsidy.
- Q. That is the situation now with regard to the class rates and the non-competitive commodity rates that you have described.
  - A. Yes.
- Q. Now, with reference to the agreed charges, and assuming again that the car moves from the same origin, one car and the same train, two cars and the same train, and one is dropped off at Calgary and the other goes on to Vancouver, regardless of what the present rate is, you would expect that the cost of moving the car to Vancouver would be greater



than moving the car to Calgary.

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A.	I	should	imagine	so.
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- Q. What would be the effect if your principle were adopted, what would be the effect of that rate-wise?
- A. It depends on the nature of the traffic. Is it going to be captive traffic? What are you specifying?
- Q. Well, if we have that admitted difference in cost, and just let us assume there is an appreciable difference in cost, in fact I put it to you the whole cost of moving the car 645 miles from Calgary to Vancouver -- but assume it is an appreciable difference in cost in favour of Calgary: under what circumstances would that fail to react to Calgary's benefit under your system?
- A. If it was captive traffic you would get a lower rate than we would.
  - Q. Yes, and if it was not captive traffic?
- Then the out-of-pocket costs would be the minimum and there would be no maximum.



- Q. That would be sort of unregulated?

  The railway would be permitted, notwithstanding the difference in the cost, to charge Calgary more than Vancouver?
- A. Well, the situation is no different now.


  You are talking about agreed charges. There is a

  classification rate which is much higher.
- Q. I quite agree with what you say about what the situation is today, but I was rather hopeful when I read this paragraph of yours. Are you now telling me that, notwithstanding what you said there, I can't take much comfort out of that paragraph in so far as agreed charges are concerned? ---

MR. BRAZIER: I am somewhat confused myself, and possibly the witness is, too, as to whether Mr. Frawley is now putting to him a case where there is an agreed charge to Vancouver as against a commodity rate to Calgary; or is he putting a case where there are agreed charges in both cases?

MR. FRAWLEY: ". I will put both to him.

- Q. If you have an agreed charge to Vancouver and a special commodity rate to Calgary -- in some instances, perhaps, one double the other . . .
- A. A non-competitive commedity rate into Calgary?
  - Q. Yes.
- A. Well, then, the ceiling is for the fully distributed cost; there is no ceiling on the agreed charge to Vancouver.



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Q. No ceiling?

If it is competitive there is no ceiling COMMISSIONER MANN: Are you, Mr. Hughes, automatically equating non-competitive rates with captive traffic?

THE WITNESS: Yes. If it is non-competitive there is no competition and it wouldn't go into the competitive class; but it needn't necessarily follow.

COMMISSIONER MANN: You are, then, saying that wherever I find a class rate or a non-competitive commodity rate in the tariff today the designation by rate determines whether or not the traffic is competitive? You have no other criteria?


THE WITNESS: Initially, we did that for administrative convenience. I don't think you would be too far out.

COMMISSIONER MANN: And you do the weeding out after?

THE WITNESS: Yes; there are some classes of rates, no doubt, that are competitive, but I think most of these are in the LCL classes and not touching the carload. But I can't imagine many carload rates. in the classification which are actually moving traffic.

MR. FRAWLEY: Q. Perhaps we can have an example. I am trying to have regard to Mr. Brazier's remark which is probably -- I shouldn't say "probably" -- which is a sensible one, that we should compare like to like as much as we can.

Take the case of canned goods. Now, we have



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
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an agreed charge to Vancouver, an agreed charge to Calgary and Edmonton and an agreed charge to Lethbridge; that is one agreed charge taking in a lot of territory. You have the railways hauling canned goods to Vancouver, and I am reading from page 3 of your statement, Exhibit 81. You have the railways hauling canned goods from the eastern rate groups to Vancouver for \$1.80, with a 60,000-pound minimum -- so there would be no objection on that score -- and you have the railways hauling canned goods from the same origins to Calgary for \$2.30, and to Edmonton for \$2.41, with the same 60,000-pound minimum.

That is, perhaps, as good an example as you They are both agreed charges, and both you and I have agreed that, having in mind the very reasonable supposition that those cars -- some for Vancouver and some for Calgary and some for Edmonton -- would leave the eastern origin in the same train, and a car is dropped off at Calgary and it is charged \$2.30, and the car ahead of it goes on to Vancouver and is charged \$1.80; and let us assume that there are additional costs, both variable and constant.

Now, then, how would that work out in the rate scheme you are putting forward to the Board? They are both agreed charges.

A. Well, of course, there is competition; there is water competition in Vancouver, presumably; there is competition in Calgary, Lethbridge and Edmonton -- maybe truck competition. .



- Q. I think if you explored it you would find that it is not water competition in Vancouver. They tell me it is American railway competition.
  - A. For canned goods?

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- Q. Yes, for canned goods; but, anyway, whatever it is -- that is, perhaps, not important -- whatever it is . . . ?
- A. The point is that probably nothing would happen at all, because the competition is setting the agreed charges, or the agreed charges wouldn't be there; so I can't see anything happen to the rate.
- Q. That is why I am anxious, because that is just as good an example as any. So this proposition you have been putting up to the Commission for a couple of days would leave the situation which you have now as it is -- canned goods to Vancouver, \$1.80; \$2.30 to Calgary and \$2.41 to Edmonton. You would leave it just like that?
- A. Well, I wouldn't do it. It would depend on the railways -- what they would do; as long as the rates were above out-of-pocket costs; but I can't see the rates would go any higher than they are now. The sky is not the limit; it is the competition that is the limit.
- Q. There is no question of letting cost of service do something else to reduce the rates to Edmonton and Calgary and reflect the fact that the car has moved a further 760 miles, as is the case in the Canadian National, and 641 miles in the case of



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Canadian Pacific? There is nothing in your scheme which would permit the cost of service principle to operate so as to reduce the lower costed traffic, namely, the traffic to Edmonton and Calgary?

A. Yes; with a cost of service scheme it would. I think the railways will be losing all that unremunerative traffic, branch line traffic, some way freight train traffic to trucks, and the overall cost position of the railways would benefit all rates.

COMMISSIONER MANN: You don't mean the cost of service principle would bring this about?

THE WITNESS: No.

COMMISSIONER MANN: You can get unremunerative services under your present system. This would depend on the introduction of the cost of service principle?

THE WITNESS: It isn't dependent on it.


THE CHAIRMAN: It is a matter of bargaining?

THE WITNESS: Yes, I think so.

MR. FRAWLEY: Q.So it has to come about as a metter of bargaining. I am simply putting it to you that it costs less to move a car of canned goods from Essex County to Calgary than it does to move it from Essex County to Vancouver. I think that is a fair assumption, isn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. All right. What I am putting to you is that it is an inequity that Calgary should have to pay \$2.30 for a car of canned goods and Vancouver \$1.80.



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Just indulge me for the moment. I am saying it is an inequity. Whether it is or not I am anxious to know whether anything that you have worked out -and you have spent a great deal of time on this -that is apparent -- whether you think there is anything, if the intermediate territories adopted and supported your proposal -- is there anything which you have worked out which would give relief from the kind of situation we find in connection with canned goods?

- So far as agreed charges are concerned, There may be other traffic that will get relief because maybe the rate will come down to the fully allocated cost; and these are probably above fully allocated cost.
- Q. You think that if the rate of \$2.30 is above fully allocated cost then it has to come down to fully allocated cost?
  - If it is a non-competitive rate, yes.
  - But it is an agreed charge now?
- Well, the competitive situation is limited, as it is right here in the expenses you have given me.
- Q. Perhaps I am not understanding you. We now pay \$2.30, and if it is more -- I don't know if it is or not, again, not having a burden study -- but if it is more than fully allocated cost then would that rate come down under your proposal te fully allocated cost?
  - A. It all depends on the level of the



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
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competition. It doesn't automatically come down.

It depends on what the railways want to do in the light of the competitive situation.

- Q. It depends on what the railways want to
  - A. Yes.
- Q. Well, then, of course, I suggest that the railways will not want to bring the rate down by so much as a fraction of a cent.
- A. I would not agree with you, because a high rate doesn't necessarily bring in the most revenue. They might find that a lower rate brings in more revenue.
- Q. Apart from these economic theories, you say that because it is an agreed charge then the ceiling of the fully allocated cost does not apply?
  - A. That is right.
- Q. If it were something other than an agreed charge -- and there are many of them here -- many, many, many of them -- then you say these rates of ours to intermediate territories -- that if you set the rate to the cost of the agreed charge they would then come down to fully distributed cost?
- A. If it is competitive traffic and you went along to the Board and proved that there was reasonable competition.
- Q. Again you have introduced a third element, that it must be established that there is reasonable competition existing?



- A. Yes.
  - Q. And unless it were not then it wouldn't be considered as competitive traffic and again your full allocated cost wouldn't be applied?
  - A. Yes; the same as it is now with these charges that we have. It is the competition that is setting the limit.
    - Q. I am glad to know the extent of your scheme in sc far as our problems are concerned.

Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. McDonald?

MR. BRAZIER: If I might be excused by Mr. McDonald, Mr. Chairman, there is one short statement that Mr. Hughes has prepared. It is on a question that has been raised once or twice, as to where the railway is to get necessary revenue if they are moving at fully distributed cost.

THE CHAIRMAN: We are very interested in that.

MR. BRAZIER: I thought that before railway counsel started their cross-examination it would be as well to have him read in this statement which he has prepared.

It is not an easy question to answer, and

Mr. Hughes has prepared a brief statement, and, with

everybody's permission, we will read it into the record

now.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, read it now.

THE WITNESS: Paragraph 111 of Part 2 of the B. C. submission reads as follows:



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"It is suggested that maximum schedules be drawn up for captive traffic." Paragraph 114 reads:

> "In order that there be some relation to costs in the schedules, it is suggested that the maximum rate schedules be the fully distributed costs as far as could be ascertained."

This proposal immediately begs a question. If railways are to carry captive traffic at no more than fully distributed cost how are they to remain solvent?

The question is provoked largely by the construed nature of "fully distributed costs." These costs are no more than a statistical allocation of constant expenses among the units of traffie handled; they cannot be "fully distributed" except on a purely arbitrary basis, whether it be by ton miles, tons, passengers, or the proportion of variable costs of the traffic to the total variable costs. This being so, it is obvious that several different "fully distributed" costs can be given for any particular traffic.

"Fully distributed" costs are out-of pocket costs plus a prorated share of constant costs. Constant costs can be viewed as a block of expenses which remain the same irrespective of the traffic being handled.

The problem is that this block of constant expenses must be recovered from all traffic. If traffic covers something more than its out-of-pocket

costs then some contribution expenses is made. It is the total contribution that is important rather than the contribution per unit. For example, if 200 tons moved at a rate of \$4 per ton above out-of-pocket costs the contribution to this block of constant expenses would be \$800. The rate of \$4 may be below or above the level of "fully distributed" costs.

A lower rate of \$3 may move 300 tons and contribute \$900 to constant expenses. Now, the rate of \$3 may even be below "fully distributed" costs.

So, if there is a block of constant expenses to be met by all traffic the rate below"fully distributed" costs will contribute more revenue to constant expenses than the rate above "fully distributed" costs.

(Page 13787 follows)



This is not merely theoretical. The Interstate


Commerce Commission study shows the situation well,
in the absence of Canadian studies. The Interstate

Commerce Commission statement 2-59 "Distribution of
the rail revenue contribution by commodity groups,
1957", page 1, shows the principal contributors to
constant costs in various territories. Some of these
commodities were primary commodities: lumber,
fertilizers, wheat, coal. The biggest contributor
by far was coal, and yet the commodity did not cover
its fully distributed costs.

The British Columbia proposal would put
maximum rates for captive traffic at fully distributed
costs, however calculated. If any of these commodities
are now being carried at a lower level than this,
there is no reason to think that the actual rates
would go up as the railways may suffer a loss in
net revenue. Should any captive traffic be now
carried at above this level, the rates would be
reduced.

All rates, of course, cannot be below fully distributed costs and the question arises of how can the railways live and make a profit if primary commodities and other captive traffic is carried at this level.

In the British Columbia scheme any difference between total revenue and total cost will have to be borne by the competitive traffic. Some competitive traffic will take rates at above fully distributed costs. This is essentially the present situation as



can be seen by the Interstate Commerce Commission study.

In this traffic which is normally competitive, the traffic contributed revenues above fully distributed costs in the following proportions:

Item 523, crude rubber, 177 per cent is the ratio of revenue to fully distributed cost.

Item 525, rubber goods, N.O.S., 153 per cent.

Item 595, machinery and machines, 210 per
cent fully allocated cost.

Item 597, machinery parts, 208 per cent.

Item 607, 195 per cent.

Item 615, 188 per cent.


Item 617, 177 per cent.

There are many other similar items all in the manufacturing miscellaneous group which is the most competitive group of all.

Because an article is in competition, therefore, it does not mean that rates are below fully distributed costs. The reason for the high rates is that the competitors' rates are even higher.

The upper limit for rates set at fully allocated costs is not necessarily a burden on the railways in view of their proven ability to charge higher than fully distributed costs on competitive traffic.

However, should the railways prove that their revenues are not sufficient to cover their total expenses, then British Columbia is not inflexible in the maximum rate position. The province would be





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willing to have a maximum rate above fully distributed costs providing that such rates reflected railway costs.

## CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. McDONALD:

Q. Mr. Hughes, I refer first to Part 1 of your submission, page 16, at the bottom of the first column where the following statement appears:

"The most important products shipped by
"rail are lumber, accounting for merely 46 per
"cent of total shipments . . . "

Now, for the assistance of the Commission, can you give us the value of lumber shipped from British Columbia in each of the years 1952 to 1959 inclusive to the following places ---

MR. BRAZIER: You mean right now?

MR. McDONALD: Well, he can do it later.

- Q. --- (a) Western provinces -- and when
  I say "western provinces", I mean Alberta, Saskatchewan
  and Manitoba. (b) Ontario and Eastern Canada.
- (c) The United States. (d) The United Kingdom.
- I don't expect you to give it right now.
  - A. The value -- what kind of value?
  - Q. In dollars.

MR. BRAZIER: The price of lumber goes up and down so violently these days.

MR. McDONALD: Well, I think it will give what we want, and you can reduce it to constant dollars if you wish. What I want to see is the trend of where the



lumber is going. You speak in here about the
United Kingdom market being reduced, and so on, and
yet your production of lumber has increased. I want
to see where it has been going -- what the shift has
been.

THE CHAIRMAN: What the movement is.

MR. McDONALD: What the movement is.

COMMISSIONER GOBEIL: And to other countries.

MR. McDONALD: Q. Are those the principal places to which your lumber goes from British Columbia?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you get me that information?

A. I think I can.


MR. BRAZIER: May I be of some assistance,
Mr. McDonald. The British Columbia Manufacturers
Association, in their annual report each year, does
give a wealth of statistics on production and shipments
of lumber in British Columbia, and they are all in
million board feet. It would be a considerable task,
I think, to convert those into dollars, and I think
probably the board feet mean more, actually, than the
dollars do.

MR. McDONALD: Quantity rather than the value -- yes, that is all right, as long as we use the same yardstick all the way through. It won't be too difficult to get that?

MR. BRAZIER: No, we will get that for you.

MR. McDONALD: Thank you.

Q. On page 18, the statement is made:





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"... this cost has been dispropertionate and constitutes an undue burden as a result of freight rate increases."

You are speaking about the cost of freight and the increases: do you know of any instance where any shipper has been hurt in British Columbia by the present level of freight rates?

instance of where anybody is hurt. You have to more or less go and find a man who has gone out of business. But, I do know that the coastal people no longer sell any dimensional lumber in Central Canada, and the reason -- and the traffic manager of MacMillan-Bloedell told me -- that it was the percentage increase that had taken them right out of the market and they could not get into it.

- Q. "The coastal people --would that be from Vancouver?
  - A. Vancouver and the island, and the coast.
  - Q. To Central Ontario, and so on?
- A. Yes, this is a market that they used to get into and they no longer do.
- Q. Did that lumber from Vancouver, coastal lumber, to Central Ontario take all the percentage increases?
  - A. Not the lumber to Ontario, no.
- Q. Because you are aware of the fact that shipments of lumber from Vancouver and that district to Ontario is based on the rates from Seattle,



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Yes.

- And they have only taken the ex parte increases in the United States which have amounted, since 1951, to 19 per cent?
  - A. 119 per cent?
  - Well, 19 per cent. Q.
  - 19 per cent increase. A.
  - Q. Yes, 19 per cent increase.
- I will have to look into that. I don't A. accept that.
  - Q. You can check that figure.
  - I will check it, yes.

MR. BRAZIER: Your proposition, Mr. McDonald, is that the ex parte increases in the United States have amounted to 19 per cent?

MR. McDONALD: Since 1951.

COMMISSIONER MANN: Is that the increase on western to official territory, or is that the general United States increase?

MR. McDONALD: It reflects the increase over the former rate, I am told. That can be checked.

MR. BRAZIER: I think your adviser stated that it was the percentage increase in the rate since the rate was put on the Seattle basis. I think that proposition is right, but at one time it was not based on the Seattle rate, and finally it was, and it has had 19 per cent increase since that time.

MR. McDONALD: Yes, 1951 was the time of

it.



MR. SINCLAIR: The railways did what the lumber people asked them to do.

MR. McDONALD: Q. So, therefore, following that, as you stated about MacMillan-Bloedell and this lumber -- the difficulty of getting it into the Ontario market on account of the Canadian percentage increases, that is not correct, is it, if my advice is so, that they didn't get the Canadian percentage increases?

- A. He was speaking about the general revenue cases since the war. He was not talking about since 1951, and this was the reason he gave. It was not Mr. Campbell. It was another traffic manager, at the Vancouver Island plant who told me that.
- Q. Then, do you know whether the sales of any of the products enumerated in Table I to the Canadian market east of the Rockies have been increased since 1952?
  - A. Have any of these . . . ?
- Q. Have the sales of any of these products enumerated there to the Canadian market to points east of the Rockies been increased since 1952?
- A. I should think so in view of the great increase in population and gross national product which we have had in Canada, yes.
- Q. So, despite increases in freight rates, the sales to Canadian markets east of the Rockies have increased?



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- A. Because the general level of prices and gross national product have been going up, and population has been going up. If everything else had been static, I have no doubt increased freight rates would have cut things down. Of course, railways don't carry all the traffic into the prairies.
- Q. Then, on page 21, Table XII, that is the table that shows the approximate exports of sawn and planed softwoods from selected countries to the United Kingdom. Now, that shows a substantial loss in Canadian shipments; is that right?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. Are all those shipments referred to there related to British Columbia lumber?
  - A. No, this is Canadian.
- Q. Well, what proportion of that would be attributed to British Columbia?
- A. A large proportion, but I can't -I was looking around for British Columbia figures,
  and I couldn't get any, but I can assure you it is a
  large proportion of this.
- Q. Have you any figures taking the export of this type of lumber from Canada, and what proportion British Columbia lumber bears to the whole?
- A. It is very large. British Columbia, as you know, is the major exporter of lumber in Canada, almost entirely of certain types of lumber.
  - Q. Yes.
  - A. And I cannot tell you right now, but I



can assure you it is very large.

- Q. Would it be 90 per cent?
- I should think so; I think it is up in that region.
- Outside of mine props, and so on, shipped from America, I guess most of it would be from British Columbia?
  - A. Yes.
- --- A short recess.





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THE CHAIRMAN: Order, please. Mr. McDonald?

MR. McDONALD: Q. Then, Mr. Hughes, we were dealing with the question of the British Columbia exports as compared to the total Canadian exports of lumber. You stated that they were a large proportion of the total, and then the exports to the United Kingdom were, according to your statement, sharply reduced, but there was an increase in forestry production in British Columbia from 1954 to 1959. That is also shown in your statement?

A. Yes.

This is opening up the land; we get
more population and more people working and more
housing construction, and so on, in Canada, and naturally there will be increase in production.

- Q. Your statement shows there was an increase in production, there was a reduction in sales to the United Kingdom market which was substantial. But what market absorbed your loss of sales in the United Kingdom and your increased production?
- A. Mainly the United States. But, at the same time, if there is a drop in the market, as very often happens, there is a drop in production; the mills just keep the stuff and there is a drop in production, and this could have happened here.
- Q. Your statement shows there was an increase in production between 1954 and 1959 and, at the same time, there was a reduction in your sales to the United Kingdom. I want to know what market



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absorbed both the reduction in the United Kingdom sales and the increased production?

- Well, this would be mainly the United States.
  - Did the Canadian market take any of it?
- Yes, there is an increase in shipments to the Canadian markets.
  - Then on page 22 your statement is made: "The vagaries of export markets and prices make imperative access of British Columbia producers to markets at home. Only with assured Canadian consumption can producers hope to compete abroad."

I am not just clear what you mean by that statement. Would you elaborate on that?

The export markets are very -- they fluctuate a good deal, and with our new trading blocs coming in in Europe we are getting very worried about what is going to happen to Canadian lumber, and it is this kind of situation. I have a little cutting out of The Financial Post here, and I would like you to see what has happened in the lumber situation and what is likely to happen if the trading blocs come in. This is The Financial Post, May 21st, 1960, and it is talking about trading blocs.

THE CHAIRMAN: Who wrote that?

THE WITNESS: Paul S. Beacon, Financial



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"Our timber and some paper products are the items in our U.K. exports most affected by the new EFTA arrangements, with fish and agricultural products involved to a lesser extent."

"While agricultural and fisheries products are generally excluded from the EFTA tariff reduction program, many allied items of great interest to Canada are affected. Such producersas prepared soups, preserved and processed fish (including canned salmon and canned lobster), fishmeals and frozen fish fillets will be considered industrial."

"A great deal of what we sell overseas is in the form of standard products
-- raw materials that compete to a great
extent on price rather than special
qualities of design.

"Removal of a tariff preference, or an increase in external tariff of a trading bloc while internal tariffs are reduced quickly alters our ability to compete."

. . . . . . . .

"In addition, other sources of metals and other industrial materials have been



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developed in recent years, particularly in Africa. These will intensify our competitive problems."

And it goes on:

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"One example is aluminum."

This is the reason we are getting very worried.

We are going, evidently, to get timber affected out of seven, fish products and aluminum, and that is why we write things like this.

Q. That wasn't part of your statement I didn't just understand. You say:

"Only with assured Canadian consumption can producers hope to compete abroad."

What has the Canadian consumption got to do with your ability to compete abroad?

A. It has a great deal to do with it, because take the British market in canned salmon, and the Japanese will come in with a shipload and force our prices down until the producer is getting no profit, and if he can have the Canadian market to sell his excess, then he is in a much better position than if he has nothing at all. A man producing only for the export market, as a lot of producers do, are in a very bad way; they have to take a loss from Japan and Russia.

Q. One meaning I took from this as I read it is that you were expecting a little cross-subsidization here, that you would make enough money on your



products you sold to the Canadian market that you could cut your prices to compete in the foreign markets?

A. No, that isn't the point.

COMMISSIONER ANSCOMB: But that is the general point of industry, isn't it? You get your prime cost down to compete in the foreign market.

THE WITNESS: You are able to spread your costs out and keep it going without shutting it down completely.

COMMISSIONER GOBEIL: Is it not a fact that the Japanese plywood is as bad for you as your freight rate for the eastern market?

THE WITNESS: Yes, we are getting Japanese plywood in. I have seen Japanese plywood and wood coming into the docks. There is a great deal of competition coming from all over.

MR. McDONALD: Q. Then page 26, on the column on the left hand side, the second full paragraph from the bottom:

"... British Columbia shippers have to pay a high freight charge swollen out of proportion by unremunerative services offered elsewhere and by other factors."

What other factors do you mean, have in mind there?

A. The one and one-third rule is an example, and horizontal -- well, the distance from the market there is included, that type of thing.



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
in wages or fuel exp

- Q. That is what you mean by "other factors"?

  A. Yes.
- Q. Then on page 29 you have the statement that the Province of British Columbia has a great interest in the matter as the greater proportion of its traffic moves at rates which take the full general freight rate increase, and I just wanted to point that up again. I have already dealt with that. Lumber is one of your largest commodities, and they haven't taken the full Canadian freight rate increase?
- A. I agree with you, they haven't. In the eastern market they haven't. They have taken quite a lot in the prairies.
  - Q. On page 31 you state:
  - ". . . it is felt that rising railway expenses are not incurred in the west to the same extent as in the east."

Would you just explain that and what the basis of that statement is?

- A. This is because in the east you get more short-haul traffic than you do in the west, and in short-haul traffic you get a larger propertion of terminal expenses, which is very heavily in wages in the east, whereas in the west you get long-haul and good utilization and the wages as a proportion of the total cost is not so great.
- Q. You don't mean there is any difference in wages or fuel expenses?
  - A. No, I am not saying there is a differential



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in wages. It is just the utilization and type of hauls which takes more labour in the east than it does in the west.

- Q. On page 37 you are dealing with rail-lake-rail traffic, and I think you said earlier in Mr. Cooper's examination that you understood that this portion of the lake haul was performed by railwayowned vessels?
  - Α. That was my understanding, yes.
- We might clear that up. Canadian National has no vessels on the Great Lakes, so that doesn't apply to us.
- Α. Yes, but if the C.P. has -- well, that is all right.
- Q. As far as Canadian National is concerned, anyway, there are no railway-owned vessels.

Then are you aware of the fact that in fixing these rates, this reduction in the rate when it goes by rail-lake-rail, it is the steamship company which takes the reduction, not the railway company. The railway company is not losing any money, it is the steamship that is taking the reduction?

- A. I am not too sure of the situation ---
- Speaking from the Canadian National standpoint, when one of these rail-lake-rail rates is fixed and there is this differential, it is the steamship company that takes the lower charge for their portion of the haul?
  - Yes, I realize that.



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
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- Q. Then speaking of these freight rate increases and the effect on British Columbia, you are aware that there are hundreds of transcontinental rates put in to meet competition?
- I will take your word that there are Α. hundreds.
- Q. I didn't count them; I took a look at the I would say hundreds would be pretty safe. tariffs. For instance, the transcontinental rates in open tariffs -- I got this from the Canadian Freight Association --Tariff No. 1-N, CTC No. 1575, westbound, and for eastbound there is Canadian Freight Association Tariff No. 101-J. Those list those rates?
  - A. Yes.
- Then on agreed charges, I just had these taken off, and it may be of interest if you consider these. It is an easy matter to check them because they are all listed. Eastbound to central Canada and east from Manitoba, there are seven; from Saskatchewan, nine; from Alberta, seventeen; from British Columbia, the interior, three, and the coast, ten. Then westbound from central Canada and east you get 71 to Manitoba, 41 to Saskatchewan, 66 to Alberta, 22 to the interior of British Columbia, and 90 to the coast.
- What was the number for Manitoba again, please?
  - Seventy-one. Q. .
- You have the figures for Ontario and Quebec there as well?



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Q. No. I just took it off for Manitoba,
Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia, and so on.
You can check that up. Those are the figures given
by the Traffic Department?

A. Yes.

(Page 13808 follows)



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There are thousands of competitive Q. rates have been put in.

Yes.

Paragraph 29, at the bottom of page 9, Q. the last sentence, you state -- I might read the first part of that paragraph to get the full meaning of it. Paragraph 29:

"In view of the growth of competition, one "would expect that there would have been a "corresponding movement toward rate-making "based on costs in order that the full "potentialities of railway cost advantages "could be realized. However, this has not "been the case. Railway management seems "to have been somewhat complacent about "the competitive situation up to now in "view of increasing railway tonnage induced "by rising industrial production, population, "and gross national product in the last decade. "The fact that the railshare of tonnage has "declined is obscured in a growing economy, "and the relative loss of traffic has been "cushioned by absolute gains. Under such "circumstances, there has been no hurry "to change long-established traditional "thinking and practices."

Now, you are aware, no doubt, speaking over the period of the last ten years, that the railways have put in over 1,000 agreed charges to date, you know that.

Yes, just over 1,000.



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- Q. Incentive carload rates have been established.
  - Not very many of those.
- Q. And piggy-back has been introduced. growing considerably?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. Does not that indicate some progressive thinking on the part of railways, rather than being complacent?
- We still have not got any loadability incentive to load cars right up, or we haven't got very many of them. We haven't got anything ---
- Q. There are minimum weights and different rates, lower rates for higher minimum weights.
- A. I think paper products is one. I don't know of any others as far as I know. I know there are some, but not very many incentives for higher carloadings. I don't recall anybody suggesting multiple car rates, for example. There is another one ---
- Q. Well, do you know that you cannot quote multiple car rates under the present law, regulations?
  - I did not know that.
- The Board has ruled against that some years ago on the basis that that would be unfair to the small shipper. If a shipper had 50 carloads and got a lower rate, the one with one carload had to pay a lower rate.

COMMISSIONER MANN: Section 32 of the Transport Act forbids the making of multiple carload



rates on agreed charge traffic.



MR. McDONALD: On agreed charge only, but the Board had ruled on the matter some years ago in so far as multiple car rates were concerned.

Q. Paragraph 50 and 51 on page 15, this is where you deal with your cost-oriented rate-making and the use of marginal cost as a minimum rate. What I take from your proposal is that the floor for all the rates should be no lower than variable cost.

A. Yes.

Q. Well, as far as Canadian National is concerned, we would agree with you on that proposition, because we agree that no traffic should be carried at a rate less than variable cost; but where we disagree with you is on the publishing of these minimum rates. How important is that now?

A. Well, I said yesterday that if they are not published, then there may be a possibility that the railways will go below out-of-pocket costs for some period of time, in order to do away with a competitor. We don't know; but we would know if we could see, if the captive shippers, non-competitive shippers could see that there was no burden being put on them by the railroads.


Also, truckers want to make sure that there is none of this so-called predatory pricing -- I keep using the term but I hate the word -- they want to be certain that no traffic is carried at less than out-of-pocket costs, because the railways have such a large





proportion of the total transportation cost, common carrier transportation in this country, that any individual trucker would not stand a chance if there is any selective rate-making. We are not saying this happens at all; I am saying it could very well happen in the future.

- Q. Why should we be so considerate of the truckers who are our main competition and who do not publish their costs or give their costs to anyone?
- A. I think the railways are very much bigger than any individual truckers, and I am sure that truckers do not know their costs in many cases; but what I said yesterday, to go on, was that it would not be necessary at all to publish minimum schedules if there was somebody in the regulatory body, a cost-finding section, so that the minimum schedules could be just filed and examined without publication.
- Q. Yes, you realize from the practical standpoint, publishing these in all sorts of tariffs, the cost and the work involved, it would take a few years to get them published. Then youwould have to change it at great expense every time there was an increase in costs.
- A. I cannot see that there would be all that expense in publishing, because it is one classification which works right down through the carload scale.
- Q. Don't you think for all sorts of different types of cars and moving between different





points all across Canada, you would have thousands of them?

A. I don't think so. You would certainly have your different types of cars, but this would be taken into account in the classification, the kind of car that the commodity usually travelled in. You already have route tables printed, you already have distance scales.

I do not see that there would be any more work. There would be probably considerably less work for years, and there would be considerably less work because in essence there will be a competitive type of tariff and there will be a captive type of tariff so you would not have so many tariffs around, all kinds of different ones.

- Q. Do you know any business in the free economy that publishes the costs of its services or the product it has to sell?
- A. Well, I am not talking about free business enterprise. We are talking about a public utility.
- Q. Do you know any public utility that publishes its costs of all the services it renders?
  - A. United States railroads, yes.
- Q. What do you refer to there, the burden study?
  - A. Yes.
  - Q. But that is a really different ---
  - A. You can get out-of-pocket costs for



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
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You take any business, do you know any businessman in Canada that publishes his costs for his service or the goods he has to sell?

each type of car or line terminal costs and so on.

A. No, because most businessmen in Canada are not public utilities in the position that the railways are in.

- Q. I am just speaking of general businessmen, as a practice. It is unknown in Canada, is it not?
- A. Yes, but I am not asking you to publish costs if there is a section in the Board of Transport Commissioners that can do it, that can look at them. I am not asking for publication of costs unless this thing is not set up in the Board.
- Don't you ask for it in your brief, in your submission, publication?
- I think I qualified it -- no, I did not qualify it, but I am qualifying it now and I have done for the last two or three days, that if an adequate cost-finding section is formed in the Board, there is somebody there that knows about out-of-pocket costs, it is not necessary to publish them. You would be on the same basis as any public utility, because the Public Utilities Commission of British Columbia and a lot of others know the costs of the electric utilities and gas utilities and so on.
- Do they send to each consumer what it costs them to produce the electricity they are selling?
  - No, and again I am not asking for that A.



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
to be done if there is a cost-finding section in the Board.

Q. Another thing, how are the railways going to negotiate rates with shippers if those shippers know their costs?

Hughes, cr-ex

(McDonald)


- A. It all hinges on the same thing. If there is a cost-finding section, you would not need it. In the United States this happens, the shippers know roughly the costs, they know the type of car, they know the length of haul and so on, and it has done very well in the United States.
- Q. Well, we are dealing with a little different situation in Canada, because you would realize, getting to the practical standpoint, if you had some goods and you wanted to ship them and you were trying to get a rate on it and if you knew the costs of the railway, you know where you would be starting your negotiations, at that cost plus 1 per cent.
- A. Well, you would be starting at out-of-pocket costs.
- Q. My submission is that it certainly would not be workable, and that is what our rate people tell me.
- A. This is why I say again that if you have a cost-finding section then maybe it would not be necessary.
- Q. Then they would not be made public, they would be just given to the Board.
  - A. That is right, just filed.



- Q. Then did you make any study to determine how long it would take the railways to prepare these minimum rate tables?
- A. Well, I said that I think it would take three, five years to get the scheme put in. I said that yesterday.
- Q. And then how often would they have to be revised?
- A. Well, the railways now know a great deal about their costs, they have been doing cost studies

  -- it was said in the transcript, Mr. Stenason said they have been doing it for ten or fifteen years, and they have costed pretty well every major commodity, now, so the costs are already there.
- Q. Once you get it in, three to five years to put it in, and there are cost changes, there are wage increases, fuel increases and tax increases and so on, how often would these have to be revised?
- A. Well, I think that when the minimum schedule is there, then some reasonable forecast will have to be made of increasing costs. You don't want the costs as of this minute. If you expect a wage increase tomorrow, then you would have to adjust for it, as we do now when there is a percentage increase. Then the Board takes into account what is going to happen tomorrow, what is going to happen in the reasonable length of time.

What happens when your costs for other traffic go up? You don't have to go through and



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
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that increase is. Q. I am talking about your proposed

system, your minimum rate schedules which reflect variable costs. They would have to be kept up to date.

alter all your cards. You know approximately what

- No, not every day, they would not have to be kept up to date. I think it is reasonable, with a bit of give and take in this, I think we can forecast pretty well the level of costs at least a year ahead. I know it is difficult to do, but the railways have had an awful lot of experience in costs and they should know something about the likely trend of events, say, in the next year's time.
- Q. Take an example. Suppose there is an increase in wages given to engineers and firemen, for instance. How are you going to figure that out in your costs on all these various shipments?
- A. Well, it would either come in the terminal group or route arbitrary or distance, but you would not be putting an increase in the terminal costs onto the line haul or anything like that, or branch line costs onto main line costs. I think it would be fairly simple to do.
- Q. You think it would be fairly simple. Then have you made any estimate of the cost to the railways of preparing these minimum schedule rate tables?
  - As I have said, I think they have already A.



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
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done it for a great many commodities, so I don't think there would be too much additional cost.

- Do you know the number of schedules that would be involved?
- There would be one basic schedule and this is the distance one. There would not be thousands of schedules. There would be the basic distance scale there, not a great number.
- What about the varying costs for different commodities?
- This is taken account of in the classification. To handle grain, for example, it may cost exactly the same as a hundred other commodities and they would all come in the same part as far as handling characteristics are concerned, cost of handling.
- Would your cost schedules cover separately Q. . box cars, covered cars, tank cars, covered hopper cars?
- A. No, again this would be incorporated in the classification. We know that grain normally travels in box cars or lumber very often travels in box cars also, but knowing these things about commodities, we know the way they normally move and we know the cost, they normally move in box cars and so on. This would be incorporated into the classification.
- Do you know whether any railway has published these minimum rate schedules?
- Well, I know that it is not very hard to find the I.C.C. costs for various types of cars.
  - Q. Has any railway published these minimum



rate schedules?

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THE WITNESS: No, there is nothing to

stop them at all.

COMMISSIONER MANN: Thank you.

THE WITNESS: Excuse me, Mr. McDonald.

A. Yes, in France.

- Q. In France?
- A. That is one country.
- Q. Are they published there?
- A. Yes.
- Q. How long has it been in effect?
- A. I am not sure, but I think it is since 1950 they have been published in France.
  - Is that on the same scheme as yours? Q.
  - Pretty well, yes.

COMMISSIONER MANN: Mr. Hughes, the British Transport Commission does not publish minimum rate schedules, but does it have a pretty good idea of its variable costs?

Oh, yes, they have cost teams, they have had cost teams for a long time now, and they know. They stated objective is not to make a rate at less than out-of-pocket costs, and they have gone now to find their out-of-pocket costs, and it is really surprising, I think.

COMMISSIONER MANN: There is nothing in the British law that prevents the British Transport Commission from publishing rates below out-of-pocket costs.



The French railways first published, to be exact, their minimum and maximum with arbitraries for the terminals, in 1947, and this took them since the end of the war, about two years. Things were getting on when the war was over and it took them about two years, it took them to March, 1947, to get their first publication in.



COMMISSIONER MANN: And you relate your minimum cost to variable schedules?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

COMMISSIONER MANN: And those are the schedules below which the French railways will not go?

THE WITNESS: These are what are called direct costs and from the records of the United Nations Cost Committee, in the book that I have been reading on that, they define "direct cost" as "out-of-pocket cost".


COMMISSIONER MANN: Thank you.

MR. McDONALD: Q. Well, in paragraph 56 -route cost -- on page 15, you say that unless the
railways do allow route cost differences to be reflected
in the rate, they will continue to encourage truck
competition along what should be the most profitable
lines while they will be left with unremunerative
traffic elsewhere.

What I understand from your submission on this point -- I just want to make sure that I am clear on it -- is that the railway must take into consideration, in fixing its rates, the higher cost incurred, say, on light density branch lines.

A. If there are high costs there, it would do.

- Q. You add that.
- A. Yes.
- Q. For instance, you would assume that on your main line, where you had high density traffic,



you have lower costs?



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A. If there we

- A. If there were lower costs; but you may have high terminal costs because of congestion.

  It all depends on how the cost figures come out.
- Q. But suppose you have 40 miles on a branch line and 500 miles on the main line, this portion on the branch line, on account of low cost difference -- you would have to add something to that.

A. Yes.

- Q. For instance, take some specific examples. Take the Hudson Bay Railway operated by Canadian National. According to your theory of costs, if it is found that the costsfrom this line are higher than on the trans-continental line, this should be reflected in the rate.
- A. No; it would be reflected in the minimum rate schedule; but you have already said yourself that the C.N.R. wouldn't want to carry traffic at less than out-of-pocket cost. It would be lower than out-of-pocket cost. But it is up to the railway to do what they do in the tariff.
- Q. Well, the tariff? -- I thought your minimum rate schedule -- I thought that was the foundation for your tariff.
- A. It certainly isn't the tariff. This is the level below which the railways' rate would not be allowed to fall.
- Q. So, therefore, following along with the Hudson Bay Railway, we heard the evidence of carrying





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grain up to Churchill. There is practically 100 per cent empty return movement of those cars, so it costs more to handle grain to Churchill than the head of the lakes.

- A. Yes, I can quite see that.
- Q. Therefore, according to your theory of costing, that extra cost should be reflected for these movements.
- A. No; I say the minimum rates schedule would reflect that; and if the railway wanted to reflect it in the tariff for any reasons -- very good reasons, or course -- then there is nothing to say that they shouldn't keep the relationship. But we want to make sure that the Hudson's Bay Railway was not carrying at less than out-of-pocket cost and the burden being put somewhere else.
- Q. If the costs were higher on that route, then the floor for your rates. . .
  - A. The floor would be higher.
  - Q. . . . would be higher.
  - A. Yes.
  - Q. And you couldn't come below that.

Then, there is another instance in British Columbia, the Canadian National line to Prince Rupert, which is about 200 miles longer than the line to Vancouver; and you know the rates in Vancouver and Prince Rupert are equalized, I understand.


- A. Yes.
- Q. So, therefore, on your theory of costing,



then, the floor on all those rates would be based on the actual cost on the Prince Rupert line for Prince Rupert traffic.

- A. Certainly there is an element of grouping here. What do we understand by grouping?

  Is that your question?
- Q. No; this is routine. You have one line going to Prince Rupert and you have another line going to Vancouver. Strictly applying your cost of service on traffic going to Prince Rupert, to get the floor, we would have to determine the actual costs on that line which would take into consideration the extra mileage.
- A. Yes; the floor would be different in both cases if the costs were different.
- Q. And the line for Prince Rupert being 200 miles longer, isn't it reasonable to assume that the costs would be higher?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. So the floor for all rates on that line would have to be higher than those to and from Vancouver?
- A. The floor would have to be different; not necessarily the rate.
- Q. Then, we have other lines that we can speak of in the Canadian National. There is a line in the Province of Quebec from St. Felicien to Chibougamau, where there is a new line, and from Beattyville to Chibougamau.



A. Yes.

- Q. On your floor theory the rates on the lines would depend on the actual cost of handling the traffic on the line.
- A. Yes; the C.N.R. doesn't want to carry traffic at out-of-pocket cost, so there would be no objection to that.
- Q. Then, in paragraph 73 on page 20, you refer to:

"Competition and its relationship to
"minimum carload weight is discussed by
"Dr. Joel Dean . . "

This deals with the United States situation, doesn't it -- only.

A. Yes.

- Q. And I suggest to you that that has no reference, or has no application, to the situation in Canada? He speaks of ". . . on LCL freight, the lowest rail rate is for 5,000 lbs. . . . " That situation doesn't prevail in Canada? You are aware of that?
- A. No; but the principle he is talking about applies to Canada. In my opinion, it does.
  - Q. He is speaking about . . .
  - A. He says this:

"If the loss of revenue and goodwill were
"not so serious, it would be almost ludicrous
"to see car after car moving half-empty

"during critical freight car shortages,



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"while little is done to induce shippers
"to load cars heavier."

This is the kind of principle he is talking about. It is also my opinion.

- Q. But you are speaking of LCL traffic, and the situation regarding LCL traffic in Canada and the United States is different. That is all I want to point out.
- A. Yes; well, you are pointing out the difference in the United States, and I agree.
- Q. You couldn't take this statement holusbolus and apply it to the situation in Canada?
  - A. No.
- Q. Then, on "Recovery of Overhead Costs", paragraphs 80 and 81 on page 22, for the purpose of your submission, I will accept your proposition that
  - ". . . distribution according to the value of "service . . "
- and ". . . distribution of overhead by a standard

"mark-up of the out-of-pocket cost incurred ..."

is an acceptable method. But, having accepted that,
why do you depart from it when you come to captive
traffic, where you recommend applying maximum rate
schedules to the fully distributed costs, as set out in
paragraph 114.

A. Well, the competitive shipper needs protection, and I base this on the public utility theory and on the old common law that where a man provides a common necessity -- I am not a lawyer and I



Q. Going along with your suggestion, instead of putting in maximum rates on the captive

don't know too much about it -- but Sir Thomas Aquinas indicated that a just and reasonable price should be charged where there was an actual monopoly to the person using it -- that that monopoly should be protected in some way.


- Q. Isn't that just exactly the position in Canada today? You say a just and reasonable price should be charged, and under the Railway Act, the Board has power to set just and reasonable rates.

  Doesn't that follow the same principle?
- A. It isn't exactly the same, because the price in these ancient monopolies, in so far as it was just and reasonable, was the cost to the producer plus a fair profit. This was their just and reasonable price.

Now, then, on any particular segment of traffic the rate could be much more than the cost plus a general return on the work done, or the investment.

So it isn't exactly the same as you have now.

- Q. Well, I don't see the difference of the situation.
- A. Well, now it is the rate of return to the railway as a whole and not the rate of return on any individual traffic.
- Q. But the Board of Transport Commissioners has the power to fix just and reasonable rates.
  - A. Well, it has the power to do so, yes.





 traffic based on fully distributed costs, why not leave the matter to the Board of Transport Commissioners to decide what are just and reasonable rates for that traffic?

- A. If it is just and reasonable rates in the light of costs, I would tend to go along with you.
- Q. Costs would be one factor; but the value of service would apply the same as you apply it to the captive traffic.
- A. One reason is that I think that rates -and I have gone along all the way in this -- that
  rates should all, in one way, be related to cost;
  the rates should be cost-oriented; and the traffic
  should be allocated to the real value of transportation
  and not according to the free play of co-ordination;
  and this is precisely the situation, I think, which
  Mr. Stenason was talking about in the long extract
  from the book. He thinks the same thing, evidently.
- Q. Well, I may not agree with you, but I believe that costs are one factor to be taken into consideration in fixing rates, but I suggest on this captive traffic there are other things that have to be taken into consideration, and that the control of the ceiling on these rates should be left to the Board of Transport Commissioners.
- A. That may well be the ceiling, but if we look at the burden study, it may be less than the maximum rate schedule we propose; it may be above.



- Q. All those things come in, and they would be lower.
- A. I certainly think the maximum should be cost-related; and if it was set by the Board it would not necessarily be so.
- Q. Then, these views which Mr.Brazier expressed are the views of the Province of British

  Columbia and not necessarily your views as an economist.
- A. These are the views of British Columbia, yes.
- Q. Do you, as an economist, separate from

  British Columbia, mean to tell this Commission that

  it is your considered opinion on recommendation that

  the railways should publish maximum rates on all captive

  traffic based on fully distributed cost?
  - A. Yes, it is.
  - Q. You are quite . . .
- A. It is my opinion, and it is Mr. Stenason's opinion, from what I got on reading the book.
  - Q. Is that what it is based on?
- A. No; I base it on my opinion, and I say he backs my opinion up.

MR. McDONALD: Well, Mr. Chairman, the next point is a new one.

THE CHAIRMAN: We will adjourn until ten o'clock tomorrow morning.

--- Adjournment.



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# ROYAL COMMISSION

ON

# TRANSPORTATION

HEARINGS

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AWATTO

VOLUME No:

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No.

# INDEX

Page No.

# HUGHES, William

Cross-examination

By Mr. McDonald (cont'd) By Mr. Sinclair 

#### EXHIBITS

# Description

Letter dated June 2nd, 1960, from President, Council of Forest Industries of British Columbia to the Honourable Robert W. Bonner, Q.C., Attorney General and Minister of Industrial Development, Trade and Commerce, British Columbia. 13940



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# ROYAL COMMISSION ON TRANSPORTATION

Proceedings of hearings held in the Court Room, Board of Transport Commissioners Office, Ottawa, Ontario, on the 9th day of June, 1960.

#### COMMISSION

Mr. M. A. McPherson, Q.C.

Chairman

Mr. H. Anscomb

Member

Mr. A. H. Balca

Member

Mr. R. Gobeil Member

Mr. H. A. Mann

Member

Mr. A. Platt Member

# COMMISSION COUNSEL

Mr. A. G. Cooper, Q.C.

Mr. G. S. Cumming


Mr. H. W. Ellicott

Adviser

Mr. F. W. Anderson

Secretary

Major N. Lafrance Assistant Secretary



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Ottawa, Ontario, Thursday, June 9th, 1960

--- On commencing at 10.00 a.m.

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TORONTO, ONTARIO

THE CHAIRMAN: Order, please.

## WILLIAM HUGHES, continued

## CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. McDONALD (Cont'd):

Q. Mr. Hughes, I would like to refer you to yesterday's transcript, Volume No. 78, at page 13791, line 11. I will read it to you. You will probably remember it. You say in your answer there:

> "But, I do know that the coastal people no longer sell any dimensional lumber in central Canada, and the reasons -- and the traffic manager of MacMillan-Bloedell told me that it was the percentage increase that had taken them right out of the market and they could not get into it."

And then later you stated it was not Mr. Campbell but another traffic manager, on page 13793 --

> "It was another traffic manager, at Vancouver Island plant who told me that."

Now, I would like to know the name of this man who gave you that information.

I don't know his name. He is the traffic manager at the Alberni plant of MacMillan-



Bloedell.

Q. I am informed there is only one traffic manager of MacMillan-Bloedell, and that is Mr. Campbell who is sitting in the room, and that your information is not correct, that they are selling dimensional lumber in the Toronto market now?

A. Yes. I wasn't trying to be misleading.

This was to the best of my belief.

Q. Mr. Campbell is in the room and I confirmed this statement with him, that they are selling dimensional lumber in the Toronto area.

Then would you refer to Part 2 of your submission, page 25, paragraph 92? You state:

"Cost-oriented rate making is impossible if rates are to have more regard for the costs of a competitor
rather than of the railway itself."

Now, let's take a hypothetical case, where the cost of a competitor is 40 cents per 100 pounds, the railway variable cost is 35 cents per hundred pounds. Where would you place the rate, as an economist?

A. Well, as a rate-making man, which I am not, I would put it somewhere near the 40 cents, but I certainly wouldn't put it over 40 cents. As an economist, I wouldn't set the rate at all, I would let the market find the rate. But I wouldn't have a rate over the cost of the competitor, obviously.

COMMISSIONER MANN: Before we leave that point, Mr. McDonald, if I may ask Mr. Hugnes this



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
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question. You would take into account, I suppose, the service characteristics of the competing motor transportation, would you not? For instance, if this is a line-haul rate of the railways, the variable cost of the line-haul movement was 75 cents, you would have to find out whether there was any pickup and delivery costs attached to that, and you would also want to have a look and see what your speed of service was, and then you would set your rate in the light of all these facts?

THE WITNESS: Yes. I believe when the railways set the piggyback rates they look at all the service characteristics and set a rate at which they think they are going to get the traffic, yes.

MR. McDONALD: Q. As to the so-called captive traffic, would it not be a reasonable proposition from the economic standpoint to place the rates at a level which will provide the free movement of the traffic and maximize the railways' earnings?

- Would it not be ---A .
- Would it not be a reasonable proposition from the economic standpoint to place the rates at a level which will provide the free movement of the traffic and maximize the railways! earnings?
- A. I think -- and again Mr. Stenason is in agreement with me here -- I think that traffic which is captive traffic should get the benefit of any cost advantages that the railways get. always at what the traffic will bear, trying to get





what the traffic will bear, but it will not get any cost reduction through modernization or anything else, they are always there, and I think there has to be a ceiling on the captive traffic related to the cost of providing the service, and this is in the interests of the railways, too. I am not the only one who thinks that. It is borne out in the British Columbia position, and it is also in the book.

MR. McDONALD: Thank you very much, Mr. Hughes. I realize that you and Mr. Guest and Mr. Brazier have done a tremendous lot of work on this brief, and no doubt the Commission will enjoy reading it and studying it.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Sinclair?

## CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SINCLAIR:

- Q. Mr. Hughes, in answer to one of my friends speaking to you about the British Transport Act of 1953, you said it was a long time since you have been there. I take it that you have been in Canada, what, four or five years?
- A. I have been in Canada three years and in the United States two years.
- Q. And in this period you have concentrated on transportation economics in furtherance of your work in British Columbia?
  - A. Among other things, yes.
- Q. Before I put to you a number of questions relating to your rate-making proposals, there are a few points in Part 1 of your submission that I would

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
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29 30 like to deal with, if you don't mind. So would you turn to that?

In a number of these tables which you have, for example, Tables 9, 10, and so on, you do not attempt in any way to weight these by the commodity mix, do you?


- A. These are weighted by the amount of tens moving in each rate category. If you take the noncompetitive, for example, there are 100 tons, as an example, moving at that; competitive there are two tons moving at that; agreed charges, say, five tens. It is all in the various tonnage in each group to give a weighted average.
- What about the various types of traffic within, for instance, agreed charge traffic, and there is a large variation in the rates depending on the type of the equipment they use, the loading characteristics, and other things. You don't try to weight that out?
- A. No. These tables are not misleading. They say exactly what they are supposed to say. get around to just exactly what type of commodity is carried at agreed charges and split into groups and length of haul, and so on, this is beyond the resources of the province.
- Q. So the relative position of British Columbia could change materially by introducing a factor for commodity mix?
- A. No. I don't taink so, because when you get down to doing that you probably find you have no



A. Table 15-A. When you see lumber and selling prices, you see the selling price in Winnipeg, \$90 for nemlock, the freight charged to Winnipeg, \$32.20.

carloads in the sample in the particular area, and there may be actually a lot of traffic, and if you look at it it is fairly small, but if you subdivide it there is no traffic.

- Q. Let's say, for example, there was a lot of lumber moving in British Columbia relative to other commodities, and there was a lot of coal moving in Alberta relative to other commodities, do you not think that would have an effect on your weighting under the present rate structure?
- A. I don't really see how it affects these tables. If you do it for Canada as a whole you could weight it like that, but if you take it for British Columbia -- and this is what the tables do for the most part -- then Alberta coal has not much influence on the lumber. These tables do what they say they do, and if you subdivide it you don't get the picture.
- Q. You would agree that the value of transportation in relation to the selling price has some impact on the freight charges?
- A. The value of transportation to the selling price has an impact on the freight charges?
  - Q. Yes.
- A. I don't know. There is an example in here that I used.
  - Q. What is that?



Now, then, since the prices of lumber dropped considerably over \$20 in the last week or two, I understand, then the freight charges certainly haven't come down \$20. What I am saying is that the freight charges are not flexible with the selling price of the commodity.



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
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- Q. That is true; but what I am saying to you is that, for instance -- I don't know what 1,000 fpm is -- but you mean the equivalent, whether the commodity is of much lesser value; the impact of the freight charges on a much lesser-value commodity has a less effect.
- Α. Yes. If you were putting very high freight rates on bricks, for example, they would only move a few miles.
- 0. That is about one ton -- a little over a long ton?
  - Yes.
- Grain, hemlock and fir, a little over a long ton -- do you know what it would be worth in the Winnipeg market? You say \$90. Is that an actual price?
- It was when this table was constructed. A. It is somewhat less now.
- Did you ever hear of any coal drawing \$90? Let us take canal coal which, I think, is about the most expensive; and I think it gets to about 45 tons delivered in Canada; that is half the price. Do you know of any coal . .
- Well, I know that coal freight rates are much less than lumber freight rates.
  - And you think that is a proper thing. Q.
- Well, this is probably the best position Α. the railways can get. They are trying to maximize their rates and that is the way they do it for coal, and are probably trying to get as much revenue out of it



Q.	Do	you	think	that	is	a	proper	thing
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- A. From the point of view of the railway it is a proper thing.
- Q. And a necessary thing to enable the railways to be financially strong, I suggest to you.
  - A. Yes.
- Q. Now, just one little point on page 22 of part 1.

You are quoting the Henry study -- the

Henry and Associates study -- in the Rowell-Sirois

Royal Commission which was done, I think, about 1937 or

1938, and following that you have a paragraph:

"The railways were constructed in uneconomic

"locations and became instruments of national

"policy. Although these aspects were con
"sidered by the Turgeon Commission, the

"disadvantages remain for the British Columbia

"shipper who must ship over a route to his

"market which was more costly in construction

"and more circuitive than it could have been ...

And Henry and Associates, in the quotation


immediately preceding that, made specific reference to the line between Central Canada and the Maritimes.

I suppose you quoted this in support of your statement of circuity, did you?

A. Just a second. Well, that is one thing, with the Inter-Colonial Line.

The other thing:

". . . as an alternative, a connection between



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"Central Canada and British Columbia could "have been provided by a line running from "Sault Ste. Marie through Northern Michigan, "Minnesota, Manitoba and the Canadian Northwest ... which indicates that the line is not a direct line; it

Let us look at Canadian Pacific across the country. Canadian Pacific has the short line

between the Prairies and the B.C. Coast; is that correct?

A. Yes --in Canada, yes.

is not as short as it could have been.

- 0. Do you get from Winnipeg to Vancouver by the United States?
- No; but you can get a shorter line from Sault Ste. Marie: this is the way the pipeline goes.
- Q. Let us not get any more confused about what is west and what is not west. I am speaking of the Prairies now. The short route from the Prairies to Vancouver -- from Winnipeg and Regina and all the way along the line -- the short route is the Canadian Pacific route rather than by Edmonton.
- A. What I am trying to say is that the short line route was evidently, on this opinion, through the United States. I am going by what he says. I have never studied mileages and distances, but I think Mr. Henry knew what he was doing.
- Q. That is one of the difficulties, that you must analyse statements a little bit, because quite often people fall into error and somebody takes something out



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of these Royal Commission reports that is probably a myth and blow it up as though it was a fact.

Let us take a look at this. You have agreed that the Canadian Pacific has the short route from the Prairies to the Coast?

MR. BRAZIER: Part of the Prairies. There is Saskatoon.

MR. SINCLAIR: Yes; I will take Saskatoon -the mileage Saskatoon, Calgary to Vancouver as against Saskatoon, Edmonton, Vancouver.

A. If you don't mind, I am looking into this.

- Q. Let us go to the next place, and that is from Central Canada. Have you ever checked the mileage to Winnipeg via the Detroit gateway from Eastern Canada?
  - A. No, I haven't.
- Q. I suggest it is longer. Have you ever checked the mileage via Sault Ste. Marie to Winnipeg?
  - A. No.
- Q. From Toronto I again suggest that it would be longer. Then, let us go down to the Maritimes. Have you ever analysed the railway routes to the Maritimes? That has been done, and it is published. I wonder why you didn't take a look at that. I think you will find, if you do, Mr. Hughes, that the Canadian Pacific has the short line to the Maritimes through Maine. Have you ever checked that?
  - A. No, I haven't checked on it.



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
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- 0. So, you see, it could well be that in 1927 when somebody was reaching for the route to assist the Maritime Provinces, they put it on railway mileage of one single route; but that wasn't the route that governed the rate-making. Did that ever occur to you?
- A. But this isn't entirely true about Canadian Pacific; it is not true about Canadian Pacific to the Maritimes, and it is not . .
- Q. Do you consider that the long route sets the rate in Canada?
- A. No, it is the short route that sets the rate in Canada.
- Q. Then, how is British Columbia disadvantaged by more circuitous railway lines than it could have been?
- A. Well, it is fairly obvious that if the short line is charging short line mileage and the long line is charging short line mileage, then the long line is charging at below cost. If the one line is right, then the other one is higher than cost. This is a dissipation of economic strength.
- Q. You think railways could set rates on the variable cost . . .
  - No, I don't. Α.
- Q. . . . of the short line mileage, or do they put it at something over the variable cost of the short line mileage?
- A. I don't know, because I have no access to the cost information.



analysed that to support it.

A. Yes; I have read it very carefully,

statement you have made except Mr. Henry, and you haven't

and it seems to me that Mr. Henry knew what he was

Commission report unless the statement had some

talking about or he wouldn't have written it in a Royal

be written in a Royal Commission report unless it had

because it is in a Royal Commission report, that makes

some foundation. Are you going to say that just

Well, you really have no support for the

That is quite a statement, that it wouldn't

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foundation.

it . . .

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into the future, Mr. Sinclair!

MR. SINCLAIR: He must be.


THE CHAIRMAN: Or the past.

MR. SINCLAIR: Let us take a look at the

MR. SINCLAIR: Let us take a look at the other part of it. I think you said to my friend, Mr. Cooper, that the railways may be used as instrumental for national policy. You agreed to that.

A. Yes.


- Q. If I put it another way, I take it you would agree that the railways have been used for national policy as distinct from being instruments of national policy.
  - A. I fail to see any distinction.
- Q. You wouldn't agree, from your study of Canadian rates and the use of these rates, that the rate



structure has been used for purposes of economic advantage to given areas.

- A. Oh, I certainly know that is the case, especially in the Prairies.
- Q. For instance, an example is the bridge subsidy, isn't it?
- A. Yes; that gives a great advantage to Ontario.
- Q. And the Maritime Freight Rates Act is another example, is it not?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. And the removal of the mountain differential might be another example?
- A. Well, I don't think you are right.

  You see, you pick out two examples there where the railways don't suffer any loss of revenue. What I am talking about is burden on the shippers such as through the statutory grain rates, or probably keeping a line on that is uneconomic and it is not in the national interest to abandon it. Those are the things I am thinking of. You mention the mountain differential and that is a different matter completely.
- Q. What you had in mind were burdens that were placed on the railways by an obligation under a statute.
  - A. Yes; and other shippers pay for it.
- Q. Well, we will discuss that latter part later. It would still be an obligation where they were being used as instruments for national policy, or as




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 instrumental, no matter who paid for it, would it not?

- A. Well, the railways seem to assume all sorts of obligations that nobody tells them to do.
- Q. Let us take the statutory grain rates.

  They are not assuming those without anybody telling them to do so.
- A. That is one; but you mentioned the mountain differential. The C.P.R.doesn't want to get out of that, and I don't know that -- officially, I don't think you were told to reduce the rates in the mountains.
- Q. The Canadian Pacific thought there was justification for that, Mr. Hughes, and after full inquiry, they determined that there was justification for it. There was a judicial inquiry into that, wasn't there?
- A. Well, that is one case of statutory grain rates, and there are a few items which are in the actual tariff; and yet there are many items in the tariff where the railway thinks there is an obligation to carry this stuff.
- Q. You had quite a little discussion here about corn flakes and things like that. Now, corn flakes and things like that are not under the tariff at all.
  - A. I was going on the word of Mr. Edsforth.
- Q. He wasn't talking about corn flakes; he was talking about oatmeal.

I am glad you brought this up. Do you think




that, under the obligations of the railway to carry grain and flour at a fixed rate, they could carry the by-products of the milling process for a higher rate and still not practise unjust discrimination?

- A. I can't see that any Board would rule anything as indiscriminatory if the rate was set below the out-of-pocket cost -- I can't see how any Board would call it unjust discrimination. They couldn't force the carrier to carry at a less cost than that.
- Q. Well, let us take it, for example, that they have by statute fixed the rate for goods at the moment.
  - A. That is statutory.
- Q. It has no reference to just and reasonable-ness whatsoever.
  - A. That is a statutory agreement.
- Q. It is a statutory rate under the Railway Act today, isn't it?

Are you suggesting to this Commission that the railways could carry the by-product of the milling process at just and reasonable rates notwithstanding the statutes? Is that your suggestion?

- A. That is not my suggestion at all.
- Q. Then, why did you mention the fact that the railways, without any obligation, had extended the statutory rates to milled products?
- A. It seems to me that the railways assume that obligation without any statute to say that they do it. The railways do it voluntarily; and I am sure



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
nobody has told them to do it; and I don't think there is anything in the Railway Act that says they have to do it.

- Q. You are saying -- it is your interpretation . .
- A. That is my interpretation. I am not a lawyer, but that is my interpretation.
- Q. Your interpretation would be that the railways could put everything except grain and flour -that is, the by-products -- on a just and reasonable level of rates tomorrow by filing a tariff.
- A. That is my interpretation of the legal position, yes.
  - Q. . Thank you.
  - A. Am I right?
- Did you ask Mr. Brazier if you were I would like to have Mr. Brazier's answer on right? the record.

THE CHAIRMAN: I think we can excuse him. MR. BRAZIER: We were talking about beet pulp.

MR. SINCLAIR: My friend wants to discuss beet pulp as being different from by-products in the milling process in regard to animal feeds. I would be glad to discuss that with him.

Q. Now, Mr. Hughes, I refer to one little matter in Part 1 that is in the area, in my respectful submission, of myth, and we will discuss this for a moment. It is this:



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"British Columbia pays the freight both ways." THE CHAIRMAN: Which page is that, Mr.

Sinclair?

MR. SINCLAIR: Page 25.

- Q. It is described as a paradox. Just let us take a look at the products moving into British Columbia. The shippers of these commodities must meet . . .
- A. Which commodities are you talking about? If you are talking about pipe and steel, that is correct.
  - Q. Let us take bottles.
- Bottles from California as against Alberta bottles, yes. Pipe and steel; I don't know of any other article.
  - Q. Automobiles?
- A. No, not automobiles. You can't say that an American automobile is the same as a British automobile on a Volkswagen or anything else. You are talking about two different products.
- Q. Have you never heard of compact cars which are put out by the Canadian automobile industry?
- A. We get them; we don't get too many in Vancouver.
- Q. You get quite a few British cars and European cars?
- A. Yes; the freight is very low from Britain.
  - Q. So that the freight is very low from



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Britain,	and	anyone	who	wants	to	sell	in	that	market	must
meet this	s con	mpetitio	on.							
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- think that price competition is too important in the car market. I think the competition would be more on what the person wants to buy in a car. He cannot see the price competition; it is the look of the car and the advertising that makes the demand inelastic: it is not really price competition.
- Q. In so far as there is a market, the competition is the cost . . .
  - For skelp and pipe and bottles, yes.
  - Q. And whatever other items there are . .
  - A. None.
- Q. Just a moment. In so far as there is market competition in the cost from foreign markets, either the United States or from overseas, the eastern Canadian producer meeting that market competition would have to absorb the freight rate, would he not -to meet that competition?
- A. If the demand in British Columbia is completely elastic, such as in the case of skelp, it doesn't matter whether he buys skelp from here or whether he buys it in England or Belgium -- and pipes and bottles; the demand would be elastic. But when you get into cars, refrigerators, radios -- things like that -the demand isn't elastic and we have to bring things in under a tariff barrier; there are not many alternative sources of supply, and the freight rates are quite high.



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Q. Let us take buses from Japan and buses from Can-Car in Montreal. There was a factual investigation of the situation that existed in Vancouver. Do you remember that one?


> A. No.

- 0. You don't know about the Japanese buses and the B.C. Electric's negotiations for Japanese buses against buses from Can-Car, Montreal?
- A. I have heard it spoken about, but I don't know anything factually. I don't know too much about it at all.
- Q. Well, now, let us take another that you would know something about. Let us take dairy products from Red Deer, Alberta, to Vancouver, in competition with dairy products in the lower Fraser Valley.
- A. That is a "funny" example of a dairy product. It is one of the extreme examples; but you certainly don't get fresh milk from Alberta.
- Q. Let us take the example I gave you. Who would pay the freight charges on the dried milk from Red Deer into the British Columbia market in competition with the dried milk from the various plants that are scattered throughout the lower Fraser Valley?



A. Well, as I said, Mr. Sinclair, you have not really got a good example product there. Dried milk comes in all kinds of fancy packages with price differentials for the same weights and probably just the same milk, for all I know, but it is a differentiated product, and people will not switch from one brand of dried milk to another, whatever the price difference, within a certain range. Then there is just monopolistic competition. You are not talking about milk or eggs, that is a different situation.

- Q. Let us take condensed milk. If Carnation snips condensed milk from Alberta and also manufactures condensed milk in British Columbia, who would pay the freight rates on the movement from Alberta, the producer?
- A. If Carnation made milk in Alberta and made it in British Columbia and sold the milk in British Columbia, who would pay the freight rates? That is a very hypothetical situation, but I would say that the consumer paid the freight rate because again the demand is inelastic. You are looking at two types of Carnation, you are looking at Carnation milk and all other kinds of canned milk and assessing it with dried milk as well. You are not taking a very realistic view of dairy products.
- Q. Let us get some economic principles settled first. Maybe that is what you would like to do. Would you agree with this, that a producer would pay the freight rates in the following circumstances: first,



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if there is competition from other sources of supply in the final market and the price in the final market is set by the alternative product. Do you agree with that?

- Α. Where there is demand in the final market it is elastic, that is what you are saying?
- Q. I am just saying that if there is competition from other sources of supply in the final market, and the price at the final market is set by the alternative production ---
  - A. Then the consumer pays?
  - 0. Then the producer pays?
- Α. The producer pays the freight. Yes, this is the reverse situation where we are shipping to Ontario.
- Let me give you a second principle and see if you agree with that. If the demand for the commodity in question is price-elastic, that is, where a small increase would drop sales significantly, then the producer bears the freight rate there, too, does he not?
  - Where the demand is inelastic?
  - No, elastic, price-elastic?
- Then it is the producer who takes the freight rate, yes.
- Q. The third one, where the producer would take it, would be where the demand is price-inelastic, but that the alternative source of supply is priceelastic; is that correct? That would be the third?



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A. That is correct, yes.

- Q. Now, those three basic principles would determine, and the cost of them, would determine whether the producer or the consumer paid the freight rate; do you agree?
- A. Yes. Let me make it clear before you go on, that we are talking of a short run position, because in the long run everybody knows that the consumer has to pay the freight rate. Otherwise, where does the farmer and so on get his price from? He has got to live, and of course his profits come from the commodity he sells. So we are talking about a short run situation here.
  - Q. Yes, in the long run ---
  - A. In the long run the consumer ---
- Q. Pays freight on everything, on ships and everything?
  - A. Exactly what it says in the brief here.
- Q. Yes, that is what you say. I am discussing what may be termed the relatively short term position.

COMMISSIONER MANN: Are you leaving this point now, Mr. Sinclair?

MR. SINCLAIR: No, I am going to be a little while.

commissioner mann: I just want to clarify your first premise there. I think this was where the producer pays all the freight, or would you like to modify that and say that he pays all or some of the



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
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freight or pays the freight to the extent necessary? MR: SINCLAIR: Well, he pays freight to the extent necessary because there is an interplay. COMMISSIONER MANN: Yes.

MR. SINCIAIR: Of forces, but what I have in mind is the suggestion, Mr. Commissioner Mann. that someone says they pay the freight but they mean the pay the freight necessary.

COMMISSIONER MANN: I just want to make that clear. It is not an all-inclusive statement? MR. SINCLAIR: Oh, no.

- So that, Mr. Hugnes, where you have a product that controls the Canadian market -- use a product that controls the Canadian market -- then the consumer would pay the freight; correct? For instance, canned salmon?
- A. If it is a monopoly, you mean, by saying "controlling the market"?
- Q. Yes. its production is such that it so overshadows the market that if you want canned salmon you buy B.C. canned salmon; isn't that correct? What other kind of salmon do you buy?
- A. If you are talking about a monopoly situation, then quite easily monopolists may bear the freight rate. If you want to get into theoretical economics I can give you very good examples of that.
  - Let us take canned salmon. Q.
- A. But in a monopoly situation you are talking about something else, and very easily the



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
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producer may pay the freight rate because he may be making just as much revenue as he had before the freight rate increased.

- Q. But dealing with canned salmon, if you want to buy it in Canada, you buy B.C. canned salmon; correct? What other kind of canned salmon can you buy?
  - You can buy tunafish.
- Q. I am taking canned salmon. There is a difference.
  - Α. Very close competition.
- Q. I said, there is a difference between tuna and salmon, is there not? It looks different, it tastes different?
  - A. I don't know; I like fresh salmon.
- You only eat fresh salmon. That is because you live in Vancouver.
- A. I would say there is monopoly, there is monopoly in the strict sense of the word. There is only one kind of canned salmon, but of course there is fresh salmon or tunafish competing, other products.
- Q. You would not believe it that on canned salmon the consumer pays the freight; you do not think you could go that far?
- A. If the demand was inelastic, I would say he pays the freight.
  - Q. If the demand was inelastic?
- A. If the demand for the canned salmon was inelastic, then I would say he pays the freight.



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- Say the difference was a cent a can, would you say that a cent a can would make the demand price-elastic?
  - For what kind of salmon?
  - Can of salmon, the usual kind they pack?
- The very fact that there is a brand name on it, it is not a standard product, it means it is inelastic. You do not get branded products sold with names on and everything when it is sompletely elastic. It is not like selling wheat. People put a brand on it which makes it inelastic, as it is, in varying degrees, and it is well accepted.
- Q. Do you know much about the fish processing industry in Canada? Do you know when the brand names are put on them?
- A. It is just like even if it is one firm, even if it is the same salmon, or anything like that, it does not matter: the firm is trying to differentiate its products, the same way as the railroads differentiate the same product.
- Q. Let us take another one you have discussed and we will be discussing it some more, and this is something that you have knowledge of, that is, the lumber industry of British Columbia. On select and large timbers, would you say that the B.C. in shipping those paid the freight, the B.C. producer in the Canadian market?
- A. Yes, we have to compete with Oregon and Washington, I believe, in that market.



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- You do? You have to compete with Q. Oregon and Washington on fir, large timbers, selects? Let us take a position, Saskatoon?
  - A. Not in Saskatoon, no.
- Q. Then any shipments to Saskatoon, you would not pay the freight there, the B.C. producer; correct?
- No, not where there is a monopoly position.
- Q. Would you pay them, for instance, in Edmonton?
- A. No, but we would in the European market or the American market, or eastern Canada market, or midwest.
- Q. You would pay it in the eastern Canadian market, would you?
  - Α. Yes.
  - The B.C. producer would? Q.
  - Α. Yes.
- What did you mean, then, when you told my friend Mr. Cooper that lumber shipments in Canada would be captive shipments, that is, that there would be no alternative transportation source?
- A. If there is no alternative transport other than rail, then it would be in my mind a captive shipper. I realize that there are other means of transportation to the eastern market. I never said there was not. So I would not think that would be a captive shipment.



Then you told my friend Mr. Cooper that

Q.

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
- lumber would be captive. Now you want to alter it. A. I was using lumber, thinking of all
- lumber, but if you want to differentiate the different markets, of course, you get water competition, as we know, into eastern United States, and probably there is some of it to eastern Canada, a little bit.
- Q. As I understand it, about 25 per cent of all United States shipping of lumber in 1959 was to the east coast of the United States by water, and that controls the lumber rates throughout the United States and throughout Canada. You disagree with that? Have you studied the level of freight tariffs?
- A. It seems to be a very peculiar kind of control. I am not sure what the rate is to New York, but I think it is 176, or something -- 147 to New York, I understand, and it is 140 to Winnipeg. So I do not see how the New York rate is controlling the Winnipeg rate.
  - Q. You do not understand that?
  - A. I cannot understand it.

MR. BRAZIER: Nobody does.

THE WITNESS: You know more about it than I do, obviously.

MR. SINCLAIR: Q. Then, Mr. Hughes, let us take shipments from the Kootenays of lumber into western Canada. Do you think they are captive traffic for the railways?

A. I think so, yes.



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
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- Q. Have you heard of any truck competition on lumber?
- A. It depends on how far east you are moving it from the Kootenays out to eastern Canada.
  - Q. I said to the prairies?
- A. To the prairies I know there are some rail competitive rates on that.
- Q. So what this comes down to, I take it, is that lumber in some parts would be captive traffic to the railway and in other cases it would be non-captive?
  - A. That is right, yes.
- Q. And where it was captive, you would say that the freight rates would be passed on to the consumer, but where it was not captive freight rates would be paid by the producer? Would you go that far?
- A. No, I would not go that far. You are talking now about carrier competition. Before you were talking about market competition. The very fact that there is carrier competition does not make a commodity elastic in the market.
- Q. Does market competition have any effect on freight rates, that is the point?
- A. It has an effect on who pays the freight rate, yes.
  - Q. It has an effect on ---
  - A. Who pays the freight rate.
- Q. Does it have any effect on the level of the freight rate?



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I can think of obvious examples, yes. Α.


Q. Then, when you determined what was

captive and non-captive traffic with the railways, why did you exclude market competition as a factor in determining your situation as to what would and what would not be captive traffic?

This is your own definition, paragraph 111 of Part 2?

If you are talking about captive traffic which is captive to the railways, how can you bring market competition into that factor? You see, the upper limits for railway rates would be either market competition or carrier competition, so why would you want to define captive shippers as anything to do with market competition?

- In any event you say that market competition can have an effect on the level of the rate, but notwithstanding this you do not give any weight to it in determining what is the captive traffice for your rate-making proposal? I just want to make this clear. We will discuss the implications of it later, but I just want to make it clear.
- No, I did not, and, as I say, the A . reason is that once you assume that market competition, if there was a good degree of market competition and it was there, then this would provide the upper level of railway rates.
  - .That is the reason you exclude it?
  - Α. Yes.



Q. Now, I want to come back to the point I followed off on before I got into another subject, and that was that British Columbia pays the freight both ways. I just have one other example I want to put to you and to which I want you to give some thought, and that is apples, peaches and pears from the Okanagan Valley to Alberta. Who pays the freight on those -- cherries?

THE CHAIRMAN: I think that question should wait until Mr. Frawley gets here.

THE WITNESS: I understand there is a great deal -- I don't know much about it -- of market competition from Washington, probably Idaho, and so on, so I should think the producer in the Okanagan bears the freight rate.

MR. SINCLAIR: Q. Now, Mr. Hughes, you see, this Commission has been told on a number of occasions that the people in the prairies pay the freight on everything they ship and on everything they receive.

Now, do you say the same thing? You not only ship to the prairies but you receive from the prairies?

A. There is a difference in some phases of it and what I say. I say not on everything, and I myself separate it into short-run and long-run positions, and I did not say on everything either.

- Q. You did not?
- A. No, I did not say on everything.
- Q. Both on the things sold and on the commodities imported, there is no exception in it?



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- I find out price elasticities, yes.
- In Canada with the tariffs and alternative Q.

- A. Then it is not everything. In the discussion this morning I think it makes it quite obvious I am not taking this as an overall position, as the prairies do.
- Q. The disadvantage that British Columbia may have in regard to this, is, I suggest to you, restricted to the situation where they are forcing into a market against an alternative source of supply or where they are forcing into a world market and their distance from the world market is such as to make the transport charges in Canada significant?
- A. I agree with you, yes, and this is what I am saying in my brief.
- Q. Furthermore, as an economist, you would agree that a very intensive study of incidence must be made before you can ever say with assurance that on a given shipment at a given time, where the incidence of freight charges may lie, leaving aside this world market situation?
- A. I do not say you need a very intensive study to find out the values of the elasticities.
- Q. You don't think it is difficult to find out the elasticities of the product price?
- A. I know it has been done in very many cases without too much -- I mean, it is not a year's job or anything like that. It is not a very big job.
  - Q. Have you ever done it?
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A. I don't know the submission, no.

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- A. Not for any particular products in Canada I have not, no.
- Q. Would tariffs have something to do with it?
- Tariffs would have something to do with price elasticitics. In a market where there is a tariff against it, then the price tends to become inelastic.
- Q. There is a very large number of considerations that determine, even in an eternal market like Canada, where the incidence of freight rate charges may lie, including alternative sources of supply, elasticities of price, of demand?
  - Oh, yes. Α.
  - And tariffs? Q. .
  - Yes. A .
- Q. And if there is a disability in regard to B.C. producers and some markets, it could be completely eliminated by tariff action?
  - A. Certainly, yes.
- Q. On the top of page 26 you have an example of a comparison between lumber from New Brunswick to Ontario against lumber from Britisa Columbia to Ontario. This Commission has had a submission made to it concerning what has been described as "threshold" -- put the maritimes on the threshold of central markets transportation free. Do you know that submission?



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
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- Q. As I understand what it means, it means that by subsidy the full transportation costs from points in the maritimes to the threshold of the central Canadian market would be taken care of.
  - It is a very interesting submission.
  - Q. . It has been made to this Commission.
  - A. I didn't know that.
- Q. You didn't know that. Then would you consider making a submission to this Commission that you also be put at the threshold of your market in central Canada?
  - A. Oh, I don't think two wrongs make a right.
- Q. So you are saying that the other submission is wrong; correct?
- A. I don't know who wrote it or who put it in, but there may be very good reasons for it, yes; but always the effect on other producers trying to get into the market must be thought of. From British Columbia's point of view it is obviously wrong.
- Q. But if I suggest to you, Mr. Hughes, that if you wanted to assist the B.C. industry or industry in any section of the country, that the use of freight rates as a measure of assistance should be resorted to only when there is no other practical advantage, and by that I mean where the costs or administration or other things would make the use of an alternative method of assistance preferable?
- A. Yes, we look at a modernization programme and cost reductions, and so on, in the Canadian railways



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rates should

as our long-term solution, and we do not look for any short-term artificial solutions, unless there is very good urgent need for it in that particular time.

Q. But my question to you, Mr. Hughes, was that if assistance is to be given to an area -for instance, Ontario or British Columbia, for some
reason -- that the last place that assistance should
be given is through the freight rate structure; that
all other alternative means should be considered and
should be used in preference to the use of the
freight rate structure, because of the artificiality
that subsidies through the freight rate structure
introduce. Would you agree with that?

A. There may be implications that I cannot speak about in the position in British Columbia, but speaking for myself I would agree with you.


COMMISSIONER MANN: Mr. Sinclair, may I ask Mr. Hughes something about the answer.

Why, Mr. Hughes, do you think that freight rates should be the last field that should be touched if assistance were to be given, say, to use Mr. Sinclair's example, to Ontario or British Columbia? What other fields would you think are more suitable for the distribution of assistance that may be necessary?

THE WITNESS: I can only speak for myself.

COMMISSIONER MANN: I understand that.

THE WITNESS: The only reason I do not like to see subsidies in the freight rate structure is because



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it cuts out the economic coordination. Probably the trucker should be carrying traffic on a relative cost basis, but if the railway gets subsidized on any particular traffic -- and I think the truckers had a case there in the maritimes -- then obviously truckers cannot easily get into that particular market.

That is why, I think, if you are going to distribute it, if it is necessary for people in the maritimes or any affected place or industry, then I think that the subsidy, if possible, should be paid to those people, and that is a very difficult thing to administer.


COMMISSIONER MANN: Your concern with a subsidy, as I understand it, distributed through the freight rate structure, is that it obscures the pricing mechanism as between different carriers?

THE WITNESS: It keeps an awful lot of inefficiencies in the transportation system. We want to get these cost reductions under way, and let us get some advantages from modernization and techniques, and so on.

COMMISSIONER MANN: Let us take the case of distributing assistance via the tax structure whereby, say, a carrier is given a tax exemption. Would that tend to obscure the pricing mechanism as well?

THE WITNESS: I think it is a hidden subsidy to the particular carrier, yes.

commissioner mann: So that you would have the same objection to it as you would have to direct subsidy given by way of the freight rate structure, because it obscures



the pricing mechanism?

A. Yes, if the railway has to do something because of national policy and it gets a subsidy for that, well, all right, and you can put the subsidy either into the railways or into other shippers or probably both, if we permit that; but if there are no national obligations and you want to put a subsidy into the railways, to put it into the income tax structure it is just as bad to me as putting it anywhere else in the freight rate structure.


COMMISSIONER MANN: Thank you very much.

MR. SINCLAIR: Q. Your position, I take it, Mr. Hughes, is that the railways should stand on their own feet, and if they are required to carry traffic at unremunerative rates for national policy reasons, that they should be compensated for that so that their proper financial position in relation to work done will come out at the end of the year?

A. That is right, yes, and if any other shippers should also bear the same kind of burden with the railways, they then should also have a reduction in their tariffs to make things the same as they would be under a normal competitive situation.

THE CHAIRMAN: Five minutes, Mr. Sinclair.

---Short recess.



THE CHAIRMAN: Order.

MR. SINCLAIR: Q. Mr. Hughes, in your brief, but to a greater extent in answer to some of my friends, you had some harsh things to say about the horizontal percentage increase method to take care of adjustments, cost of transportation in general revenue cases. You recall what you said in the transcript and in your brief. It starts at page 26 and goes on for a number of pages. You recall "outmoded", "bygone" -- various words like that?

MR. BRAZIER: They are not harsh words.

THE WITNESS: I have some more.

MR.SINCLAIR: Q. Well, let's have them all, Mr. Hughes.

- A. I think the provinces over the years have said everything that can be said about them, but nothing has been done about them, except what we hope to push a little bit further along.
- Q. I quite agree with you that over the years the provinces have said everything that can be said about them, and I quite agree that what the provinces might have wanted to be done has not been done. Has it ever occurred to you that there may be good and sufficient reason for not having done anything about them?
- A. It is very convenient for the railways to do it; it is administrative ease. Apart from that reason, I can't think of any other reason.
  - Q. In other words, you don't think the





Board of Transport Commissioners, in weighing all the problems and necessities in handling these matters, have approached that problem with the understanding and knowledge that, for instance, you would have on the matter?

- A. My reading of the general cases is that the Board of Transport Commissioners are not too keen on them either, but it is administrative ease to do this rather than economic.
- Q. That is the reason that the Board have used it?
  - A. Yes; it has continued.
  - Q. It is because it is easy?
- A. Not just because it is easy. It is easier than possibly any other method.
- Q. Is that the reason they have gone along with horizontal percentage increases -- ease of administration?
  - A. Yes, as far as I can see.
- Q. Have you studied transcripts on the matter?
- A. I have studied the judgments, and I think I have seen one or two transcripts, yes.
- Q. Have you ever taken the trouble to read submissions of various people on behalf of Canadian Pacific on this matter?
  - A. I have seen some.
  - Q. Have you studied them carefully?
  - A. No.



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
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Of income tax.

Isn't income tax a factor in investment

- Q. Have you ever seen suggested ease of administration for the reason that the Board should use horizontal increases?
- A. No, I haven't seen that. There probably would be a lot of other reasons put up by Canadian Pacific, but I don't think that would be one of them.
- Q. As your alternative to the percentage increase method, you suggested that the increased cost be ascertained, these be dissected, and the increases be applied where the increased cost imposed a burden on the railways.
  - That is right.
- And both Mr. McDonald and one other counsel who discussed it with you allowed you to take an easy example, allowed you to take an increase in wages. I would like to ask you to take one that is not quite so easy, and that would be an increase in income taxes. How would you dissect that and apply that?
- A. I would use the type of increase in income tax, I would take the multiple regression analysis on it, find out the percentage variable -line haul -- prorated with the terminal cost and the variable section prorated with the line terminal to increases on the out-of-pocket costs. Now, --
- Before you leave the variable cost, you say you would ascertain the variable portion of investment.




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cost? You determine the variable portion of investment. Is that not so? Where do you think the income tax is picked up in a cost study? Maybe I should ask you that to see if we are on the same wave length.


- A. The question was on income tax. I can't see our reference to investment now. I don't understand the question now.
- Q. You said you would apply multiple regression techniques to determine the impact of income tax.
- A. Yes, and there may be other techniques, but I think I would be inclined to use that.
- Q. What would be the method you would use to get the variability in your regression analysis as to income tax?
- A. I can't just think back to what was done in the grain study here, but there are tests to find out whether certain output units, gross ton-miles and engine hours, miles of track, and so on -- some will be variable to a different degree with the income tax.

  I can't remember what was done in the grain study, but I wouldn't be surprised if that was the method. I can't remember what was done about income tax.
- Q. Let me suggest to you that to get the impact of income tax, it would have to be related to the variability of investment.
  - A. Yes. Another way to do it would be to put it into the cost of money and do it that way.




- Q. Now, there is a large portion of investment that isn't variable.
  - A. Yes.
- Q. And under your method, how would you dissect the income tax cost increase and spread that over that portion of the investment that isn't variable?
- A. Of course, this would be reflected in the fully distributed cost, the same way as the constant expense is done, according to whichever way you want to do it, the proportion of the variable cost or the gross ton-miles.
- Q. What you are saying is that the impact of increase in income tax would be spread over the various elements of the traffic in accordance with their ability to take higher costs and still move freely and make a major contribution?
- A. That is not the way I am saying it, no.

  What I am saying is that the minimum schedule would be increased by the out-of-pocket costs; this is a variable element in the income tax. The maximum schedule would also be increased by the constant element, the fully distributed cost, and the way the railways wanted to recover it is up to them.
- Q. You said that segment of traffic would bear the increased cost arising from the use it made proportionately to the factor that caused the increase in cost. That is your theory as an alternative to horizontal increases.
  - A. And the practical application is to have



the reflection in the out-of-pocket costs in the maximum schedules.

- Q. But the reflection in out-of-pocket costs would be relatively small.
  - A. That may be so, yes.
- Q. And so the big part would be distributed in accordance with the ability of the traffic to bear that increased cost and still move freely, under your method. Is that not so?
- A. Apart from the captive traffic which would take the fully distributed costs, yes.
- Q. That means that the captive traffic, you say, takes the fully distributed cost.
- A. This is the maximum it could take. This isn't the rate, it is the maximum schedule the rates can go.
- Q. And except for the proportion that would move on the maximum, the ability of the traffic to stand the increase and still move freely would determine what increase it took. Is that not so, under your scheme?
- A. Yes, because there is the constant element.
- Q. Now, Mr. Hughes, what you are suggesting, then, is that rate increases on a general basis be put on and tested empirically to see whether they can stand the increase. Is that not what you get down to?
- A. That is just the way a normal competitive firm does it. When it gets an increase it sounds a





particular market out, and the commercial judgment, I think, of the men in business and the railways -- they know where they can put on 2 per cent or 3 per cent and maybe take some off somewhere else. As in any competitive business, it would be precisely the same.

- Q. Now, I have no questions on your chapter on the bridge subsidy, because Canadian Pacific agrees with your position in principle.
  - A. From the same school, I understand.
- Q. And it is of the view that the bridge subsidy was a mistake and should be eliminated at the earliest possible date. But we know that someone else may take a different view, and so I wonder if you could help the Commission by advising -- and I am quite sure you are able to do this -- when the bridge subsidy was applied to that traffic from Eastern Canada, that 20 per cent which you talk about, did the price of the commodities fall to the exact amount of the bridge subsidy in the rate?
  - A. I really don't know, Mr. Sinclair.
- Q. Did you find any indication that that was so, or do you think that the eastern manufacturer took it as a subsidy to himself and put it in his pocket?
- A. No. We are talking about who pays the rates, and so on, and you said yourself there are many factors, and I couldn't honestly say where the subsidy went.
- Q. Did you not say that the bridge subsidy was a subsidy to Ontario or Eastern Canada?





A. Yes.

Q. Then what that means is that the bridge subsidy did not reduce the selling price of commodities moving across the bridge to British Columbia that were subject to the bridge subsidy?

A. That would seem to be so, yes.

COMMISSIONER MANN: Mr. Sinclair, before you leave this point, I wonder whether Mr. Hughes could clarify this for me.

If a commodity is sold f.o.b. plant plus freight, and that movement is subject to the bridge subsidy, would you not then get the benefit in British Columbia from the bridge subsidy? Now, the conditions were f.o.b. plant plus freight.

of long and short-term effects, and it depends exactly what the commodity is. In this instance you outline, then, of course, British Columbia would get the benefit.


COMMISSIONER MANN: It is true that only a relatively small proportion of your traffic is eligible for the bridge subsidy.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

COMMISSIONER MANN: That is because most of your traffic moves west under agreed charges and competitive rates.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

commissioner mann: If, however, two things happened: the bridge subsidy were increased, that is the amount of money was raised from seven million to



seven plus million, and the bridge subsidy were applied to competitive rates and agreed charges, then would it not be true that to the extent that the commodities are sold f.o.b. plant plus freight, British Columbia would get the benefit?

THE WITNESS: British Columbia would get benefit, but only a relative benefit. The very position of the bridge makes the market which is nearer to Ontario than British Columbia -- whether we have it on agreed charges, and so on. This is where I am saying that Ontario gets the benefit.


COMMISSIONER MANN: I think Mr. Sinclair's question was in regard to the movement westward over the bridge.

THE WITNESS: British Columbia does get the benefit in that instance, yes.

MR. SINCLAIR: Q. I appreciate Commissioner Mann raising that. If the price f.o.b. plant plus freight was increased to the amount of the subsidy, which would be a normal thing to do if you were a seller who had control of the market, then what would be the advantage to British Columbia? You have got a true situation of the bridge subsidy being taken as a subsidy to the Ontario producer.

A. Yes. You put your own assumption on that, of course.

COMMISSIONER GOBEIL: You would have to assume that a firm in Toronto would have an f.o.b. price for Ontario and for the West.



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Q. Now, you referred to a number of what you called problem areas, and you went back to the 1949 Royal Commission Submission of the Canadian Pacific.

MR. SINCLAIR: Is there anything wrong with that, may I ask? I take it that you think there isn't that kind of deal made in business.

MR. FRAWLEY: It would be an exceptional seller that he had complete control of the market that he could move the price up as he wanted day by day.

MR. SINCLAIR: Q. In the case you were talking about, he did control the market.

- A. Because the demand was inelastic in British Columbia, yes.
- Q. And he would be able to take the full advantage to himself of the bridge subsidy?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. And I take it that is one of the reasons that British Columbia is against it?
- A. I didn't think of it like that, but it seems to be a very plausible -- it follows from my analysis this morning.
- Q. Now, in regard to your chapter on unremunerative services, basically the position of British
  Columbia is that for good resource allocation, the
  railways should be permitted to abandon unremunerative
  services rather than have these subsidized unless
  there is a subsidy needed to maintain the service in
  the national interest.
  - A. Yes.



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Let me take the first one, and that is At. and East grain rates. I suggest to you that At. and East grain rates have increased very, very substantially since 1948.


- A. Now, then, I am not sure now whether At.

  and East grain rates are at 1 cent a ton-mile, which

  I understand is the cost of carrying the statutory grain.

  I know there are differences of the length of haul,

  and so on.
  - Q. Differences in gathering cost, too?
- A. Yes, I know there are differences in cost, and so on, and I haven't analysed the situation. I was just pointing out that these are suspect areas.
- Q. Did you read the evidence of Mr. Edsforth on At. and East grain rates, that the shipments, for instance, at the At. and East rates to Montreal, he said, would be remunerative, the ones to Quebec, Three Rivers, would be marginal, and the ones to Halifax were suspect and they were looking at it. Do you remember that evidence?
  - A. I recall it now, yes.
- Q. So that problem is in hand in view of that?
- A. If these very long distance rates to the Coast are being looked at, it would seem to be in hand, yes.



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Q. Now, another area you referred to was LCL.

By the way, have you seen the integrated merchandising terminal of Canadian Pacific at Vancouver?


A. Yes.

- Q. And this terminal and the service there of using rail or trucks based on the economics of such movements is a way of attacking this short-haul LCL problem, is it not?
- A. Yes; I was very impressed with the terminal and the things they do.

COMMISSIONER BALCH: Is this set up as a merchandising . . . ?

MR. SINCLAIR: This is the merchandising service of Canadian Pacific in their pilot operations, referred to in the evidence and about which the Commission will hear more.

- Q. That problem is in hand?
- A. Well . . .
- Q. It is being worked on?
- A. It is being worked on in Vancouver, yes; and no doubt you are doing all you can about it. But nobody knows what the costs are. We all know what the revenues are and what the rates are. Nobody knows what the costs are; so we take the Canadian Pacific's word for it that they are doing all they can about it.
- Q. What you mean by "nobody" is nobody except the people who have the responsibility of pricing the service at such a level as to go out and make a dollar?



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- Yes; but if Canadian Pacific is running, say, LCL at a loss as the service was in 1949, then somebody is going to take up the burden; and it is not the C.P.R. that is doing it; it is the freight shippers.
- I will discuss who is taking up the Q. . burden with you later. But is there anything wrong in having the responsibility placed on a man, who has the obligation to make a dollar, of pricing his goods properly? Is there anything wrong with that in the railway industry?
- Α. There are many things that prevent the railways from doing that. There is passenger deficit ..
  - Q. I am talking about LCL.
- If it happened in 1949 why shouldn't it happen in 1960?
- Q. I will discuss passenger deficit later, right after this. Let us keep to the LCL. You have had an opportunity of seeing it and looking at it and studying it. The Canadian Pacific have introduced an integrated merchandise service to deal with the LCL problem -- and this terminal cost a substantial amount of money, didn't it?
  - I should think so, yes. Α.
- Q. Is it not the proper way to allow the person, who has the responsibility of making a dollar on his investment, to price his services and to know his costs without telling everybody else about it? What is wrong with that?



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- Α. Because if you don't make a profit on it -- if you are pricing the service at less than outof-pocket cost -- then somebody is going to bear the burden.
  - It may very well be the shareholders?
- A. That may very well be, but by the same token it is the shipper who has to have his freight rate put up; and if it happened in 1949 what is going to happen in the future when we are going to get more and more competition and captive traffic is getting less and less?
- Q. So that one of the things that you are trying to do is to protect the Canadian Pacific shareholder from the incompetence of its management?
  - A. It would seem to be that, yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: Are you working this in British Columbia?


MR. SINCLAIR: Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: Is that rail or non-rail?

THE WITNESS: It is a mixter-maxter right at the moment, because it is in its pilot operation. There is some of it in rail and some of it isn't in rail; but obviously this becomes rail when the thing sorts out.

COMMISSIONER MANN: Express?

MR. SINCLAIR: Under Board of Transport section 387, the studies we have had them and the discussion we have had with them, they recognize that we are in a transition period and in a difficult problem of



integration; and we have problems in making certain that our labour relations are straightened out; we have a big problem there. We have a big problem on our method and procedure and a number of other things.

But I would expect -- I have no reason to expect othewise -- that when the matter got straightened out it would come all into rail. Basically it is LCL and express and LTL.

THE CHAIRMAN: It is all scrambled at the moment?

MR. SINCLAIR: At the moment, yes.

Q. You urged me, Mr. Hughes, to discuss the passenger situation with you.

I think you would agree -- if you don't I am sure you will tell me -- that the passenger problem is best met by eliminating the deficit either by having the service stand on its own feet where it is operated, or eliminating this service where alternative methods of travel and the desire to use those alternative methods have been indicated by the travelling public?

A. Yes.

Q. The policy of Canadian Pacific, Mr.

Hughes -- and you have done an awful lot of reading,

and I wouldn't be at all surprised if you have even

read this -- the policy of the Canadian Pacific in

passenger train services has been stated quite recently,

and I just wonder if you have read it. It was on

May 4th, 1960, by the president in his address to the

shareholders. Did you happen to see that?



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A. I must have overlooked this year's copy.

Q. Maybe I will put it to you so that you can have it. I think it might be of interest also to the Commission.


This is Mr. Crump speaking . . .

MR. BRAZIER: Are you going to file it as an exhibit?

MR. SINCLAIR: I don't think it is necessary to file all this.

"One of your company's objectives has been, and continunes to be, the elimination of all losses from the operation of railway passenger services. Aggressive action has been taken over a number of years to reduce passenger service in relation to the demand. Reduction in the volume of passenger business, brought about by the changing travel habits of Canadians, will necessitate still further reductions in passenger train service. Your Company has the second largest fleet of any railroad of modern self-propelled rail diesel cars. Modern stainless steel passenger train coaches, including scenic dome cars, are available for runs that will support volume movement of passengers with conventional trains."

Now, in the light of that policy my questions to you



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will be these: Canadian Pacific is phasing out of passenger operations where that is indicated by virtue of demand.

- Α. I am very glad to hear it.
- Q. I have just stated it.
- Α. I am glad to hear your policy there.
- Q. Now, you would agree that has to be a gradual process?
  - A . Yes.
- Q. . And that the railway has to do it gradually and meet gradually what has been a most rapid change in the travelling habits of people.
- I don't think there has been a very rapid change. I don't know your passenger figure, but it seems to me that these passenger deficits have been going on for an awful long time and that is one of the reasons why we have had these revenue cases .
- Q. Have you ever looked at the statistics to see the increase in air travel between Winnipeg and Toronto arising from the excellent air service and the competition in the air that is now available between these two points?
- A. Yes; but that is only one factor. In the same year we have had an increase in population, increase in the wealth of the people who get around more. The very fact that you have air transportation suddenly appearing doesn't mean to say that the deficits that the railways experience will drop off.
  - Let me give you an example once again. Q.



Do you know what the increase in air travel was on

Trans-Canada Air Lines between Toronto and Montreal


last year? I suggest it was 25.6 per cent in one year.

The population between Toronto and Montreal didn't go

up 25.6 per cent.

- A. This is also a profitable operation for the railways in passenger service, isn't it?
  - Q. Yes.
- A. Well, it doesn't correlate with what you are saying.
- Q. It may require adjustment of services,
  may it not, and adjustments to equipment and adjustments
  of time? All these things take time.
  - A. Adjustments do take time, yes.
- Q. And, Mr. Hughes, it would be wrong to suggest that the freight payer at the time of the change should be relieved of any burden that comes from passenger services when the benefits from passenger services were acquired by those same freight payers in days gone by?
  - A. I can't understand your reasoning there.
- Q. You can't. Let me put it to you again:
  In this period of change of passenger service, which,
  you have agreed, must be gradual, the freight payers
  should continue to take the passengers as a part of the
  unitized railway operations just as they did in the
  past?

For instance, when passenger train service was profitable it relieved the amount of money necessary



 from the freight payer?

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MR. BRAZIER: How far back?

MR. SINCLAIR: Just a minute. If you want to be cross-examined you had better ask him to step down and I will cross-examine you.

THE WITNESS: In that period the earnings on Canadian Pacific stock were very much greater than they are now, and the deficits were distributed equally to the railways and probably there was less burden on the freight shipper -- maybe there was even a subsidy; but it was equally shared between the stockholders and the freight shippers, and this is what we are asking for now, essentially.

(Page 13890 follows)



- Q. I see, you are not one of those people that suggests that while there is a gradual phasing out, passenger train deficits as they now are should be eliminated in considering freight rates.
- A. I don't know how long you are speaking of when passenger services were profitable, but the body of freight shippers has very obviously changed in these years. There are new shippers now that were not in existence then.
- Q. What I am asking you, Mr. Hughes, is: is it your position, the position of British Columbia, that passenger train deficits which are now under the process of phasing out, according to the policy I have given you of the Canadian Pacific, in that phasing out period should put no longer any burden on any other user of railway services. Is that your position?
- A. Yes, we do not want the burden of passenger deficits on freight shippers.
- Q. But if, Mr. Hughes, having had the advantage, you took it down through the years, why should not you take the concomitant burden that arises through changes in the travel pattern?
- A. It seems to me that you are making a statement there that I have no method of checking. You say there were passenger profits in the past applied to the freight rates of shippers, and this is something I know that the equity stock has been paying less and less of C.P. over the years, I know that fact, but I do not know the fact about the passenger profits and

costs and so on during the period you are talking about, so I cannot accept what you are saying.

- Q. Let us assume at some time in the history that these passenger train services and freight services were considered by the regulatory tribunal to be a unitized service, that railway service was considered to be unitized in respect of passenger and freight. You know that is the way the regulatory authority considers it, don't you?
- A. As far as I know, that was the position in the 21 per cent case, wash't it?
- Q. And they were only expressing the same position that they had in the 1920.
  - A. Yes.
- Q. Then I am asking you, during this period of phasing out of passenger train services, why should the people who demanded this service not take the obligation for it?
- A. Mr. Gordon before the Sessional Committee said that the C.N.R. on I.C.C. statistics lost \$90 million for passenger services. Now, this is an awful lot for one railroad to be putting onto the freight shippers, if those figures are right.
- Q. Let us forget about Mr. Gordon and you talk to Mr. McDonald about him.
- A. It is the same thing as happening in the C.P. now.
- Q. What have you got to suggest that there is the same thing happening?




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again. It is the position of British Columbia that freight payers should not bear the passenger deficit.

- A. That is right, yes.
- Q. Is it the position of British Columbia that, for instance, they want passenger service?
- A. I don't think they are expressing very strong views on that, whether they want it on the C.F.R. line. They are willing to go out and do something about it, willing to put some money out to be protected and so on. Where they want it they do something about it.
- Q. I see, and if it is shown that the passenger train service that they want cannot stand on its own feet, then is it the position of your Government that they will make up the difference so that it will not continue to be a burden on anybody?
- A. I cannot say what is the position of the Government on that.

MR. BRAZIER: I can advise my learned friend that it is not the position of the Province of British Columbia.

- MR. SINCLAIR: Q. Then now having it stated by counsel that it is not the position of British Columbia that the province wants to make up deficits, that it is going to make up the deficits, if the only person that wants it is B.C. and the railways do not want it, they are losing money, but B.C. wants it -- who is going to make up the difference?
  - A. I say I spread it all out in the brief



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here, and I say probably a contract service, probably an abandonment where it is not possible, probably repricing. There are all kinds of solutions.

If the thing cannot be abandoned, it has to be in the national interest that they have a railway passenger service put on, then this should be borne by the nation and not by the particular freight or class of captive freight shippers.

- What you are saying to this Commission on passenger service, is this, that the railways, where there are alternative methods that meet the requirements of the travelling public, should abandon their service.
  - A. Where possible, yes.
- Q. And No. 2, if the service is serving a local need, that they should adjust their prices, and if they still cannot make it up, then that local need should make up any deficit, correct?
  - A. Yes, that is all down here.
- And the third alternative would be 0. where there would be a passenger train service that was necessary in the national interest and it could not make money, and in this instance that service deficit should be the obligation of the national treasury.
- A. Where it was deemed in the national interest, yes.
- Q. Now, have you read the submission of Mr. Crump to this Commission in which he said that he knew of no passenger trains on the Canadian Pacific that



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It was to that portent, you recall?

A. I cannot recall the exact words.

A. Yes.

were in the national interest?

- Q. Now, have you any passenger train services on Canadian Pacific that you would like to suggest that are in the national interest which Mr. Crump has overlooked?
- A. No, I am not the keeper of the national interests, and I am not coming from one end of the country in such a lowly position and saying what is the national interest.
- Q. British Columbia -- not speaking to you as Mr. Hughes -- has British Columbia got any that they would like to say Mr. Crump has overlooked, and the reasons therefor?
- A. I cannot answer that one because I do not know what British Columbia thinks is the national interest.

MR. GUEST: You have still got passenger services on the P.G.E.?

MR. SINCLAIR: Of course, any losses on P.G.E. are subsidized by the Province of British Columbia, and that may be quite proper.

THE CHAIRMAN: But B.C. may be pretty clear that they were to be in subsidy. Then P.G.E. had to get in on it.

MR. GUEST: Get in on the act.

MR. SINCLAIR: Only, I think, sir, when we are dealing with matters of movement, projects that were



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
in the national interest.

THE CHAIRMAN: Oh, yes, surely.

MR. SINCLAIR: Q. Now, Mr. Hughes, if I may, I will come to another matter, and that is the question of Crow's Nest grain rates. I think your submission has made it clear, first, that the position of British Columbia is that the grain growing industry in Western Canada is in the national interest, that is correct?

- A. Yes.
- Q. In the brief of British Columbia?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And that in the view of British Columbia now and in the foreseeable future, the Western Canadian grain farmer cannot afford to take up higher transportation charges in the movement of grain and products to export positions.
  - A. Where do I say this?
- Q. You said that in some of the evidence in amplification of your brief. I have not the page.

  Do you not recall expressing that view?
- A. I am not sure if you have got the words there or the context. I am just looking for it if you don't mind.
- Q. I have not the context. I am asking you if that was not your position? Are you quarrelling with some word I used in your mind, Mr. Hughes? Let met put it again, that it is the position of British Columbia that now and in the foreseeable future, in the



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light of all the facts involved in the grain business, that the farmer cannot afford himself to take up higher transportation charges -- the farmer cannot now or in the foreseeable future, without undue hardship, afford to take up additional transportation charges in moving

grain and products to export positions.

A. I do not want to be unresponsive here. I am just not sure what I said. It sounds as though it might be it. It is the "foreseeable future" I am not too clear on. I would like to have a look at where I said that.

- Q. As far as you can see forward, put it that way, I think that is exactly what you said.
  - A. Yes.
  - Q. As far as you can see forward?
  - Α. Yes.
- Q. Then you would accept that statement, correct?

COMMISSIONER ANSCOMB: May I just ask you, Mr. Hughes, what makes you think that?

THE WITNESS: I this is what I said. I would rather have a look at the transcript and see what I did say.

COMMISSIONER ANSCOMB: Let us forget what you did say. Do you think it?

THE WITNESS: That the farmer in the future probably won't be able to pay his freight rate?

COMMISSIONER ANSCOMB: I do not say pay the freightrates. Mr. Sinclair said he could not pay



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29 30 any more freight rates. Do you say that, do you agree with that?


THE WITNESS: As far as I can see, with the position of world markets now, I cannot see the farmers getting any richer or the competition getting easier. I think if there was an increase in the statutory rates, then production of wheat would be cut down quite a lot in Canada, and this may or may not be in the national interest.

COMMISSIONER ANSCOMB: I want you to forget this national interest business for a minute -- and I must admit I would like somebody to tell me what this national interest business really is -- but how do you know that the farmer cannot pay any more freight now, this morning? Have you got any evidence to support that?

A. No, if you put freight rates up for statutory grain, then some of them could not pay the freight, but obviously I do not think grain would stop moving. Some of them could bear it and others could not. It depends on the increase in the rates.

However, I am sure there would be less grain grown simply because some of them could not afford to move the wheat at the new rate. On the other hand, there would be some that could. Not all farmers are in the same position.

COMMISSIONER ANSCOMB: Every other business in Canada is in that position. No matter what business it is, some can do this and some the other and some



cannot.

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A. Yes, if costs go up in the business, then some businesses go out in that line of trade. That is what would happen in the farming, I think, some of the marginal farmers.

MR. SINCLAIR: Q. The farmer is in a different position in Canada, is he not, in that he is meeting nationalistic policies in the importing countries in regard to cereal grain production, and he is also meeting subsidized production in the very large competing area in the United States who resort to dumping into typical Canadian cereal markets. That is so, is it not?

A. Apart from your last statement. I am not sure about dumping into typical Canadian markets.

I would not accept that without having a look at it a little bit further.

COMMISSIONER BALCH: Is it not possible,

Mr. Sinclair, that Russia in the future may be quite a

competitor with the world markets in grain?

MR. SINCLAIR: Well, of course, Mr. Balch, at one time what is now part of Russia was a competitor, and I see no reason to think that, Russian trade policies being what they are, they will not be a very formidable factor; but I do not think we have to look as far away as Russia to look for a formidable factor on that question of grain sales and overseas markets. We just have to look to the United States.

COMMISSIONER BALCH: Dumping, yes.



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MR. SINCLAIR: Whether we use a harsh word like "dumping" or some other kind of word like "loan".

THE CHAIRMAN: Some device.

MR. SINCLAIR: Some device. It still has a tremendous impact on the ability of the western Canadian agriculture to carry increased costs, because it would be my submission, sir, that the efficiency of the western Canada farmer is certainly not less than his American counterpart, and that he operates under just as stable a government, and his costs or production other than transportation are not higher overall. His transportation costs are certainly very much lower. But, notwithstanding all these things, his returns are substantially less than his American counterpart, and this arises from Government policy.

It is these reasons that were behind the basis put forward by Canadian Pacific jointly with Canadian National, that the western Canadian farmer, without undue hardship, could not bear increased transportation costs; and, with the knowledge that under existing world market situations and demand elasticities, that an increase in those transportation costs would flow right back to the farmer.

THE CHAIRMAN: Well, we will solve this question at two o'clock.

MR. SINCLAIR: I have now found the part of the record where Mr. Hughes was dealing with this question I put to him and I will show it to him.

---Luncheon Adjournment.





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On resuming at 2.00 p.m.


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THE CHAIRMAN: Order, please.

MR. SINCLAIR: Q. Mr. Hughes, just prior to the luncheon adjournment we were discussing the position of the province of British Columbia in the matter of statutory rates on grain and grain products to export positions in western Canada, being your Chapter 4 in your part 1, and we had dealt with the first position that grain growing in western Canada and the movement of the grain and grain products to export positions was in the national interest, and you agreed with that, and I was on the second position, and that was, as I had paraphrased your position, the position of British Columbia was that the farmer western Canada, the grain farmer in western Canada could not take in increased transportation charges without undue hardship, and you asked me to refer you to the transcript, and I have done so and it is volume 76, page 13489, where you said:

> "I have not studied the situation of farm income too much, but the general impression I get is that the statutory rates will have to remain at the existing level. if the prairie provinces are going to continue to be a help to Canada in the exports of wheat and so on that they are now."

And then later on on the same page: "I think the wheat market is getting



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more and more competitive, and I see no trend that farm incomes are going up."

It was on the basis of those answers to my friend Mr. Cooper that I paraphrased the position I put to you. In the light of that, do you accept -- you are not wanting to change that position?


- A. No, that is fine.
- The third position of British Columbia would be, I take it, that in the light of those two facts we have just discussed a difference between the statutory level and what would be a just and reasonable rate should be a charge upon the national treasury?
  - Α. Yes.
- Then as I said to you at the recess, I now want to turn to page 13491 of Volume 76 and ask for some clarification. Here the Chairman asked you:

"Do you agree with the C.P.R.'s submission in this connection, do you go that

Your answer:

certainly do not, no. Well, fair contribution to overhead here, I think what I had in mind was the constant expenses which are solely related to the grain traffic. That is what I had in mind."

Now, Mr. Hughes, it seems to me a



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little garbled, because I think we can agree that constant expenses are, by definition, not traceable, and, of course, if you have a solely related expense it is variable in its entirety. So what you are saying is that the contribution would have relation to constant expenses which are solely related must be garbled in some way, and I take t when you say you are not agreeing with the Canadian Pacific's proposal, it is really this, and see if you agree with this, that the Canadian Pacific proposal was that the just and reasonable rate for the movement of grain and grain products to export position in western Canada was at a level that would fit it in with the balance of the freight rate structure and then was tested against total cost?

- A. Yes.
- Q. Now, your proposition would be that the level of the grain rate, such traffic being captive, should be fixed at total cost --
- No -- have you finished the question? I am sorry.
- -- at total cost as long as that level Q. would make the maximum contribution to the financial requirement of the railway, and that is your proposition, is it not?
  - Not quite. Α.
- Then I guess I don't understand your position. Maybe you could help me and possibly, through me, the Commission and tell me where I have



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misstated it?

A. First of all, I will clear up this bit on page 13491 in answer to your question, and I do realise now, of course -- and it is in here what I mean by constant cost is constant to the whole system. Constant cost is not related to the grain traffic; there is not a solely related cost to grain. That is one part of the question.

Now, the other part of the question. It is British Columbia's idea that the captive traffic, any captive traffic , -- the maximum rate shall not go above fully distributed cost. Now, the actual grain rate may be below fully distributed cost, but it may not be above it.

- Q. The only reason it would be below it would be where demand factors were such that if it was put at fully allocated cost, putting it at that level would result in a smaller contribution to constant expenses than if it was put atta lowerolevelleve Now, that is basic to your position as to all captive traffic?
- A. Yes. If the demand is elastic you get a greater contribution if you reduce the price.
- Q. You are not saying it is significant, the elasticity?
  - A. I don't know what the elasticity is.
- Q. When you are considering matters of that kind as an economist, one has to also consider not only price elasticity and the effect of price elasticity



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
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but also the inability of certain fixed segments of the community to move quickly. This is a factor that an economist must look at. Correct?

A. Yes.

- Q. And while I recognise you have only been in Canada a short time, you would agree that another factor that must be looked upon is the socialogical factor which marked changes in the grain-growing economy of western Canada would bring about by marked shifts in price to the farmer?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. And all these things taken together,

  I suggest to you, makes for the factors that you look
  upon and take into consideration when considering
  elesticity of demand for transportation?
- A. When one is studying elasticity of demand for transportation, it is usual to take the short-run in which these socialogical factors -- they are just not there in the short-run; and if you are talking about the long-run, it is not very usual to talk about long-run elasticities.
- Q. Do you not think that socialogical changes in western Canada are operative in the short-run in respect to elasticity of demand for transportation in the movement of grain?
- A. No, not socialogical factors. If
  you put the grain up socialogical factors would not
  affect the short-run.
  - Q. In other words, you are saying that



because you think transportation demand is inelastic?

- A. No; in the long-run the demand for transportation would be elastic.
  - Q. I asked you in the short-run?
    - A. It would be inelastic.
- Q. The socialogical factors alone would make it inelastic?
- A. I wouldn't agree with socialogical factors in the short-run. It may be that the farmer is growing his wheat and he has to move it and sell it, and therefore he will demand transportation even if the price has gone up. It has nothing to do with socialogical conditions; it is just that he is growing his wheat.
- Q. Let me suggest to you that the whole socialogical factors would motivate authorities to protect the farm community and not allow large movements off farm because of the change in the transportation factor, that socialogically that could not happen in the short-term?
- A. In the short-term, no; in the long-term, yes.
- Q. And a short-term in the matter where the whole of the economy for seventy years has been built around growing grain, cereal grains, may be thirty years or so; in other words, a family cycle?
- A. No. I am talking about price elasticities and changes in reight rates. If you



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call this the long-run. I am asking you on socialogical factors. Q.

are talking about thirty years or more, then I would

- You couldn't envisage changes in more than the family cycle, say, thirty years. It would have to be done very, very gradually if you are going to shrink the western farmer in western Canada?
- A. Yes, I would agree it would be a long time.
- Q. Now, when you deal with fully allocated costs as fixing the level for captive traffic -- and you, of course, make reference to the burden studies in the United States on a number of occasions -- when you talk about fully distributed costs or fully allocated costs, you mean calculated as they are in the United States Bureau of Cost-finding?
- A. It doesn't matter which method you use, whether in the grain study or the I.C.C., they are both an arbitrary allocation of constant cost.
- What you mean is that by arbitrary --I suggest to you that doesn't allow tracing; it means you have to pick a statistical technique and divide it equally over all traffic without actually tracing the traffic which occasions the expense?
  - A. That is correct.
- Q. You said it didn't make any difference to you whether you operated under the United States distribution of constant costs or under the one adopted



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in i	the	grain	studies	presented	to	this	Commission?
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- Α. In the brief we state the method used in the grain study would be quite acceptable, but any level for the fully distributed costs should be related in some way to the out-of-pocket expenses of moving the traffic. Either of those methods would do that.
- But there are some other differences Q. . you may have overlooked, and I don't want to try at some later date to take your evidence out of context. In the United States allocation the deficit is distributed over freight?
  - Yes, in this burden study. Α.
  - 0. And you accept that?
- I don't accept the principle of freight shippers paying for passenger shippers. Something should be done about that. But if you can't do anything about it, if the position is there and this was the constant expense, then it has to be allocated to whoever can pay it.
- Then, Mr. Hughes, you had a number of questions put to you which finished by you stating at page 13499, Volume 76, that on the Canadian Pacific -and I am using your words -- "it is a clear case."

THE CHAIRMAN: What was a clear case?

MR. SINCLAIR: A clear case that the burden from grain had been borne by the other shippers and I think the witness said later on in answer to one of my friends, he qualified that to some degree by saying that there was some of each, some borne by



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
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the railways and some borne by the shippers. Q.

- Is that correct, Mr. Hughes?
- Yes.
- I just want to see how you come to the view that some of the burden arising from statutory grain rates has been borne by the shippers and has not been borne by the railways, and I must do this, if you don't mind, by asking you to consider specific movements as examples. instance, apples out of the Okanagan: How would they have affected the movement of apples out of the Okanagan, how would the shippers of apples have borne any part of the statutory grain?
- Well, apples -- I am just trying to think of the percentage increase in apples, whether it is a low percentage increase or a high percentage increase. The very fact that there has been a percentage increase puts the burden on the apple growers in the Okanagan.
- Are you suggesting that if grain had Q. borne its proportionate share of increased costs of transportation the rate on apples would have gone up less, notwithstanding the fact that on Canadian Pacific it has been 3 per cent or 4 per cent?
- Yes, and I have based my answer on what A. Mr. Edsforth said.
- They did not state that the increase Q. would have been less, all they said was it would be



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a factor to take into account when the percentage increase was applied. You see, Mr. Hughes, what you have overlooked is that the result of percentage increases is an empirical testing of the market. Let me give you the example of lumber, which you are very familiar with, coming from British Columbia. Mr. McDonald pointed out that since 1951 the increases in the lumber shipments east were 19 per cent, but even from the post war period that was 78 per cent, and even though the rates are fixed at a commodity level, they still reflect competitive factors?

Let me give you an example of a competitive rate that has gone up on lumber 148 per cent. It has gone up from Vancouver to Winnipeg 148 per cent since the first general level, so I can't see how you can say we have not been taking the increase in other areas.

There is another one that has gone 0. up 86 per cent, and that is to Saskatchewan. Have you figured that one out, too? Does this not show, Mr. Hughes, that, notwithstanding percentage increases, the very ability of the traffic to withstand transportation charges and continue to move freely -- the rates have been adjusted to that factor?

Yes, and the point is that it is the that are bearing the burden. If other shippers it wasn't for the percentage increase, then they wouldn't have to pay 148 per cent increase into Winnipeg.

Page 13915 follows



Q. They wouldn't; so that what you are saying is that with that the railways made a proper profit to keep them in a financially sound position. In the light of that let me take the years 1958 and 1959. In 1958, you will recall from your reading that the Canadian National Railways had a deficit of approximately \$50 million and Canadian Pacific made a return of 2.7 per cent on its net investment. In 1959 Canadian National had a deficit in excess of \$40 million and the Canadian Pacific made a return again of 2.7 per cent, leaving off fractions.

In the light of that, even at the rates -some 150, some maybe 140, some 75, some 35 over any
given level -- how can they be bearing a burden of
grain rates with that very small return? ---

MR. BRAZIER: I don't see too much connection between the two.

MR. SINCLAIR: Maybe I can explain it to my friend.

- Q. This isn't clear to you? Is it clear to you, Mr. Hughes?
  - A. No.
- Q. All right. I will explain it again.

  What you are assuming, Mr. Hughes, is this, that the


  Canadian Pacific can forego any increase from one-quarter to

  one-third of its total Canadian traffic and transfer

  the burden that should have been borne by that traffic

  to other traffic and still allow it to move freely

  and maximize the movement on behalf of the carrier?



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
That is the assumption.

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- That seems a little involved, because .
- Well, it is an involved situation, and I think you have to get it down to its elements.

Did you know that grain and grain products involved between one-half and one-third of the total freight movement of the Canadian Pacific?

- Yes, I did.
- Then, you are suggesting the railways, notwithstanding that, were able to transfer all that burden to the balance of its traffic?
- A. No, but they have certainly transferred some of that burden, because as Mr. Edsforta said in cross-examination the horizontal percentage increases would be between 112 per cent and 115 per cent instead of the very large one of 157 per cent increase that we have; so that suggests to me that there is some burden there. There may have been some burden to the railway as well, but there has certainly been a burden on the shipper.
- What Mr. Edsforth said was that if you took the revenue requirements in any given year and applied those to the dollar amount of traffic that the railways had to carry by statute in a given year the resulting calculation would have been less; but we have been testing now for two years, and so while you can do these things theoretically I am asking you to turn your mind to it practically and take 1958 and 1959. You have explained it would have meant Canadian Pacific



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was able to transfer the costs associated with carrying from a quarter to a third of its total freight in Canada to the balance; and the fact that it nasn't been able to so is demonstrated by the fact that it only made a return of 2.7 per cent.

Do you not see that and agree with it?

- A. I agree with that, but I can only go part of the way. But some of the burden has been borne by the other shippers, and I would like to give you what Mr. Edsforth did say. I can look it up . . .
- Q. Well, you can read it and I will argue about it. You can read it if you wish.

COMMISSIONER GOBEIL: May I ask you a question,
Mr. Sinclair?

MR. SINCLAIR: Yes.

COMMISSIONER GOBEIL: Do I understand if the C.P.R. would have \$40 million more subsidy given to the farmers -- to the railways -- for grain export it wouldn't change anything in the tariff?

MR. SINCLAIR: I wouldn't say that; I wouldn't say that at all. I would say that that is a factor which must be taken into account and the rates looked at in the light of the availability of that money. But I am now talking about who is carrying the burden. You see the reason why this is important. Royal Commissions sometimes make mistakes. We pointed out one with respect to the short line to the maritimes . . .

MR. FRAWLEY: The second Turgeon Commission was another one.



Hard facts so far

MR. SINCLAIR: I am talking about facts, not about opinions on Royal Commissions being wrong.

as Alberta is concerned.

MR. FRAWLEY:

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MR. SINCLAIR: The point I was making, until I was so rudely interrupted in answering — the point is that in the Turgeon Royal Commission of 1949-50 the mistake was made of assuming that the burden of the statutory grain rates had been transferred by the railways to other shippers, notwithstanding the facts; but I am saying to this Commission now that whatever they did this has not been so today. I have given you the years 1958 and 1959, and the results which have pointed up, if I may say, very helpfully, this point; and it is too bad that this is so, by the position of the Canadian National and Canadian Pacific combined.

But the specific answer to your question:

Does that mean that it wouldn't affect the rate

structure? -- The answer to that is No, it would

affect it because it would give traffic officers an


opportunity to operate within that amount of net

revenues to maximize the flow of traffic at different

levels, which they cannot do now.

THE CHAIRMAN: I suppose we will hear a lot more about that later from both sides.

COMMISSIONER MANN: On the assumption that Canadian Pacific had, in 1949, advanced to the Turgeon Commission the formula you are now advancing, and on the further assumption that the Turgeon Commission



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would have granted your request . .

MR. SINCLAIR: Yes?

COMMISSIONER MANN: . . . would the increases since that time have been as high as they have been?

MR. SINCLAIR: Well, if I may answer that in this way, I would think that the increases would not have had to be as high because the attrition and erosion that arose from the empirical testing out of the demand for transport characteristics for some other traffic would not have been necessary, and for that reason the increases wouldn't have been as high.

THE CHAIRMAN: Would other rates have been lower?

MR. SINCLAIR: The answer to that, for the reason I have given, is Yes.


THE WITNESS: I want to give you, Mr. Sinclair, the bases of my opinion in my answer.

MR. SINCLAIR: Q. Yes, by all means.

A. In Volume 13 at page 1815:

"Q. Can you give me any indication of what the percentage increase would have been had you been able to increase the statutory rate on the various increases that occurred since 1950, what the percentage would have been.

"A. Well, that is quite an involved calculation, Mr. Brazier. I would think around -- it may have been 115, 112 per cent, I don't know; it would be in that range, I think."



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"A. Well, of course, rates have moved up in general revenue cases higher than they would have had we been able to

places the emphasis on statutory grain. . . " Then, moving down to line 21, to a question by Mr. Blair:

And Mr. Roberts, in Volume 28, page 4175, line 12:

You say 'unless a substantial burden' -- these are your words -- 'were to be placed on other traffic.' Have you any idea what other types of traffic might have to bear any burden?

"A. Well, they have all shared, I would say, Mr. Blair, in varying degrees, because we have applied increases as and when it was possible for us to do so.

So that your conclusion is that the burden has been imposed upon them?

"A. There has been a burden on traffic and a burden on the railways as a result of the statutory rates."

Those are the bases of my opinion.


Q. And you would agree that, whatever was the fact over the ten years from 1948 to 1958, the testing ground is here now, and you an see the effect of a given rate level subject to empirical testing by improving volume, by lowering certain tnings . . .

A. I can, certainly.



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- Q. . . . without it bearing any part of the transportation costs that are rightfully belonging to it in view of its proportion to the total traffic?
- A. I can certainly see the effect of this increase in burden on other traffic. I can see the effect in connection with truck traffic -- the erosion of that class of traffic to the truck. I think you mentioned the erosion of traffic to rates being pushed on to the other traffic.
- Q. You seem very anxious to talk about the erosion to trucking traffic, but let me suggest to you that if traffic is competitive then the rate, if the railways were moving the traffic, is taking into account the alternative transportation media and is properly pricing the traffic?
  - A. Oh, yes.
- Q. So that they wouldn't change the price of that traffic?
  - A. No.
- Q. And if the railways on captive traffic, on your basis of rate making, were charging less than fully distributed cost then there would be one reason for saying, under your scheme, that there is no burden put on that traffic; is that correct?
- A. Well, the very fact that the railway rates are high -- even rates that may be paper rates which the railway may be wanting to come down lower -- when the railway puts on a rate increase because of general rate increases then the truckers will move in




and take the traffic; and at that time it is too late for the railways to backtrack and take over the traffic again. The rates have been going up, and truck competition has been coming in, and one reason is, at least, high rates due to the statutory grain.

- Q. Let us go over it again. I say: In respect to the fact of traffic being captive, if that rate on the captive traffic is less than the fully allocated cost that traffic has not been bearing any burden because of the fixed rate on grain. Is that correct?
- A. You are quite right, except that the rates would not have gone up so much had it not been for the losses in other areas.
- Q. Well, now, Mr. Hughes, I think from those answers and the answers to which you referred I can present whatever argument I have on behalf of the Canadian Pacific to the Commission on this subject.

I now come to your Chapter 5 and your one-and-one-third rule. As Mr. Frawley was anxious to say a minute ago, the Turgeon Commission made an error here. They made a grievous error; and I certainly agree with the position of British Columbia in respect to the one-and-one-third rule and the fact that it has introduced into the rate structure an unnecessary and unjustified artificality.

These were the words you used yesterday, that it introduced an unnecessary artificiality, and I think that is a very happy phrase, and I think, Mr. Hugnes, it




A. Yes.

is one that I will adopt as properly describing the one-and-one-third.

Now, we turn to Part 2, if we may, of your submission . . . I am sorry, there is one other note I have here and I must clear it up, because the fact that my friend Mr. Hume expressed surprise at your answer didn't clarify it.

This was an answer given to one of my friends, in which you said that the economic way of moving grain on branch lines might be trucks. Now, I take it, Mr. Hughes, you are aware of the transcript where the average rate on domestic grain is stated by Mr. Edsforth to be something around 2 cents per ton mile?

- A. Yes.
- Q. And I take it that it was your understanding that the railways' proposal is an overall average of a rate at one cent per ton mile?
  - A. For the statutory grain?
  - Q. For the statutory grain.
  - A. Yes.
- Q. It is 1.0 cents; in other words, half overall on the average of the rate that would be operated with respect to the average rate on domestic grain, western Canada?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. You also, I presume, know the evidence that there is relatively little -- just very small -- trucking of domestic grain in western Canada?



Q. Even the average rate is 2 cents per ton mile?

A. Yes, I do.

THE CHAIRMAN: Is there evidence as to that?

MR. SINCLAIR: Yes.

COMMISSIONER PLATT: I would like to know what part of the transcript . . .

MR. SINCLAIR: The part of the transcript where that evidence was given?


COMMISSIONER PLATT: Yes; where rural grain moving . . .

MR. SINCLAIR: Domestic grain; I will look it up and give you the transcript reference.

MR. HUME: My recollection is that it was one of the witnesses in Alberta, and my friend might look there. There was a considerable amount of it in Alberta; one of the witnesses in Edmonton.

MR. SINCLAIR: Well, of course, I recall the evidence, and I know that there are some substantial movements of grain for substantial distances at the railnead; but it is because the railway movement in those areas is not available that there is some of that coming on the N.A.R. and some to Meadow Lake; and there are in a number of places in western Canada trucks operated by grain corporations -- grain-nandling organizations -- to bring it to railnead; but there are no substantial movements that I know of.

But I think that is in the record, and if I have misstated it then I will have to get the evidence;




and I will find the transcript reference and give it to you.

MR. HUME: At pages 3073 and 3074 Mr. McCoy, in giving evidence as to the Canadian National Railways, said that there was a movement of domestic grain. He didn't qualify it with any adjectives, but he certainly indicated that there was such a movement.

MR. SINCLAIR: Very well, I will look it up.

- Q. Mr. Hughes, my point was this, and what I would like you to comment on is that the railways' proposal is based on averaging of all movement to export positions?
  - A. The railways proposal is what?
- Q. For what would be a just and reasonable level . . .
  - A. Yes.
- Q. . . . of one cent -- that is based on an average?
- A. Well, I will take it that that is the proposal, yes.
- Q. Now, if, for instance, in certain movements trucks moved grain I presume it would be the position of British Columbia that they would have to accept the same obligation as the railway in regard to the movement of grain?
- A. Yes; when I was replying to Mr. Hume yesterday I didn't have in mind that the trucks would move export grain at the export level -- should I say -- at present export level; and even if it isn't up to



fully distributed cost I cannot really see the trucks moving it. But the reason why trucks don't move domestic grain is that there is the feed grain subsidy of about \$17 million on railway-moved grain.

MR. HUME: On trucks, too.

THE WITNESS: On trucks, too, is 1t?

MR. BRAZIER: Not in British Columbia.

MR. SINCLAIR: I will accept my friend's

answer on behalf of the Trucking Association.



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Well, I think we have clarified the position then, that you were not concerned with trucking. You have made no study, have you, as to this, about the movement and cost of movement by truck versus the cost of movement of grain by rail?

- A. No, I don't know of any studies.
- You see, Mr. Hughes, as far as I know -- and maybe you can assist the Commission if you know differently -- containerization such as Strick or halfcontainerization off the farms and then doubling up to allow them to haul them to the railhead, has not been adopted in the movement of grain in Canada, not to my knowledge. Have you ever seen it?
- A. No, I have never seen it. I don't know much about short-haul movement of grain to rail head. I don't know how they do it.
- Q. Short haul of grain has to be relatively small truckloads or else it has to be double handled?
- A. If what you are saying is right, it is obviously true.


MR. BRAZIER: Mr. Sinclair was a farmer one time.

MR. SINCLAIR: I am in the happy position, Mr. Brazier, of knowing there is money in farming because I have put it there.

MR. GUEST: It is safe anyway.

MR. SINCLAIR: Q. Now, I am going to

part 2. I am not at all sure, Mr. Hughes, that I



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understand this rate proposal that you have got, and I hope you will bear with me in it.


I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, every time I go to start on this place that I approach with a certain amount of caution, I find another note of what I meant to ask the economist witness for British Columbia.

That is, that you made reference to the lumber effect of freight rates on lumber, and you and the made reference to the United Kingdom market. What impact has rail freight charges in Canada on the movement of B.C. lumber to the U.K. Market? Tell the Commission, please, how they do have an effect?

A. Yes, there is not any real effect all of railway freight rates on the movement of lumber to the British market unless you are railing some to the seaport.

I thought that might be your answer and, through the assistance of Mr. Gardiner, Mr. Wood found out how many there were. They publish export rates from the coast by St. Lawrence ports and they tariffy them as 230A, supplement 1, CFA 104K. the three months March through May 1960 there were three carloads that moved that way out of the very large shipments.

- Three carloads or a waybill sample? A.
- No, those are three actual movements, Q. all the railways received. Now, we will get that is to this part 2. Let me see if I understand what



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
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you do mean. You say that your new world for ratemaking is to be cost-oriented, that is fundamental?

A. Yes.

- Q. The next fundamental is that value of the product must not be a factor in classification?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. And the third factor is that route costs must be reflected in each rate; correct?
- A. No, in the minimum rate schedule, and it would be in the maximum rate schedule.
- Q. Well, then route costs are a factor in each rate?
- A. It is a factor in the minimum rate schedules and then whatever the railway would like to charge above that then it will be quite free to do so.
  - Q. But it is still a factor in each rate?
- A. No, it is not. It is a factor in the minimum out-of-pocket costs, minimum rate.
  - Q. Which is a factor in each rate?
- A. It does not necessarily mean you would get route costs reflected in the actual rates, original charge
- Q. Just a minute. I am trying to get these things down one, two, three, four. Then we will start on the changes in a minute. The first was they are cost-oriented; second, that the value of the commodity has no part in the classification; thirdly, the route costs are a factor only, you say, on the minimum scales and in the maximum scales?
  - A. Yes.



Q. And fourth, the maximum scales apply

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which there is not an existing reasonable method of transporting the commodity concerned --
A. By rail.

only to captive traffic waich you define as traffic for

- Q. By rail. Is there anything I have left out?
- A. I am quite sure you will find them. I cannot think of anything offhand.
- Q. Now, the purpose of your new rate scheme was to simplify the rate structure and make it more easily understandable?
  - A. That is one purpose.
- Q. How many tariff rate changes would you expect under your rate schedule?
- A. I should think they would be considerably less than they are now.
  - Q. How many do you think there are now?
- A. I did know the number. I know it is a few thousand.
- Q. A few thousand? Would you be surprised if I suggested to you that there are about thirty thousand tariff items, changes in the existing freight rate classification, Canadian that is, eliminating American?
  - A. I would not be at all surprised.
  - MR. BRAZIER: Is that per year?
  - MR. SINCLAIR: Per year.
  - Q. I would suggest to you that under your



system that would go into the hundreds of thousands?

- A. I suggest -- I don't think it would.
- Q. Have you tried a figure out what it would cost the railways to make tariff changes under your proposal?
- A. The tariff changes would be when the railways thought the value of service factor was a little different. As I see it, there would be two basic tariffs, a captive tariff or non-competitive tariff, and the competitive tariff.

We think that the railways can do what they want. They can have as many tariffs as they want or as few as they want, and there is no more reason to think that the tariffs should go up to hundreds or thousands, I cannot see that at all.

- Q. Well, my advisers are practical ratemaking people who have tried to understand this, and
  your suggestion is that you think they are wrong. You
  are entitled to their opinion and they are entitled to
  theirs.
- A. I wrote the scheme and with a lot of practical advice.
- Q. Did you make out the scheme with a lot of practical advice?
- A. With a lot of practical advice, and it is my opinion that the tariff changes would certainly be no more than they are now and probably a lot less.
  - Q. Did you receive practical advice from the



traffic managers of the lumber industry on the coast, and are they whole-heartedly supporting your cost of service, so-called pricing system?

- A. We have a traffic advisory committee there, and the lumber manufacturers are part of this committee, and the committee fully supported it, yes.
- Q. Did Mr. Brazier not let you see the letter of 2nd June to the Attorney General and Minister of Industrial Development, Trade and Commerce, from the Council of the Forest Industries, copy of which was sent to the Vice-President of Traffic of the Railway -- presumably to let you draw this to their attention.


You saw this?

- A. I have seen it.
- Q. Are you saying, notwithstanding this letter and the language used in it ---

THE CHAIRMAN: What is that letter, Mr. Sinclair?

MR. SINCLAIR: It is a letter addressed to
the Honourable Robert W. Bonner, Q.C., Attorney
General and Minister of Industrial Development,
Trade and Commerce, Parliament Buildings, Victoria,
B. C., dated June 2nd, 1960, with copies to Mr. Brazier,
Mr. A. H. Hart, Vice-President, Traffic, Canadian
National Railways, and Mr. C. D. Edsforth, Vice-President,
Traffic, Canadian Pacific Railway Company.

MR. BRAZIER: I have not yet been able to find out whether this was inspired by railway traffic men or not.



THE CHAIRMAN: Who wrote this letter?

MR. BRAZIER: Mr. Nicholson.

MR. SINCLAIR: Mr. Nicholson, who is president of the Council of the Forest Industries of British Columbia.

I don't know whether we have been able to inspire Mr. Nicholson to write a letter like this, or to have the people go over to see the Attorney General. Whatever it is, there is the letter, and there are some parts of that I would like to refer to, with your permission.

COMMISSIONER GOBEIL: Is it signed as president?


MR. SINCLAIR: It is signed as president of the Association.

MR. BRAZIER: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Nicholson's name has been mentioned. I think as a member of the Bar you would know Mr. J. R. Nicholson, who was a practising lawyer in Vancouver until the 1st of May, and he has just become what they term as president of the Council of Forest Industries of British Columbia, which is an organization of other forest industry organizations, such as B.C. Lumber, the Plywood Association. Mr. Nicholson has just stepped from the practise of law into being president.

Now, I think since Mr. Sinclair has brought this up, the whole letter should be filed as an exhibit.

MR. SINCLAIR: By all means.

THE CHAIRMAN: Well, read it and file it.



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MR. SINCLAIR: I will read the letter in its entirety then. It is addressed:


"Dear Mr. Minister:

"Re: Submission of the Province of British Columbia to the Royal Commission on Transportation.

"Thank you for the privilege and the opportunity afforded to present to you personally the views of the Council of the Forest Industries on the Submission described above." That is the submission of the Province that is now before this Commission.

"Our delegation is most appreciative of the friendly reception and the attentive hearing given on the occasion of my recent visit accompanied by Mr. J. V. Christensen, President of the B. C. Lumber Manufacturers Association, and Mr. Walter Campbell, the Chairman of our inter-association Traffic Committee.

"I had to leave for Ottawa almost immediately after seeing you in Victoria and my absence accounts for my not having written to you at an earlier date the letter which, on the occasion of the said visit, we said would be written as a follow-up to our talk with you. As we advised you at that time, our Council and its member-associations share the widespread concern of the Provincial




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Government and of industry generally throughout the province regarding the high freight rates payable on shipments of goods from British Columbia to other parts of Canada. It was because of this concern that the B.C. Lumber Manufacturers, the Plywood Manufacturers and Consolidated Red Cedar Shingle Associations of British Columbia submitted a joint brief to the Royal Commission on Transportation at its hearings in Vancouver in February last. Since that brief was prepared and presented. the Provincial Government, having after careful study come to the conclusion that the application of such a concept or theory will result in more equitable treatment to industry of the Province in the matter of freight rates, has come out strongly in its submission to the said Commission in favour of the 'Cost-of-Service' concept in ratemaking. We sincerely hope that these efforts of the Government will result in lower rates than those now applicable to timber and lumber products moving eastbound by rail from the coast region. We feel strongly that such a reduction is most important to our industry and to the economy of the Province.

"While it is ready and willing, however, to support any action that it feels



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
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
will result in lower freight rates for the lumber industry and other coast shippers in British Columbia, the Council of the Forest Industries is not prepared, at this time, to give its unqualified support to the portion of the submission of the Provincial Government advising the 'Cost-of-Service' theory in ratemaking. Many experienced traffic men in the employ of our member companies are worried about the practical application of such a theory and these experts have even more serious doubts as to whether a strict application of such a concept will result in lower rates to shippers of lumber and lumber products from the coastal region. As we advised you, however, while in view of opinions expressed by so many traffic men with several years of practical experience, our industry cannot support this part of the Government's submission., we most certainly do not intend to oppose the Government's stand. Our experts are not sufficiently clear as to just how such a theory would be applied so as to be able to either support or oppose the submission at this time. As we explained to you, however, since we do entertain these doubts, we feel we should go on record with you to that effect before the submission is put forward before the Commission.



"Our industry is particularly concerned with the fact that, since the movement of forest products by rail from British Columbia to Eastern Canada involves many long hauls, a portion of the overhead and carrying charges of the railway concerned, if a 'cost-of-service' formula should be strictly applied, would be assigned to every mile of any long haul and the commodities affected would suffer a disadvantage because they would have to pay their proportionate share of all such charges.

"We are concerned as to whether, and,
if so, how the competitive factor, which of
course is recognized in the present rail
freight rate structure, will apply if the new
theory advanced by the Government is approved
and adopted. For instance, what will happen
if a shipper can get cheaper transportation
from some other type of carrier, e.g. water
or motor transportation? Will the railways
be free to meet such competition, regardless
of the minimum rates which apparently are
involved in the 'Cost-of-Service' concept?

"We are also concerned as to how the convenience factor will be applied if the 'Cost-of-Service' theory be adopted. For instance, where a shipment of goods is being made from the Pacific Coast to Edmonton and



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
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the shipper wishes to drop a relatively small part of the load at a C.P.R. Station en route, such as Hammond or Mission, how will the freight rate be made up? Today the lumber industry gets the benefit of the rate quoted by both railways, C.N.R. and C.P.R. from Vancouver to Edmonton and yet they are free to use C.P.R. rails and either drop or pick up freight at a C.P.R. Station if convenience dictates such a course.

"Again we are concerned with the amount of compensation that would be payable in any 'Cost-of-Service' Tariff structure because of the insurance factor which arises out of the fact that the Lower Mainland of British Columbia has several alternative rail routes to Eastern Canada and it is essential that more than one such route be maintained. The 'Cost-of-Service' theory seems to involve the shortest possible route, but in practice this insurance, as well as convenience, competition and probably other factors, should and no doubt will come into the picture.

"When some weeks ago a delegation from the B. C. Lumber Manufacturers Association interviewed Mr. C. W. Brazier, Q.C., the counsel who is representing the Province before the Royal Commission on Transportation,



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
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and the economists who have been advising the Government, they were assured that the introduction of a tariff based on the 'Costof-Service' theory would not result in higher rates to the forest industries of the Province. My recollection is that, in the course of our recent interview, you said that this was also your understanding and you stated that, if further study or opposition to this new concept disclosed that it would not obtain the objective that the Province has in mind and benefit Provincial shippers, part of the Province's Submission would be modified or possibly even abandoned. Our delegation was pleased to receive this assurance from you and, on the other hand, we can assure you that if further information and study convinces us that the introduction of the proposed theory will result in a reduction in heavy freight rates now in effect, we will support the Government's stand. As we informed you, however, our doubts as to the practical application of the theory in question are sufficiently grave that we cannot give you that support at this time.

"As mentioned to you, I am sending a copy of this letter to Mr. Brazier in Ottawa. I am also forwarding a copy to each of the Vice-Presidents of Traffic of the railways



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concerned.

"Respectfully yours,

"J. R. Nicholson,

"President."

-EXHIBIT NO. 148:


Letter dated June 2nd, 1960. from President, Council of Forest Industries of British Columbia to the Honourable Robert W. Bonner, Q.C., Attorney General and Minister of Industrial Development, Trade and Commerce, British Columbia.

MR. BRAZIER: I think if my learned friend for the railways would give to the B. C. Lumber people some information as to what the costs are on lumber shipments, the B. C. lumber people would be more than satisfied to support the proposition that we are putting before this Commission.

We invite the milways, now that this matter has come out. to produce a cost study on lumber movements in western Canada.

MR. SINCLAIR: At the request of the Province of British Columbia, Mr. Chairman, Canadian Pacific did produce certain cost studies. We refused to give them point-to-point locations. We put them as Point A to Point B, and so on, and those were the cost studies requested.

If the evidence of this witness is correct and the cost concept that he has put forward works in the way that we think it works, it is our view that those lumber rates would increase.



MR. BRAZIER: Well, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Sinclair is quite right. He submitted to me the costing on a confidential basis, and they have not been disclosed to anybody, certain figures on lumber. We have respected his confident.


I might say, the cost figures we got from the C.N.R. are not the same as we got from the C.P.R. we feel undoubtedly, some of the factors in the C.P.R. are not on the conservative side: they are on the other side this time.

In view of the fact that Mr. Sinclair has now mentioned this, I think we should be released by him from the confidential nature of the information that was given to us, and it should go on the record, and there should be a witness in the stand at some stage in these proceedings to be cross-examined on the cost figures that were given to us.

MR. SINCLAIR: Mr. Chairman, this is exactly
it. We are quite prepared to give them to the lumber
industry on the scrambled basis that they have. We
are not prepared, and will not, unless we are subpoenaed
so to do by this Commission, disclose confidential
information to our competitors, and we made that clear
before.

The difficulty with this is that if Mr.

Brazier wants to be relieved of any obligation about giving it to the lumber industry of western Canada, go ahead and give it to them, because I understand that they already know about them.



MR. BRAZIER: I would even undertake if
Mr. Sinclair would produce the witness for crossexamination privately and not in an open public hearing.

MR. SINCLAIR: I am quite certain that the Commission can discuss, if they wish ---

THE CHAIRMAN: We have had lots of words on costs. As I understood Mr. Hughes he suggested a Costing Section of the Board of Transport, did you not?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

THE CHAIRMAN: And that it would cost and have the information there for its own information?

THE WITNESS: For its own information, yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: Not for Mr. Brazier, Mr.

Frawley or anybody else.

THE WITNESS: That is right, sir.


THE CHAIRMAN: Just secret.

MR. FRAWLEY: Not any more secret truly than the ICC.

MR. SINCLAIR: Certainly.

THE CHAIRMAN: That is what he was suggesting yesterday.

MR. FRAWLEY: I understood from the witness, when he talked about the costing section, and in my cross-examination when he spoke about it, and I certainly hope I did not misunderstand him; I certainly took him to mean the cost section in the ICC which operates and which annually publishes burden studies which show the relationship between revenue and cost -- the thing I have been demanding since last January and which I



still regard as pending before this Commission, my application that costs be disclosed.

THE CHAIRMAN: I only drew from him yesterday that the costing section was for the information of the Board of Transport.


MR. SINCLAIR: He think he made that clear by saying that the minimum charge scale did not have to be published under his scheme but could be turned over to the Board for their confidential information.

THE WITNESS: If there was a cost section in the Board, then we would not stick by publication of the minimum scales.

MR. SINCLAIR: Q. Do you not know, Mr. Hughes, that there is a cost section in the Board?

- A. I know what it consists of, Mr. Sinclair.
- Q. You want it expanded?
- A. I want it to be able to do cost studies instead of having the railways publish a minimum scale and saying "This is it".
- Q. Have you ever read the report of the Board?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. Do you see what they say under their Economics and Accounting under the directorship of Mr. Burwash and the assistant there Mr. Wright.
  - A. Yes, sir.
  - Q. Have you ever read that?
  - A. I know it is there.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Mann has a question.



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COMMISSIONER MANN: Mr. Sinclair, so that
we will be better able to assess this letter you have
read into the record, I wonder whether you would get
Mr. Campbell to supply to us the names of the
Committee of Traffic Managers of the Forest Industries
that advised the Council of Forest Industries?

MR. SINCLAIR: I have no jurisdiction over Mr. Campbell. He is sitting right there and the Royal Commission is all-powerful.

COMMISSIONER MANN: We will get them from Mr. Campbell, Mr. Hughes or Mr. Brazier, perhaps.


I wonder whether you might let us have the names of the people who are on the B. C. Government Advisory Council?

MR. BRAZIER: Oh, yes.

COMMISSIONER MANN: It does not need to be done now. Perhaps you can give it to our secretary.

MR. BRAZIER: I am not going to make any bones about it. This idea is novel. We have not got unanimous support in our province in favour. I think this letter indicates very much why we have not, because people do not know what the results will be, and we cannot tell them the results until we know costs from the railways. It is that unknown that they are looking at, and they want to cover themselves by a letter such as this.

THE CHAIRMAN: Well, Mr. Brazier, the discussion of the last hour has indicated how provocative and interesting the evidence of Mr. Hughes really is.



MR. SINCLAIR: I hope to enable some of these people in British Columbia to understand it a little better after I have asked the witness a few questions, after we have a recess.

THE CHAIRMAN: After the recess.

---Short recess.

(Page 13951 follows)



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THE CHAIRMAN: Order, please.

MR. SINCLAIR: Q. Now, Mr. Hughes, let's just see if we can clear up what your rate-making proposal would entail. This new classification that you would involve would group commodities in accordance with their transportation cost characteristics and nothing else. That is correct -- loadability, damage factor, and so on?


- Α. That is correct.
- Q. This would mean that all the elements now taken into account in the Canadian freight classifications as prescribed by the Board of Transport Commissioners would be taken into account with the one exception of the value of the commodity?
- Yes. Load ability would be the final factor in the classification.
- Loadability, type of car, suseptibility Q. to damage?
  - Yes, that would be in the classification. A.
- Emtpy return ratio -- all these things Q. . would be involved, just as the long list that you put down?
- Just as the long list there, but the Α. primary thing would be loadability instead of value of the commodity as it is now.
- Q. It is all these factors that are now taken into account in the Canadian freight classification with the one exception of value of commodity?



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A. Loadability is not taken into the classification, and what we can now do is move it up to the top.

- Q. It isn't taken into account in the classification?
- A. It is taken into account, but a very pale reflection of loadability.
- Q. Do you say you want weight in your classification the factors to determine which class goes into it to make loadability the overshadowing factor to determine the classification?
- A. All the cost factors would be taken into account, and loadability could well be the first factor. I am not a cost factor expert, but loadability would be one. Whether it would be the prime one, I don't know. I don't know enough about costs.
- Q. What you are saying is that you don't want to recede from the position, do you, that they would be exactly the same as the elements taken into account in the classification with the exception of value of commodity?
  - A. That is right.
  - Q. You want to recede from that?
  - A. No, that is all right.
- Q. So the only one we are leaving out is the value of the commodity, and then you would take into account the value of the commodity in a different way, because the value of the commodity, Mr. Hughes,



Q. You do?

Yes.

A. Yes.

A.

you will agree, reflects the ability of the commodity to bear transportation charges. Correct?


- A. Not really, no.
- Q. You do not think in the classification, when they look at value of the commodity, that this is the way of measuring the ability of the commodity to bear transportation charges?
- A. Where the railway has a monopoly, yes; but the very fact that there are so many rates set at below class rates is a very obvious thing where the classification isn't taken into account. But where there is the value of commodity, this has nothing to do with whether the commodity can bear the transportation charges.
- Q. I suggest to you that it is with that knowledge that commodity mileage scale and point to point commodity rates can be made, that the value of commodity classification is taken into account.

  This is a prescribed ceiling we are dealing with.

  Did that ever occur to you?
- A. You are saying to me that the railways base their rate structure on the value of the commodity.

  This is the --
- Q. I am not saying that to you at all.

  I am asking you whether you understand the interplay of factors in determining classification of goods?



- Q. You have studied it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Have you read any of the proceedings of the Committee when the last classification was evolved?
  - A. No.
- Q. My suggestion to you is that the value of commodity factor in the Canadian freight classification as it exists today is in absolute terms the ability of the commodity to bear transportation charges, with the knowledge that the railways can and do make commodity mileage scales and point to point commodity rates relating to classes?
  - A. But they don't --
  - Q. Did you look at that?
- A. Yes, because I have it in the evidence.

  But if they are basing competitive rates -- and a great deal of the traffic is competitive, and will continue to be competitive -- then the value of commodity is not taken into account at all, and I think we should have something a little bit nearer to reality.
- Q. Let's not get to competitive rates.

  Let's take it step by step, because if you don't mind me saying this, I have spent a little time trying to understand your proposal and I am having substantial difficulty and I would like to understand it. Would you mind assisting me by sticking to one point at a time, and I think we won't waste the time of the Commission, and I am sorry I am doing so at this time.



Just keep in mind that the value of the commodity

factor in the classification was set there in

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absolute terms with the knowledge that specific and commodity mileage rates could be put into effect. You would take in the value of the commodity and the ability of the traffic to move freely under your scheme first as to competitive traffic in the contribution that traffic would make over variable cost to maximise the return to the railways and yet get the traffic for the railways. Correct? A. That is right; the minimum rate would be out-of-pocket costs.


A. I didn't agree that the value of commodity and the value of service are the same thing which is what you are assuming there. I didn't agree with that, and the value of the commodity has nothing to do with the amount of freight which the commodity can pay.

Q. It is the ability of the traffic to

bear transportation charges and still move freely

and maximise the revenue to the railway?

- Q. Do you think that the competing mode transportation doesn't fix its charges in relation to the value of the commodity?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. Do you think these competitive truck rates, for instance, in British Columbia are costoriented?



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
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
A. Yes. The trucker sets the rates, and if there is competition, then the trucker or other form of transportation -- let's take water transportation -- will set their rates at their cost without reference -- and that is when the railway will come in and try and meet that bulk rate, and there is no reference to the value of the commodity being moved, it is entirely on a cost basis.

- Q. I am not knowledgeable on tramp steamship rates to the coast, but you and I know something about the prescribed rates of the rate schedules in British Columbia for truck transport. Is it your evidence to this Commission that they are cost-oriented, or are they fixed and use the rail classification basis?
- A. Yes, they actually use classification number 20, and they use it to a much greater extent than the railway does.
- Q. Are you saying they don't take into account the value of the commodity?
  - A. Yes, they do.
- Q. If the province of British Columbia wished to experiment with a cost-oriented rate structure, why did they not put it into effect where they had the legislative control and they could have done it by the stroke of the legislature's will?
- A. Because the legislators in British Columbia are just beginning to realise, I think, this very fact,



that rates are based on the value of the commodity
because there is a large growth in contract and
private trucking in British Columbia today. When
you have rates based on the value of the commodity—
and this is of no concern to a private trucker,
and this is why the railways have been losing a lot
of traffic, if the value of the commodity goes right
through the structure, as you say.

- Q. If the province of British Columbia is interested in having proper elements of transportation resources based upon cost-orientation, transport media, why did they not introduce this cost-oriented concept of rate-making where they had full authority to do sc, namely, intra and inter-provincial trucking?
- A. This is only published in 1960, but when they read it maybe they will have some further thoughts on trucking in British Columbia.
- Q. You felt it easier to present this here to this Commission and let them struggle with this problem than it was to do it under the regular tribunal under the aegis of the regulators of transportation in British Columbia?
- A. I don't know what their thinking was, but if they read this growth in private trucking, then a great deal of thinking will have to go into trucking on the cost of service basis, if they are going to remain common carriers at all.
  - Q. The ability of the commodity to bear




by the value of the commodity?

A. Not where competition is concerned.

If you have, as I have said before, a load of silk and a load of bricks and you have a high rate

transportation charges, in your view, is not affected


- silk and a load of bricks and you have a high rate on the silk because of the value of it -- let me take silk. If you have a high rate on silk because it is a valuable commodity and the trucker bases it on cost, then the railway won't see the traffic, the trucker will take it. Let's take a private trucker. He would take the silk himself and base it on his own price and not the railways' price.
- Q. And he would have 100 per cent empty return factor?
  - A. He may not.
- Q. Let's assume we have a private trucker moving silk -- and I assume you are talking about raw silk, are you?
  - A. Any valuable silk.
- Q. You see, you cannot talk about the freight rate structure in a practical way by getting off to generalities, you have to stick to the commodity. It is all very well to discuss these things theoretically, but this freight rate structure is a very practical thing?
  - A. I know, and there have been very practical men advising on it.
    - Q. Now, let's go back to the situation.



Q. Well, for instance, if you were going to fix the rate you would calculate it on the basis of


100 per cent empty return ratio, base it on the private

- Assume with me that cost-orientation is not the basis of the truck rate?
  - A. Yes, that is right.
- Q. But value of the commodity is a factor in truck rates?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. That value of commodity is a very material fact in determining the rate level?
- A. Yes. But you take the person who is not going to pay a high rate simply because the value of his commodity is high; he is going to go out and buy his own truck or sign a contract with a trucker.
- Q. That introduces possibly a very restricted ability to bring back goods and it is 100 per cent empty return?
- A. With the very high railway rates on silk, it may very well do that.
- Q. But this is a factor you would have to add in which you wouldn't have to the same degree if you had a common carrier?
- A. It is the cost going out and the cost coming back.
- Q. So you would assume the most adverse operating situation to determine the cost level; is that correct?
  - A. I don't understand the question.



carrier's, private truck carrier's cost; is that correct?

- A. I would base it on the railways' out-ofpocket cost, and their return factor -- well, it could
  be anything.
- Q. I am talking about a competitive rate between the railways and a trucking firm, and the ailways are going to have to take into account a rate which will get the business, at a rate with a contribution over their variable cost?
- A. I am quite sure the railway rate can do this now.
- Q. But what you are saying is that the basis of competition, if they take into account the value of the commodity -- and I assure you that they do, because that is the basis of the truck rates -- you are saying they are doing wrongly because they should take into account the private trucker, and I also assure you they do that. But you are saying they do that on 100 per cent empty ratio?
- A. No. I gave you an example of 100 per cent empty return ratio as an extreme example, but many truckers don't have that. Piggyback operators on the railways today don't have any consideration of value of the commodity inside the van, and I have seen a lot of Piggyback trains running about and it has nothing to do with the value of the commodity inside the trailers.



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the maximum of fully allocated cost?


- Q. Are you sure of that?
- Yes, I am sure of that.
- well, I suggest you are absolutely wrong because they take into account the factor of trucks as a common carrier, and they recognize that truck rates which enable that trucker to operate at a profit relate the value of the commodity. It may be a little complicated to get it, but I tell you it is there. Have you thought of that?
- A. I have thought of it, and I have discussed the situation with the C.P.R's piggybacking --I don't know what you call them -- the chief of piggybacking in the C.P.R. . .

MR. FRAWLEY: The chief piggybacker!

MR. SINCLAIR: Mr. Jenner.

Yes.

- He is not a rate maker.
- A. well, he knows something about rate making; and he says: 'we don't take account the value of the commodity in the trailer; we look at the truck cost, and I am saying that it has nothing whatever to do with the value of the commodity they are carrying.
- Q. Well, then, Mr. Hughes, let us take non-captive traffic. You say that the ability of the transportation charges to be met by the commodity is based solely, in your scheme, on demand characteristics;
  - A. For the competitive traffic, yes.
- Q. And, on the captive traffic, up to



A. Yes.

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Subject to breaking through the fully allocated cost, in accordance with your statement given yesterday?

A. I don't understand that. "Subject to breaking through the fully allocated cost"?

Q. You said you weren't inflexible; that if the railways in this kind of situation were short of money they could put them up high enough for captive traffic to enable them to be financially sound?

A. Yes, that is what I said.

with the understanding that I had of this yesterday.

I understood -- perhaps you can clear this up for me

-- that you were inflexible about fully distributed

cost as a ceiling; that you made yourself another

ceiling, but you certainly didn't want -- at least

this was my understanding, and if it is wrong I wish


you would tell me -- you did not want the ceiling,

once established, at whatever criterion used -- you

did not want that ceiling to be broken through?

THE WITNESS: No, we don't want the ceiling break-through. What I had in mind was: Let us have a ceiling which is cost-related. I don't want a new ceiling every day, or every year, or something like that; but whatever rate there is for captive traffic let it be based on the cost of carrying that particular captive traffic.

MR. SINCLAIR: Q. That is the opposite to



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
what you said to me a moment ago.

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MR. BRAZIER: I don't think he understood your question.

MR. SINCLAIR: Well, the record will make it clear, and there is a conflict, and I will try to straighten it out.

- Q. What you said yesterday was that you were not inflexible about your maxima; is that correct?
- A. I said I was not inflexible about the way the maximum was made as long as it reflected the operating cost of the railways.
- Yes; but, Mr. Hughes, if the railways were unable to remain financially sound with this maximum rate you were prepared to enable them, to cover their total expense, to have that maximum increased above fully distributed cost?
- A. Well, that is just what I said to Mr. Mann. isn't it?
- Well, that is what I call a break through your ceiling of fully allocated cost. Isn't that a break-through in the ceiling of fully allocated cost?
  - I am lost here. Α.
- The railways have indicated that they have all this to meet out of their competitive-rated traffic -that is, their non-captive traffic. This leaves only one place for them to go -- that is, to their captiverated traffic; and with the maxima that you put in and with the revenue that they receive from their competitive traffic they are still short of their financial



requirements. Now, under those circumstances you are flexible in enabling the railways to go above their fully distributed cost in captive traffic?

- A. They have to go to the Board to get authorization to put the maxima up.
- W. In other words, to go above the fully distributed cost on captive traffic?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. And that, I suggest, is what I have said from the beginning.

COMMISSIONER PLATT: I am getting quite confused, too.

THE WITNESS: I think it is plainly set out in the memorandum I read yesterday.

commissioner plate: As I understood the memo the amount that should be set aside for fully distributed cost, or the one and a half per cent, is settled before the scheme goes into effect?


THE WITNESS: Yes.

commissioner Platt: If the railway can't raise enough money under these circumstances then it goes broke?

MR. SINCLAIR: That is not, with respect -- what I said is based on the transcript, and I have only interpreted it.

At page 13788 he said:

"However, should the railways prove that their revenues are not sufficient to cover their total expenses, then British



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Columbia is not inflexible in the maximum rate position. The province would be willing to have a maximum rate above fully distributed cost providing that such rates reflected railway costs."

There is no doubt about this, Mr. Hughes, that you could break through the ceiling of fully distributed cost under the circumstances I have outlined to you under your proposal?


A. Well, possibly after representations to the Board of Transport Commissioners.

COMMISSIONER MANN: Then, if you will pardon me, you are no longer talking about a ceiling on captive costs, are you? You are talking about a very temporary structure of the whole thing; but it is not really a ceiling; it could be changed?

MR. BRAZIER: I think there is some confusion here between Mr. Sinclair and ---

MR. SINCLAIR: I don't think there is any confusion at all, and I think, with respect, I will show that it is not a cost-of-service concept at all; it is a new and very difficult way of getting exactly what we are getting today, and that will be the purpose of my examination.

MR. BRAZIER: If I might interject, British Columbia's scheme envisages that before this scheme is put into effect at all some body will decide that the maximum is going to be either 100 per cent fully distributed cost or 120 per cent fully distributed cost,



Q. Let me give you this example. If you

and that is going to be it, and that is going to be the ceiling. They are not going to be able, next year, to come along and say: "We want 140 per cent or 150 per cent of the fully distributed cost." You get 120 and that is where it stands.

what Mr. Hughes is saying -- he can correct
me -- is that we are not inflexible when the standard
is set in the beginning, that it be somewhat over fully
distributed costs, but once it has been fixed then it
remains there.

Is that correct?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

MR. SINCLAIR: That is a completely new concept to the one put forward by British Columbia in its submission and as explained in the carefully written out memorandum. This is the scheme not of British Columbia; this is the scheme of Brazier, with all due respect.


MR. BRAZIER: You will notice my name is on the brief, too.

MR. SINCLAIR: If your name is on the brief and you want to change the witness' testimony in the box then it is very clear that . . .

MR. BRAZIER: I just put that to Mr. Hughes and asked if that was his understanding of our scheme.


MR. SINCLAIR: What he said in answer to me yesterday and what he has said today is incorrect.

THE WITNESS: I don't think so.



set the maximum rate at 110 per cent of fully distributed cost and then it is demonstrated that the railways have

cost and then it is demonstrated that the railways have got all they can from competitive traffic, and, under your maximu, are not able to be financially sound, in those circumstances you would allow the railways to come back and show to the Board of Transport Commissioners that they couldn't provide any service at such revenues and remain financially sound, and then the maximum rates would go up? Isn't that so? That is basic to your scheme, is it not?



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MR. BRAZIER: I just told you it is not.

MR. SINCLAIR: I don't care what Mr. Brazier says, with respect, Mr. Chairman. I am trying to find out what Mr. Hughes --

THE CHAIRMAN: The witness.


MR. SINCLAIR: Yes, Mr. Brasier has just answered the question that it is not. I think he had better get in the box and I can cross-examine him. I have been trying to do that for years.

Q. Well, Mr. Hughes?

A. I cannot see that because a traffic is captive then the rate should just go up and up on it, and the scheme was that whatever the Commission thinks would be the ceiling or the Board, whether it is fully distributed cost or above that, a percentage above, as long as it is related somewhere to out-of-pocket costs.

When this ceiling is fixed, of course, it
will move as costs shift. Should the railways not be
able to get enough revenue from the competitive traffic
because the competition has been growing and growing,
well, the question is, I think: What do other businesses
do in similar situations? As I say in my brief, when
they have no corral of captive traffic, what they do,
they go out and put selective rate increases on. They
may even put rate decreases in some places. This
then gets them more traffic and more net revenue.

The last percentage increase we got 17 per



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cent increase, and the railways went out to competitive traffic and shoved it up 2, 3 or 4 per cent on them, the same in the agreed charges.


Any business in competition does not even have captive traffic on which to fall back every time, and once we get the ceiling on related costs, we want it remaining there.


Q. Let me go through this again with you, Mr. Hughes. The railways having demonstrated to the Board of Transport Commissioners that they had done all they could to increase rate of revenues in the competitive field, are still short of the money necessary to remain financially sound under the maximum rates that you have talked about here. They then go to the Board of Transport Commissioners and say: "Here is our showing. We cannot live under this ceiling, on this captive rate of traffic. Therefore we are asking it to be increased." Would you object to that?

MR. BRAZIER: Sure.

MR. SINCLAIR: Mr. Brazier, I wish you would let the witness answer, because this is the man that is the father of this scheme, as I take it, and the answer to this question, what the Commission wants to know is the answer of an economist.

- Would you give me the anwer to that? Q.
- Yes, don't forget, Mr. Sinclair, that the maximum schedule also goes up, and out-of-pocket







costs go up --

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Q. Proportionately?

A. Yes, and the answer to your question.

"What would the railway do for more money" is if


it alraedy had this maximum set ---

THE CHAIRMAN: If theceiling were reached.

THE WITNESS: Then it would have to do as other bodies do, either adjust the demand pricing or else it would have to go out of business eventually as any competitive business does.

MR. SINCLAIR: Q. Other businesses, Mr. Hughes, I suggest to you, then increase their rates empirically to test the demand factors. Would you allow the railways then to increase their rates to empirically test the demand factor, just like other businesses, is that what you mean?

- A. In the competitive segment.
- Q. We are not talking about competition but the captive?
- A. In the captive, no I would not. It is related to out-of-pocket costs. Don't forget captive traffic is paying more than its costs. When they pay more than fully distributed cost, it is also part of the cost, why should it carry on paying costs for everybody else?
- Q. Mr. Hughes, any other business does not worry about anything except maximising its sales?
  - A. I agree.
  - Q. And therefore you are saying that the






# ANGUS. STONEHOUSE & CO. LTD. Hughes cr-ex (Sinclair)

railways are not to be treated as other businesses, because you have got come concept in your mind that demand factors are not going to be properly assessed by the railways empirically in fixing the level of a rate, is that so?

- A. As far as captive traffic is concerned, and one other way they could get their money --
  - Q. Just listen to my question?
  - A. Let me finish my answer.
  - Q. I don't think he has answered --
- A. I answered the question there, that as far as captive traffic is concerned, then, value of service was not to be a factor, whether value of service was above fully distributed costs or whatever ceiling was set.
- Q. Then it is not the same situation as in other businesses, and the example you gave as to what other businesses would do would not be open to the railway?
- A. It is not the same situation, but it could conceivably get to be very near the same situation when 90 per cent of the railway traffic becomes competitive. What are they going to do then? They are going to get reduced costs somewhere or cut the services somewhere.
- Q. Then, Mr. Hughes, if that is so too, and you have agreed with me earlier that market competition was a factor in fixing rate levels, would you extend



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
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
your non-captive commodity groups to include those upon which market competition had an effect upon rate levels?

- A. I would not take market competition into account. This would already be taken into account in the freight rates, I presume.
- Q. But I am asking you as to whether the commodity that was being moved was to be declared captive or non-captive. You have in your brief limited it to carrier competition?
  - Α. That is right, yes.
- I am asking you, in view of your admission to me earlier that market competition could fix the rate level or affect a rate level: Would you not extend that to one of the types of competition that would remove that traffic from the captive category?
  - A. No, I would not.
- Q. Well then, why are you trying to protect traffic moving under a captive maximum rate level, when that traffic is already getting the benefit of market competition, in assessing the ability of that traffic to bear transportation charges? Why?
- A. Well, if there was market competition for a commodity, then the maximum ceiling, if it was a captive commodity in my definition, the maximum rate schedule would not apply to it. I am not sure whether I understand what you are saying there.
- Q. That is exactly what I am saying to you, that if there is market competition, the maximum rate



schedule should not apply to it. Do you agree?

- A. I do not agree, no. If you are right, then it would become a paper rate anyway.
- Q. But market competition may allow the rate to be substantially over fully distributed costs, just as the competition might let a rate be substantially above fully distributed costs; and why should you, Mr. Hughes, under your scheme, give one type of competition a greater impact in holding rates than another kind of competition? Can you tell the Commission why?
- A. I cannot see why this confusion or why this merging of market competition and carrier competition arises. A man is trying to get his product into the market and there are two carriers. Whether the thing is competitive at the other end, I do not see why it should take any effect in the maximum sales that the railway can charge.
- Q. Let me give you an example. There are rates into Vancouver today that are purely market empetitive, bottles from Ratcliffe, Alberta, to the breweries in Vancouver. They are market competitive, they are not carrier competitive. Under your scheme those rates would be captive to the railways, would they, and subject to the maximum?
  - A. Yes, if it was captive traffic, yes.
- Q. Notwithstanding the fact that they have now the protection of an alternative source of supply in California?



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
Now, would you like to consider my

- A. Well, how long is that alternative supply going to last?
  - In Calfornia? Q.
  - A. Yes.
- Q. Just as long as Vancouver lasts, I suggest to you, which I hope is forever.

MR. BRAZIER: They use cans down there.

MR. SINCLAIR: They also use cans in British Columbia.

- Q. My point, Mr. Hughes -- and I think it is one that this Commission should be interested in -is, why should the carrier and non-rail carrier competition be put up on a pedestal as it is under your scheme, and market competition, which is equally effective in dealing with rate situations, is discarded?
- A. I will give you a typical example again of why I do not think that market competition is effective in keeping rates down.
  - Q. You don't?
- A. I don't, because the rate to Winnipeg has gone up 148 per cent; I think it is Yorkton has gone up 140 per cent, even though these are corpetitive rates.
- Q. With all due respect, Mr. Hughes, I think that is a complete non sequitur to the question that is before you?
  - Yes, I beg your pardon. Α.
- Q.





question and talk to Mr. Guest and to your advisers afterwards then I can go on to another point. 3

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
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THE CHAIRMAN: Leave that until the morning. THE WITNESS: It certainly takes a lot of thinking about.

MR. SINCLAIR: Q. I will go on to another You would say that the rail carrier's fully distributed costs would set the maximum rate levels. Now, lumber, which can move out of British Columbia via Canadian Pacific to Winnipeg or can move via Great Northern: Whose rail rate is going to fix the maximum, Great Northern or Candian Pacific? It is captive traffic?


- A. Yes.
- Because there is no reasonable alternative Q. to rail transportation.
- A. It would be the low cost railway that would have the lowest fully distributed cost, and that would be the ceiling for all practical purposes in railway rate making.
- Q. Yes, and say that that rate level as fixed by the Canadian Pacific was below the variable cost of the alternative rail carrier, then what happens?
- A. Well, I cannot possibly see it, but if it is then obviously one railroad would not get the business. It would not be allowed to do under the scheme, but this is a situation that I just cannot possibly see.



Q. So what you are saying is that the most expensive rail carrier's operations set one part of the rate level, where there is rail competition, and that is the only competition under your scheme that sets it?

- A. If the railways get together and agree that this is going to happen, then the railways are perfectly free to do what they want, providing the rates are below the maximum and above the minimum.
- Q. So they agree among themselves that, under your rate scheme, they will take the maximum tariff costs between A and B, and they will let the other carrier take the maximum costs between A and C?

  In other words, railways have been known before, and so have other businesses, to make little arrangements like that. I mean "Why kill ourselves to the advantage of the lumber shipper, when there are other ways of making a buck." What would you do then?
- A. I cannot see your point at all, but the principles are there as I have said. No rate would be below out-of-pocket costs and none above fully allocated costs.
- Q. I suggest to you that under your scheme you are going to adversely affect the advantage of lumber shippers to alternative rail routes?
- A. Do not the railways do this on a more expensive line than on a low cost line? They equalize the rate and I am sure neither railway sets



Are you sure that neither railway sets Q.

the rate at less than out-of-pocket costs.

the rate at out-of-pocket costs? Are you sure of that about the United States railways?

A. No, I am not sure about it in the United States railways.

Q. Because, Mr. Hughes, there is quite a different aspect to rate control with respect to competitive rates in Canada as compared with the United States, and that is one of the reasons why you have to remember that in reading the book "Economics of Transportation' by Meyer et al.

THE CHAIRMAN: Well, Mr. Sinclair, we will follow that up tomorrow.

--- Adjournment.



# ROYAL COMMISSION

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## TRANSPORTATION

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
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#### EXHIBITS

No.

Document filed by Mr. Frawley showing all agreed charges in effect as of May 24, 1960



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#### ROYAL COMMISSION ON TRANSPORTATION

Proceedings of hearings held in the Court Room, Board of Transport Commissioners office, Ottawa, Ontario, on the 10th day of June, 1960.

#### COMMISSION

Mr. M. A. McPherson, Q.C. Chairman

Mr. H. Anscomb Member.

Mr. A. H. Balch Member

Mr. R. Gobeil Member

Mr. H. A. Mann Member

Mr. A. Platt Member

#### COMMISSION COUNSEL


Mr. A. G. Cooper, Q.C.

Mr. G. S. Cumming

Mr. H. W. Ellicott Adviser

Mr. F. W. Anderson Secretary

Major N. Lafrance Assistant Secretary





Ottawa, Ontario, Friday, June 10th, 1960.

---On commencing at 10.00 a.m.

THE CHAIRMAN: Order, please.

MR. SINCLAIR: Yesterday, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Commissioner Mann asked Mr. Campbell to give the names of the Joint Freight Rates Committee of which Mr. Campbell was the chairman, and he suggested that they be given to the secretary. Mr. Campbell suggested if I would on his behalf read into the record what he has written out in this list.

THE CHAIRMAN: If you would do that,

MR. SINCLAIR: Mr. Campbell's list is this:
the Joint Freight Rates Committee for the British
Columbia Lumber Manufacturers' Association, Plywood
Manufacturers Association of British Columbia and the
Consolidated Red Cedar Shingle Association of British
Columbia:

- W. S. Campbell, Chairman Rail Traffic
  Manager, MacMillan, Bloedel
  & Powell River Limited
- R. V. Vallance, Vice-President Traffic
  Manager, Crown Zellerbach
  (Canada) Limited, Lumber,
  Plywood and Shingle Divisions
- L. R. Andrews, Executive Vice-President B. C. Lumber Manufacturers'
  Association
- M. R. Dusting, Secretary B. C. Lumber
  Manufacturers' Association
- R. Homewood Traffic Manager, Rayonier Canada Limited



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Q. Yesterday, Mr. Hughes, I was asking you about market competition and why you would not recognize market competition as a factor to take a commodity out of your designation of captive traffic

- B. L. Vaughan Traffic Manager, Canadian
  Collieries Limited; Flavelle
  Cedar Division; Timberland
  Lumber Division
- R. S. McDonald, Manager, McDonald Cedar Products Limited
- A. Griffin, Sales Manager, Lions Gate Lumber Company
- J. Harris, Sales Manager, Western Forest Industries, Lumber Division, Shingle Division.
- J. R. Nicholson, President, Council of the Forest Industries of British Columbia
- J. B. Armstrong, General Manager, Plywood Manufacturers' Association of British Columbia
- G. R. Mackay, Chairman, P.M.A.B.C. Freight
  Rates Committee
- M. E. Welte, Secretary, Consolidated Red Cedar Shingle Association of British Columbia
- R. S. Vaughan and
- H. B. Greenall, who are employed by -- Mr.

Campbell forgets what companies they are with.

COMMISSIONER MANN: Did you read out Mr. Ken


Barton's name there?

MR. SINCLAIR: No.

COMMISSIONER MANN: Thank you very much.

#### WILLIAM HUGHES, continued

## CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SINCLAIR (Cont'd):



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
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fully distributed cost; correct?

- and why you gave recognition only to carrier competition and not to market competition in this proposal of yours. I left it so that you could consult Mr. Guest and your other advisers and consider your answer, and I understand you have done so.
  - Α. Yes.
- Would you please give the Commission your Q. answer?
- In the position of British Columbia market competition would be recognized, and the market competition that would be recognized to bring the traffic into the competitive class would be market competition which is presently recognized in the Canadian freight rates structure, plus such other market competition which would be recognized by the Board of Transport Commissioners.
- Q. Thank you, Mr. Hughes. You would agree. I take it, that it would be to the advantage of the railways to show in each and every case that they could that the traffic movement involved was non-captive?
- A. Well, that may be, and it depends on the movement, it depends on the product, it depends on the degree of competition, it depends on the type of It does not always follow that what you competition. say is right.
- It would be to the advantage of the Q. railways where the competition enabled the railways to fix a rate and maximize movements substantially above



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	Α.	If	you	can	maximize	at	that,	yes;	taking
those	assumption	ns,	yes	3.					

- Q. So what you find is that where the railways, from their analysis and knowledge of their traffic officers, would determine a higher rate than the maximum rate under competition, they would be applying to the Board to have that movement so recognized?
- Well, you must not forget that you put the assumption in there, Mr. Sinclair, that traffic would move at volume at this higher rate, and I said that as you put the rate up the volume falls off. That is on your assumption, but if you do not make that assumption, you may be wrong.
- Q. It would be to the advantage of every person who believes his rate to be more than the maximum rate to have his movement characterized as captive and thereby get a reduction. Correct?
- A. It would be -- to put your question another way, you said it would be in the interests of anybody who thinks he has a high rate to get it classified as competitive traffic?
  - Q. No, as captive traffic.
- A. Yes, it would be in his interest, and it would be only possible if there was no reasonable carrier competition or the type of market competition we have spoken about this morning.
- Q. Don't you see under that kind of proposal numerous interplays and strained relations between



the railways and the shippers, one trying to show that their traffic is captive and the other trying to show that it is competitive, and resulting in numerous strained relations and tensions, and matters of that kind?

- A. This certainly, to the best of my know-ledge, hasn't happened in England, and there is no reason why it should happen here. If the Board are reasonable men, the shippers know what is reasonable, the railways are reasonable people, I don't see any strained relations happening here. It hasn't happened in Britain, and I can't see why it should happen here.
- Q. Have you really studied the way they make the maximum scales in Britain, because I suggest that the way they are made is that they take the most adverse operating conditions as a base, they go and secure fully allocated costs, and they they apply an overall 50 per cent markup on top of that.
- A. The way the Board decides who is a captive shipper and the way they decide a maximum rate is on the out-of-pocket cost. It is the highest range of out-of-pocket cost.
- Q. You say they are set on out-of-pocket costs in Britain?
- A. Well, marginal cost, which is very often above ---

commissioner mann: Mr. Sinclair, you spoke about how these maximum rates are made in British, and you say they ascertain the most adverse operating



conditions and then apply a 50 per cent markup percentage. Do you mean the British Transport Commission?

MR. SINCIAIR: Yes, the Cost Section of the British Transport Commission, as I understand it, Commissioner Mann, compares these documents or scales and submits them, and this is the basis upon which they are operating.

COMMISSIONER MANN: And that is on captive traffic in Britain, one in which there is no reasonable competition, and they complain to the tribunal?

MR. SINCLAIR: Yes.

COMMISSIONER MANN: And the tribunal approves this in every case?

MR. SINCLAIR: As far as I know, they have approved it in some cases, and in other cases they have scaled it down. I don't know how they ascertain their costs; I don't understand their formula. They don't seem to include certain costs; for instance, road maintenance expenses, you can't seem to find it. I think the number of cases where they have actually set a late below the one proposed is very small.

COMMISSIONER MANN: It looks very much as though the final word rests with the trinbunal rather than with the British Transport Commission.

MR. SINCLAIR: I would think that would be right.


Q. Of course, in Britain the amount of traffic that anyone could claim to be captive would be



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very small?

- A. Well, there is quite a lot of coal traffic in Britain.
- Q. Are you suggesting that coal is not moved by truck in Britain, by lorry?
- A. In very short distances around towns and very short hauls it is moved by truck or lorry. Practically the whole of the British railway system, the freight system, was built on the coal economy, and, as you know, Britain is a very large producer of coal and this is a captive traffic in Britain which is proportionately a very large part of the traffic in Britain.
- Q. In your studies of rate-making, I take it you have travelled on the railways in Switzerland and Holland, France, Germany. Have you, Mr. Hughes?
- A. I haven't studied the transport situation in Europe. I have travelled on the railway in France, yes.
- Q. And have you studied the way they handle their rates?
- A. No; and, as I say, I am not an expert on what they do in Britain either.
- Q. In each of these countries all the railways are nationalized; the one exception to that is some of the small lines in Switzerland. Correct?
- A. I don't know if you are correct about Switzerland. I thought they were nationalized, too.
  - Q. There are some small railways in Switzer-



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29 30 MR. BRAZIER: Ski railways?

MR. SINCLAIR: Well, they may be off-gauge railways.

- Q. But in every case these railways, Frame, Germany, Switzerland, Britain, Holland, are operating, if you take into account all factors, at staggering deficits. That is correct?
- Yes, and I gave you the reasons why the British Transport Commission was in a deficit position and I said this is not the scheme we are proposing. They have maximum rates set on some basis and they can charge what they want; there is no minimum based on out-of-pocket cost. I don't know how they set their rates in France.
- Isn't it, with some modification and to gain in the modification, a preak-through over allocated Isn't that basically the French system? cost?
- I am going on one article in the British Transport Review, and the similarity would be that they have different out-of-pocket costs as the minimum rates for the line-haul and for the terminals, and they have the terminals set up on a group basis as we do. apart from that I can't say without studying the situation fully, which I certainly haven't done.
- Q. You are not suggesting that the European experience is meaningful in studying the situation under the transport conditions in North America, are you?
- I am not suggesting that at all. I said that one country has to be taken as a country and the



A. That is right.

MR. BRAZIER: A man with some practical

conditions in the freight rate structure applying to that country. We can learn a lot by other people's mistakes, experiences, see how they do things, and I think the whole situation in North America, in the United States -- everybody is starting to realize that the value of the commodity has, for all practical purposes, ceased to be the determinant of how traffic will move.

- Q. When you say everybody, you mean everybody who theoretically approaches and reads articles on transportation?
  - A. No, I am not.
- Q. Could you refer the Commission to any practical traffic man who has taken that position?
- A. Yes. I read articles in the Traffic World all the time, I read books by ----
- Q. Would you give the Commission the names, please? There are people who write in the Traffic World who come from universities, too.

COMMISSION MANN: I have a feeling that Mr.

Plowman is a mong those who advocate the cost of service theory.

THE WITNESS: This is from the Senate of Canada, proceedings of the Standing Committee on Transport and Communications, Bill C-38, Wednesday, June 17, 1959.

MR. SINCLAIR: Q. Is this the statement of Commissioner Knowles?



experience.

MR. SINCLAIR: Q. Yes. I want you to be careful to be sure that you catch what he says, because I have read that many times. This is the one you quoted, isn't it?

A. Yes. I am going to give you some other names, too. The question by Senator Smith finishes off:

"Does it cost the railway companies any more to move semi-manufactured steel that is carried a little farther in the original raw state per ton and per car? Is there any real reason why that could not be changed?

"Mr. Knowles: No, not on a cost basis, except in the case of a heavily-loaded car the unit cost would be somewhat less than it would be on a lightly-loaded car. But, Senator Smith, you have asked a great fundamental question in ratemaking that is worrying everybody today, and that is, the way the rate structure is made now, high rates are charged on high-grade materials and low rates on low-grade materials, and the higher rates are being eroded by the trucks and railways are being left with the low-grade articles which are moved at a rate less than the average



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
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cost of transportation. That is the great problem all over the world today. I read it in all the railway magazines -that is, the fact that the original method of ratemaking on a value basis, while it was very good for 75 years, is out of date today, and it may be that the railways will have to come to a more cost basis of fixing rates. But as long as the value of the service principle remains in the rate structure, you are going to have that situation existing. It is quite difficult to understand for anybody who has to use the rates, to charge 50 cents per 100 pounds on one article and \$1.50 on another when the cost of moving the cars is exactly the same."

- Q. Surely you don't think that that says that Mr. Knowles is in favour of cost-of-service ratemaking such as you have proposed to this Commission.

  Did you not note what he said in here -- it may be that the railways will have to move more to a cost basis.

  All that, surely, is saying is that the rates on the low-value commodities will have to go up. Have you ever read Mr. Knowles' views on pulpwood rates and why they should be increased, carry more of the total costs?
  - A. You are saying that practical transport



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- Q. Practical ratemaking.
- A. This is the federal transportation policy and programme, United States Department of Commerce, 1960, and the advisers in here -- there was Professor Ernest Williams; he is a professor at Columbia---
- Q. He is not a practical rate man at all, is he?
- A. No. Behind the study here, as you can see on the front page, there is a whole group of industry adviser groups, there is the Transportation Council in the United States, which is made up of shippers, of operators. These are practical men, and if you want me to get the names of these men, I can. They are practical men and they recommended in this book that the United States railways get down to a more practical type of ratemaking, and they recommend that as well.

(Page 13993 follows)



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To come back to your question -- your last question -- Mr. Sinclair, this is the problem, as Mr. Knowles says, that, based on the value of commodity service it will not be able to subsidise any other traffic; it is all going as this traffic; and this is the high-grade articles.


Q. I suggest to you that all that is in both of the documents to being said which you refer is that the practical rate makers are saying cost is becoming a bigger factor, and particularly is this so in the United States where it has been legal to charge less than variable costs for competitive-rated traffic? And I pointed you before, in regard to "The Economics of Transportation" of Meyer et al, where they talked about is in the United States concept and this this same situation in Canada. is not the realise that, Mr. Hughes, because think you of your answers - you didn't realise that in the United States the situation with regard to floor on quite different? competitive-rated traffic is

A. That may be so; you may be right; but

I want to tell you what somebody in the Canadian Pacific
thinks about the whole rate-making structure, if I
may do that.

This is an article by Mr. William G.

Scott who is, I believe, Director of Traffic Research
in the Canadian Pacific Railway.



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	Q.	He is	a	director	of	Canadia	an Pac	cific
nd he	is an	economi	st	who wa	s f	ormerly	with	the
ailway	Associ	iation?						

A. Yes, he was an economist with the Railway Association.

MR. FRAWLEY: A graduate in law from the University of Alberta.

MR. SINCLAIR: And a graduate of the London School of Economics.

THE WITNESS: I never met him in London.

I don't know if he is a graduate or not.

THE CHAIRMAN: He didn't go to Manitoba,

did he?

MR. SINCLAIR: I don't think so.

MR. GUEST: It all depends on what he

said!

MR. SINCLAIR: I thank Mr. Guest for that.

I will answer your question after I have heard what he said.

MR. FRAWLEY: Open confession is good for the soul!

THE WITNESS: He has an article called "What Differentials in Rates?" He says this:

> "The freight classification, or grouping of commodities into limited a number of classes on the basis of their value, is the classical example of traditional rate differentials. It was designed to extend market opp-



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
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ortunities as widely as possible in the interests of encouring both a uniform development of a country and a maximum development of railway traffic. The rates for each class of traffic were to bear a proper relationship to the rates of all other classes; and the revenues from all rates taken together were to be related to the railways' total costs. The freight classification has represented a complex system of bonuses and taxes, taxes being levied on some commodities far above the full cost of service and bonuses given to other types of traffic which have been traditionally carried below cost ... " MR. SINCLAIR: Q. Below? A. "...below cost..."

"Satisfactory as the railway rate structure was under monopoly conditions, it nonetheless was artificial, and was far removed from the normal concept of prices in a highly competitive economy. Its artificiality, moreover, became a matter of practical importance to the railways with the development of a number of competitive



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
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carriers.

What then is the practical significance to the railways of traditional rate differentials based on the value of commodities? Simply this -- large blocks of high rated traffic have been, and are continuing to be, diverted from the railroads to common, contract and private carriers, not because these carriers can handle high value commodities more economically than the railways, but rather because such traffic can be moved more cheaply than at the prevailing railway rates which are not based on the cost of individual shipments. Of even greater importance is the fact that the large profits made by motor carriers from many of these rates have enabled them to profitably back-haul certain traffic which under normal circumstances would be outside their economic sphere of operations on the basis of their true costs.."

Q. What is the date of that? -THE CHAIRMAN: What are you quoting from?
THE WITNESS: This is a prize essay that

Mr. Scott wrote for "Railway Age," and the date is



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THE CHAIRMAN: Was it published in Railway

THE WITNESS:

Yes.

MR. SINCLAIR: Yes, it was.

THE WITNESS: I would like to continue on the practical aspect of this, Mr. Sinclair, if you don't mind, for a minute.

Mr. Alfred E. Perlman wrote an article "Scrap This Antiquated Price Structure!"

MR. SINCLAIR: Q. You referred to that in your brief?

referred to that in the brief.

I would like to read a couple of lines in "British Transport Review," dated April 1957:

> "The railroads in the United States can cure this evil. We have the power to out and find out what our costs are. We have the power to build a sensible rate structure based upon those costs, with standby charges built into the rate structure so that a customer's load factor, demand and volume can all be taken into account. Since the days of the wood-burning locomotives have grasped all that technology could offer us to change our physical plants and have come a long way in adapting new methods to our operations. The



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
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operating officer who would try to live today with the old wood-burners would be classed as mentally obsolete. When will we recognise the need for modern thinking to replace our old wood-burning rate structure?..."

- Q. Well, I think that you have put that in the record two or three times; but let me ask you you recall a man by the name of R.B. Robinson, who was the manager of the British Columbia division of the Canadian Manufacturers Association, and who one of the gentlemen that you were calling upon with the practical traffic men in his organization for advice in dealing with the brief? Do you remember him?
- I don't know the gentleman; I don't know him very well, I should say.
- Q. Let me ask you if you agree with "On the whole it would not appear from this: what is advanced in this summary that the resultant rate structure would be any less a 'mess' or less complacated than that which we already have.

Frankly, Charlie, and as you know, practical Traffic Managers take a dim view of economists' approaches to the solution of our transportation problem. They may be



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
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it wants?

wrong, of course, but you cannot blame them if they hesitate to jump into the unknown..."

Would you agree with that?

- I can't blame them if they do hesitate; but I am telling you that there are practical men behind all commerce studies. The railway president said it in "British Trasnport Review" and Mr. Scott said it; and it isn't only the economists who are leading the field in this respect -- by no means.
  - Q. That is your view?
  - A. That is my view.
- Well, let me ask you this little Q. practical problem: Under your scheme what would happen where a shipper is serving a market; his plant is located on a light density branch line. Another shipper, making the same goods, is also shipping to the same market, but his plant is located on a heavy density main line; and they are equidistant from the market; and both movements would be captive under your proposal. What would the rate be?
- A. So long as the rate was above the out-of-pocket cost and below the maximum fully distributed cost then the railway can make the rate whatever it wants.
  - The railway can make the rate whatever Q.



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
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Α. The same as it does

- It could make the rate on the branch Q. line movement to the junction of the branch main line on the fully distributed cost for that?
- It could equalize the rates for both because now, as I understand, the railways do not want to move anything at less than out-ofpocket cost.
- Will you please listen to my question: Q. The railway could put the rate on the fully-allocated cost on the branch line movement; is that correct?
- A. If it wanted to do it it could; but is no need to do it. If it is in competition with trucks...
- Just listen to the question. Captive Q. traffic: The railway, under the proposal you have given, could put the rate on the fully distributed cost?
  - A. Yes.
  - Fully allocated cost? Q.
  - A. Yes.
- On the branch line movement; and 0. because that cost would be substantially higher than the main line movement that would preclude the shipper on the branch line from getting his product to the market?
- If the railway put the rate at fully distributed cost, yes -- as would probably happen now.



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As would probably happen now? Q.

A. Yes.

Of course, I haven't got any purpose in Q. pointing things out to you, but I think you are completely wrong, and I have given you the classic example of unjust discrimmination.

There is just one small point on page 15, part 2, and then I am finished. You quote Merril Roberts! "Regulation and Economic Efficiency," and he says:

"Fully distributed costs are a false pricing standard.." and you quoted that as proof?


> A. Yes.

- What Professor Roberts meant by that was Q. fully distributed cost being the sole determinant of a rate; is that correct?
- No: what Professor Roberts is talking that fully distributed costs are a false about is price standard for minimum rating.
- Q. For a sole determinent of a rate, I suggest to you? --

The next sentence can be THE CHAIRMAN: read along with it.

THE WITNESS: I beg your pardon?

What I am suggesting is MR. SINCLAIR: Q. - and the Chairman says the next sentence reads right along with it -- what I am saying to you is that



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
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what	Professor	Rober	ts w	vas	saying	there		what	he
means	is th	at fu	lly d	list	ributed	costs	are	e a	false
price	standard	as a	sole	e de	eterminar	nt of a	a ra	ate?	

- A. I don't think he is saying that.
- 0. You don't?
- A. He is certainly not saying it from the extract I have got here.
- MR. SINCLAIR: I have no doubt we can clear this up, because a little bird has just told me that this gentleman may be here.
- Q. Well, anyhow, that isn't what you think he means?
  - A. No.
- Q. But, in any event, insofar as your scheme is concerned, if the price demand is inelastic, if the transportation demand is inelastic, under your proposal fully distributed costs are the sole determinant of the rate?
- A. Well, I would like to say if the traffic is captive the fully distributed costs...
  - Q. ... are the sole determinant?
- A. ... are the determinant of the maximum rate schedule, not of the rate.
- Q. If the product that is moving is inelastic in its demand for transportation, or its price is inelastic, I suggest to you that under your scheme the sole determinant of the rate is fully distributed cost?



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
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30 power.

- I don't agree with you. A.
- Q. Why?
- Because, in the first place, I am it is captive traffic that should take the maximum rate schedule and not the rate as to fully distributed cost. I am not talking about the rate; I am talking about the rate schedule as being the fully distributed cost; whereas Mr. Roberts is saying that fully distributed costs are a false pricing standard, for various reasons.
- Q. I am suggesting to you that under your proposal if the demand for transportation of the commodity is inelastic and price demand is inelastic and the traffic was captive the sole determinant of the rate would be fully distributed costs?
- Α. Well, again, I can say to you that you have put it a little differently. Now you have brought into it the fact of if there is captive traffic. If it is captive traffic and the demand is inelastic, then, again, the determinant of the rate lies with the railway; the rate schedule is the fully distributed costs, but not the rate. The railway might want to make it the rate, but that isn't the determinant in this scheme. That is up to the railways.
  - That is the result of your scheme? Q.
  - Well, that is within the railways! Α.



## Hughes cr-ex (Sinclair)

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COMMISSIONER MANN: I don't quite understand this. Mr. Sinclair said to you that, under the conditions posed by him, the sole determinant of the rate would be fully distributed cost?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

COMMISSIONER MANN: Now, it was my understanding until you answered his question that fully distributed cost, under the conditions posed by Mr. Sinclair, was the ceiling -- the maximum?

THE WITNESS: That is the maximum

COMMISSIONER MANN: But the railway might be better off, on captive traffic, to charge a rate below fully distributed cost in the case posed by Mr.

Sinclair?


THE WITNESS: That is right; that is what I am telling Mr. Sinclair, that this proposes a maximum rate schedule, and we have maximum rate schedules now; and the railway can charge what they like under the maximum.

commissioner mann: It is quite clear there is no obligation on the railway, in the case of captive traffic, to charge at the level of fully distributed cost? There is a play there between out-of-pocket costs and fully distributed costs?

THE WITNESS: Yes; that is quite correct

MR. SINCLAIR: Q. Mr. Hughes, arising out


of Commissioner Mann's question I am going to take



two or three minutes more. That answer is incorrect—that the obligation on the railway to charge fully distributed cost is the sole determinant of the rate.

I suggest there would be an obligation on the railways before they could come and increase rates; they would have to demonstrate to the Board of Transport Commissioners that they were getting every single penny that they could, and under the conditions I gave you of inelastic demand and inelastic price that would necessarily force the rate to the fully distributed cost basis as the sole determinant.

- A. But one of the reasons you are...
- Q. Is that one?
- A. You are correct in the context you have given of inelastic demand; and, of course, if you say that, you are right; but if there is no inelastic demand then the railway might maximise its revenue by actually reducing the rate below the fully distributed cost.
- Q. You, on a number of occasions, have referred to the fact that they might maximise their contribution by lowering the rate; and you referred to coal in the United States. You said that is a good example; is that correct?
- A. That is a good example. I can think of others.
- Q. The reason why coal makes such a large contribution is because of the large proportion



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of coal that is moving; is that correct?

- Α. Yes: but... -- yes, all right.
- Q. if the railways of the United Now. could show that they could get more money out of coal by charging it at fully distributed cost there would be an obligation on them, under your method of rate-making, to increase the coal rates; is that correct?
  - Α. If they could show that, yes.


Lumber is another article carried in the United States at less than fully distributed cost, I believe, and it makes a very big contribution, too.

> That is competitive traffic. MR. SINCLAIR:

Well, Mr. Hughes, thank you very much. know that you and Mr. Guest and, apparently, Brazier, from what he has said, worked very hard to prepare this evidence for this Commission, and it has been very interesting to discuss it.

the privilege MR. FRAWLEY: May I have of asking one or two questions of Mr. Hughes arising out of something that transpired between Mr. Sinclair and Mr. Hughes?

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr. Frawley.



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FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. FRAWLEY


Q. Mr. Hughes, yesterday on page 13960 of the transcript you were discussing with Mr. Sinclair the piggyback operation. Reading from your answer at the bottom of page 13960:

"A. I gave you an example of 100

per cent empty return ratio as an extreme example, but many truckers don't have that. Piggyback operators on the railways today don't have any consideration of value of the commodity inside the van, and I have seen a lot of piggyback trains running about and it has nothing to do with the value of the commodity inside the trailers.

- Q. Are you sure of that?
- A. Yes, I am sure of that.
- Q. Well, I suggest you are absolutely wrong because they take into account the factor of trucks as a common carrier, and they recognize that truck rates which enable the trucker to operate at a profit relate the value of the commodity. It may be a little complicated to get it, but I tell you it is there. Have you thought of that?

A. I have thought of it, and I



have discussed the situation with the C.P.R's piggybacking -- I don't know what you call them -- the chief of piggybacking in the C.P.R. . . . "

Then followed some jocular interplay:

"A. Well, he knows something about rate making; and he says: 'We don't take account the value of the commodity in the trailer; we look at the truck cost,' and I am saying that it has nothing whatever to do with the value of the commodity they are carrying."


Then Mr. Sinclair went on to something else. I

quite agree with you, Mr. Hughes, and I would like to
ask you to have in mind Agreed charge No. 474, effective
September 15th, 1958, made between the C.P.R. and
Canadian Pacific Transport Company Limited on behalf of
itself and its subsidiaries, Dench of Canada Limited,
Expressway Truck Lines (Canada) Limited and Okay Valley
Freight Lines Limited. My reading of that agreed
charge ---

MR. SINCLAIR: Is that agreed charge still in effect?

MR. FRAWLEY: That agreed charge is still in effect, yes.

Q. I put it to you, Mr. Hughes, that when you look at that agreed charge and you want to find out how much it costs to move between, say, Brandon and Calgary you will find it costs \$164 for a loaded van



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regardless of the contents so long as the excluded commodities are not in the van, and the excluded commodities are -- and I read from Condition D, paragraph 8:


> "The following commodities loaded on semi-trailers are not included and will not be accepted under the conditions of this agreement: freight requiring transit privileges, explosives high, household goods and settlers' effects used, livestock, poultry live."

Isn't it a fact that, other than those excluded commodities, the shipping companies -- Dench of Canada, for instance, to take the Alberta subsidiary of Canadian Pacific Transport, if they wanted to ship a trailer of any kind of freight, other than those excluded commodities, they would pay Canadian Pacific Railways \$164 regardless of the contents of the an?

A. Yes, this is a general way of making piggyback rates today.

MR. SINCLAIR: That is exactly what I said.

MR. FRAWLEY: Q. That is the agreed charge, and so far as I know, it is the only agreed charge covering piggyback operations in Canada. I may be wrong, but that is the only one I have found. Then, there is Canadian Freight Association, freight tariff No. 38-D, CTC No. 1621, and that is an open tariff for the carriage of loaded and empty trailers for for-hire carriers -all for-hire carriers. I put it to you again, Mr. Hughes,



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if you want to find out how much it would cost to ship a loaded trailer containing any kind of freight except the following excluded commodities -- automobiles, buses, trucks and highway tractors new, explosives Class A, explosives Class B, household goods and settlers effects used, livestock, poultry live, Royal mail, semi-trailers or trailers new or used -- so long as your freight did not come within that prohibited class, then any kind of freight from the highest to the lowest class would move, I suggest to you, from Fredericton to Ottawa for \$1.97 per hundred with a 32,000-pound minimum or from Medicine Hat to Toronto at \$6.60 per hundredweight with a 34,000-pound minimum entirely regardless of the value or even of the nature of the commodity within the van. Is that not your understanding?

A. That is right, Mr. Frawley.

MR. FRAWLEY: Mr. Chairman, those were the questions I wanted to ask Mr. Hughes, and now I would like, if I may, to offer as an exhibit a rather formidable statement prepared by my office in Edmonton which shows all agreed charges in effect as of May 24th, 1960. I am only offering this as a reference work for the Commission. I do not expect them to carry it about with them on their travels, but it may be that some time during their deliberations they may like to refer to an agreed charge, and there is this information gathered at considerable expense, but with great satisfaction.

THE CHAIRMAN: You want to file it?



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MR. FRAWLEY: It has not yet received a

Document filed by Mr.Frawley showing all agreed charges in effect as of May 24th, 1960.


MR. FRAWLEY: It contains the interesting information that as of May 24th, 1960 there were in effect -- there had been filed; I will not say "in effect", but there had been filed agreed charges up to the number of 908, and I understand since the 24th of May, because the wheel is constantly turning, that now it has hit 999 -- yesterday morning. There are in effect, of those 999 -- I should have the exact figure, and I think I will get that and put it on the record. It is somewhere between 850 and 900, I think, still in effect. So, this is the agreed charge; this is the technique which the railways have found to be so effective, and I may say they have found it increasingly effective since they succeeded, through a fluke in the legislation, in getting rid of the one-andone-third rule on transcontinental traffic.

MR. SINCLAIR: Mr. Chairman, I don't know that that is all set out on the exhibit which Mr.Frawley has talked about, but, if it is, then the exhibit is not factual and should not be taken by the Commission. It is no fluke in the legislation.

THE CHAIRMAN: That is not in the exhibit.

MR. FRAWLEY: Is my friend saying that my

exhibit is not factual?



MR. SINCLAIR: I did not know whether you were reading from the exhibit when you were using some of the language in your last remark.

THE CHAIRMAN: He was only commenting.


MR. FRAWLEY: I was "reading" from my practically inexhaustible mind on the subject of agreed charges. I am told, thanks to the Commission's traffic adviser, that there are 858 agreed charges still in effect, the difference being that some of the earlier ones have expired.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Brazier?

MR. BRAZIER: Mr. Chairman, I presume some of the members of the Commission may wish to ask Mr. Hughes some questions, and, if I can speak to the Commission after the questioning is all over, I have a motion.

## BY COMMISSIONER GOBEIL:


Q. I would like to have some information on your Part 1 first. On page 17 in Part 1, your lumber movement, you present it over eight years for the commodity groups, but your lumber end of it seems interesting to me. In 1950 you have a percentage of distribution of 33 per cent for lumber. Four years later you move 8 per cent more, and eight years later you come to 20 per cent above 1950. Is it your impression that this trend will go on, or do you expect that in 1966, which is another eight years -- or, six years from now -- that it may be 70 or 75 per cent that the lumber may represent?



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A. I am not really well qualified to speak about the future of the lumber industry. A lot of the reasons for this are, increasing population and wealth in the United States and Canada, and if that continues to grow -- the population in both countries grows -- I don't see why these percentages should not keep on increasing.

- Q. Well, is this increase compared to the balance due to the fact that part of the other traffic is lost to the railways because of other competitive transport?
- A. If you look in the percentage distribution column you will see the mines have fallen down
  quite a lot, which makes the other figures greater.
  But, there is another factor. There is plywood and
  these products which are ever-increasing, as I say, the
  population's wealth.
- Q. In the other column, under the title
  "Delivered to foreign connections," how do you explain
  this decrease on the forests from 1950 to 1954 when
  you had them almost 16 per cent, and, in 1954 it
  decreased to 10 per cent?
- A. This 1954 was a bad year in the United States economy; that is one reason. I remember that as a recession year. Also, these are delivered to foreign connections in British Columbia. It may have been they had been routed to foreign connections in Saskatchewan or further across the prairies.
  - Q. On page 19, in your table X-B, for



manufactured and miscellaneous -- agreed charges -- between Nova Scotia and New Brunswick there is a tremendous difference in mileage; 600 compared to 1800.

What is the reason for that?

- A. I will just get the working papers; I will have to look at the waybill working papers. Very often, with the small provinces, it has to do with the size of the sample, and I will just check on that.
- Q. I thought it may be a mistake, because even in British Columbia, which normally should have the longest haul, it is only half of what you have in Nova Scotia.
- A. I am sure it is not a mistake. We did look at this some time before in Victoria, and it is not a mistake.

MR. BRAZIER: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Guest advises me the papers are not here.

COMMISSIONER GOBEIL: Well, all right; it looked peculiar to me.

Q. On page 29, in discussing British

Columbia both-ways traffic, you refer in the second

column towards the end of the page to a statement by

Mr. Knowles where it is said that most of this normal

traffic moves on the western region, as was pointed out


to the Standing Committee on Railways, Canals and

Telegraph Lines in April, 1959. There Mr. Knowles

said that 56.7 per cent of the normal traffic moves

on the western region, 26,5 per cent moves in Ontario

and Quebec and 16.8 per cent on the maritime region.





know the reason for it.

Q. On page 53, and this is the last question
I have in this section, in the second column, the first
paragraph, you say:

"It will be noted that each rate increase up to 1953 at first brought in more revenue from normal traffic, but since that time there has been a considerable decline."

What was the reason for that decline?

A. Because more and more of the normal traffic, which is the more or less captive traffic, is moving over into the competitive classes as rates go higher and higher. It is because the truckers are coming along primarily and taking this captive traffic away from the railways. It is getting more and more onto the trucks.

- Q. Mr. Frawley has just handed us a big document here: might it not be also simply due to the fact that some of that normal traffic does not go to trucks, but moves on agreed charges?
- A. Yes, as it gets competitive and there is a danger of it moving to the trucks, then the railways may put it on a competitive or agreed charge rate.
- Q. If such is the case, it would not mean that the railways are losing the traffic; it is just going under another name -- agreed charge?
  - A. Yes, that is right, but the statistics do



show that the tonnage moving by railways -- the ton mile of work moved by railways is not keeping up with the increase in the production of the country. So, they may not be losing the traffic, but they are not getting their share of the new traffic that is coming along in the rising economy.



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traffic at all?

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THE CHAIRMAN: Very well, Mr. Gobeil.

COMMISSIONER GOBEIL: Q. Mr. Hughes,
let me apply my layman approach to your cost of
service. Expecially after yesterday afternoon, I
am a little bit mixed up. You would not change
anything about competitive traffic; your cost of
service as a first will not influence competitive

- A. Providing the competitive traffic was being carried more than the out-of-pocket cost, then it would not be influenced by the cost of service principle.
- Q. As it stands now, my understanding was that is the way it is. It is not permitted at a rate below variable or out-of-pocket costs?
- A. It is not permitted, no, in competitive traffic as defined in section 334; but other traffic can be carried at out-of-pocket costs to the best of my knowledge.
  - Q. Competitive traffic?
- A. Non-competitive traffic. There is a branch line deficit and there is a passenger deficit also.
- Q. I thought that no traffic would be carried below variable costs.

MR. SINCLAIR: You are not wrong, Mr.

Commissioner.

THE CHAIRMAN: What is the law?



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
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MR. BRAZIER: The law is, of course, that it cannot be carried a rate which is non-compensatory. Now, whether a non-compensatory rate as measured today would be the same thing as termed as out-of-pocket costs could only be found after we determined what the out-of-pocket costs are. The two terms may mean different things.

MR. SINCLAIR: With respect, I should say, Commissioner Gobeil, that the long-term variable costs may, with the techniques that are now here, be able to be ascertained with greater precision, and I think that is so; but a competitive rate under our jurisprudence has always been one that meets out-of-pocket costs and something in addition, and the only refinement made is a closer ascertainment of the out-of-pocket costs. This is not only on competitive rates but on agreed charges, and there is one single exception, and that is the statutory rates on grain. This is obvious from a reading of the Railway Act, section 320, and the provisions of the Transport Act with respect to agreed charges, and section 334 with respect to competitive traffic.

commissioner mann: Mr. Sinclair, while you are on your feet, could you draw our attention to the section in the Transport Act, sub-section in section 32, where there is a requirement for compensatory rates?

MR. SINCLAIR: Sub-section (6):



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"An agreed charge shall be made on the established basis of rate making..."

Section 33, sub-section (3):

"In dealing with a reference under this section the Board shall have regard to all considerations that appear to it to be relevant, including the effect that the making of the agreed charges has had or is likely to have had on the net revenue of the carriers who are parties to it."

COMMISSIONER MANN: And your view that this is, in effect, the same as the provisions compensatory rates under section 334 of the Railway Act and the jurisdiction falls on the Board ih this case as well?

> MR. SINCLAIR: Yes.

MR. FRAWLEY: I am sure my friend would like to the Commission's attention in that regard draw the decision of the Board in the Cement Clinker case, a judgment of Commissioner Knowles and concurred in by Commissioner Wardrope, where out-of-pocket costs plus some contribution, however small, to overhead was frowned upon, and in that judgment it indicated that all costs were costs which had to be taken into account before one could say whether or not the rate was compensatory or otherwise. I would like to have that citation and give it to the Commission rather than just rely on memory. I know the Cement Clinker case, because I was in that case. It may be that we have a new definition of compensatory, and by compensatory a rate must return all of the costs.



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So what we are practically saying is --

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THE CHAIRMAN: It must not be carried at a loss.

MR. FRAWLEY: Yes, and the money as paid for dividends, it is just the same as money paid for wages, it is just as much a cost as the money paid for ties. I thought I would put this into the record at this time.


MR. SINCLAIR: Of course, Mr. Chairman -and I think there are a number of us here, including
Mr. Frawley -- we have had various cases of what is
called normal traffic, but in no case has the Board
ever allowed a rate to be less than the variable cost.
Now, what it should be above that has certainly
caused various --

MR. FRAWLEY: I don't quarrel with that.

MR. SINCLAIR: I think it is useful now it is cleared up once and for all and there is general agreement at least between myself and Mr. Frawley on the subject.

COMMISSIONER GOBEIL: Q. In practice, Mr. Hughes, your system would not change anything too serious as far as comptitive traffic is concerned?

- A. That is right.
- Q. It is on the captive traffic that it would charge?
  - A. Yes.
  - Q. And then your minimum cost would be the



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
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same as the competitive, that is out-of-pocket?

A. Yes, that is correct.

- Q. And then the maximum, where I got all mixed up yesterday afternoon. At first in reading your brief I thought your maximum would be the fully distributed cost, but later on you clarified more by saying to Mr. Cooper that it could be, instead of fully distributed being 100 per cent, 105 per cent or 110 per cent, if the Board decided or the proper authority decided that the maximum should be fixed at such a rate?
- A. Yes. Our original proposal in the brief, and it 13 still our proposal really, is that rates, the maximum rate schedule should be at fully distributed then if in the examination it appears costs, and some doubt whether the railways that there may be live if that is will be able to the case, then we say in the initial case the rate and along schedule may be fully distributed cost or the Board may say it is reasonable to have it at 5 per or 10 per cent or 25 per cent above fully distributed once that decision is made for captive cost, and the Board, then the percentage of fully traffic by and this will remains at that distributed costs automatically push up the dollars and cents in the maximum rate schedule, but the percentage will not change.
  - Q. I think I see your point. Let's put



and greater, and we see it in the piggyback system now, the railways may feel they have to put a

- it another way. This year the fully distributed cost or 110 per cent means for a certain product, say, 1.67 a ton-mile, and next year or two years later, due to wage increase, your cost increases and the fully distributed instead of being 1.67 might be 1.77?
  - A. That is right.
- Q. Then the maximum will change, at least the maximum for carrying that commodity, but your maximum level will always be fully distributed or 110 per cent if the Board decides it is 110 per cent?
  - A. That is correct.
- Q. It will always remain 100 per cent or 110 per cent?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. But if the cost of service increases, then the maximum would increase, too?
  - A. That is right.
- Q. Now, on the effect of this project of yours -- incidentally, you told Mr. Cooper the other day that in 10 years from now you believe there will be very little non-competitive freight left, normal traffic left?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. So if in ten years you say there is none to speak of, what would be the use, since your system affected only the non-competitive?


Well, as competition becomes greater



horizontal percentage increase on and push up the rates on the captive traffic, and this system would protect the captive traffic from an everincreasing burden on the smaller and smaller segments, and we want to keep the costs of actually carrying that traffic -- the captive traffic should get the benefit of any decrease in costs over the next few years because of modernization, and so on.

- Q. Mr. Frawley yesterday was trying to find out how it would affect Alberta. How would it affect not only Alberta but any non-competitive traffic? Which, according to you, are the most important commodities which are being carried at non-competitive rates, except grain for export, of course?
- A. I think quite a lot of the noncompetitive traffic is now being carried at greater than
  its fully distributed cost as a result of horizontal
  percentage increases, and lumber, I believe, is one
  of them; in certain markets, I am sure, it is being
  carried at more than its fully distributed cost. I
  can't think of an example of Alberta's traffic.
  - Q. Grain for domestic?
- A. Grain for domestic is probably being carried at more than its fully distributed cost.

  So these are two categories where the rate could well come down. But I cannot see these rates at fully distributed cost going up to the maximum schedule because the railway is probably maximizing



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- Q. The rates will go down and the railways will lose some money there?
  - A. Yes.

its revenue on these rates now.

- Q. And to get that money back they cannot increase competitive rates. But are there some competitive rates which are moving at below fully distributed?
  - A. I think there will be, yes.
- Q. Then the railways may have to get their money back, may have to let go some commodities, competitive, which are less remunerative. They will have to leave that for trucks?
- A. Yes. They will probably have to get out of the short haul field in many commodities in order to do that.
- Q. Mr. Frawley was asking you yesterday and then Commissioner Mann asked you if your system will mean that there will be some rationalization and there will be traffic which will automatically disappear, and you said no. But that is what would happen. Part of the traffic, the less remunerative traffic, would go to a competitor?
- A. That is right, yes, and branch line traffic would be an example, where probably the truckers could carry it below the railways' real cost and then they could get the traffic.
  - Q. In this letter which was read yesterday,



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Mr. Hughes, the part I am interested in is on page 13937 in the transcript. Have those gentlemen of the Forest Industries discussed with you your proposal?

No, only through the Advisory Committee, and I don't remember any Forest man speaking to me personally about it.

- They had not seen your brief? Q.
- When we go along to the Advisory Committee we take an outline, a framework, we don't take the actual brief, because it would have to be altered on their recommendation.
- But this Council of Forest Industries, 0. of which Mr. Nicholson is the President, had seen your brief?
- A. They had seen it, they had seen the When we presented it to the Advisory Committee outline. we took an outline; they had seen the framework before we presented it to the Advisory Committee.

Perhaps I could advise you, MR. BRAZIER: Of the names Mr. Sinclair read this monring, sir. are two of those numbers, Mr. Andrews of the British Columbia Lumber Manufacturers and Mr. Armstrong of the Plywood Association are both members of our Advisory Committee. They saw the brief in an abbreviated draft form.

> That is Part 2. THE CHAIRMAN:

Yes, Part 2. This 18 some MR. BRAZIER: months ago they saw that abbreviated draft



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and a meeting was held and it was discussed and then
it was completed, and at the time this letter was
written they had had the actual Part 2 in their
possession for several weeks. Copies were sent to
all the members of the Advisory Committee at the
same time they were forwarded to the Commission.
So Mr. Andrews and Mr. Armstrong would have received
copies of the brief, and Mr. Nicholson and the rest
of them would have received the information.

THE CHAIRMAN: Part 1 they would know from February.

MR. BRAZIER: Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: And also the cost of service brief.

MR. BRAZIER: Yes.

COMMISSIONER GOBEIL: Q. Why I was asking this was because on page 13937, line 14, they say:

"We are concerned as to whether, and, if so, how the competitive factor, which of course is recognized in the present rail freight rate structure, will apply if the new theory advanced by the Government is approved and adopted."

I thought there was one thing clear, Mr. Hughes, that your system will not touch the competitive rate?

A. That would seem to be so, Mr. Commissioner,



Q. That is why I was asking if they had read it. They seem to be afraid of what it will do to the competitive rates. So there is no cause for alarm there?

A. I see no cause for alarm.

MR. SINCLAIR: It is that it will move to trucks and then trucks would pay their full cost of the highway.

MR. BRAZIER: I don't know what it has to do with this letter.

COMMISSIONER GOBEIL: Those people may have very good traffic experience, but do they have the equivalent of Mr. Bandeen or Mr. Stenason in cost study?

A. They would have to be very good men to be as good as Mr. Bandeen and Mr. Stenason, I think.

## BY COMMISSIONER MANN:

- Q. Mr. Hughes, starting on a fairly large basis first, would it be right to say that the philosophy of the province of British Columbia with regard to transport in the rate-making aspect is that the province would prefer to rely on the forces of the market place rather than the hand of the state?
  - A. That is right, Mr. Mann, yes.

    Q. Would you agree with this, or perhaps

· A

I should ask you whether you agree with it: Are there any exceptions, are there any areas in which



rather than railways.

Hughes (Mann)

you see need for the state to regulate transportation,

and I am taking transportation in its widest sense

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Page 14033 follows



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A. Yes, I see a need for regulation of maximum rates on captive traffic, as I have said many times, because with captive traffic very often the sky is not the limit, and at present the classification is the limit, which is about the same thing for many commodities moving.

I see a need also for regulation of minimum rates, partly for the protection of the captive shipper and partly for the protection of the trucker.

Q. Let us see whether we can put that into a general form and we can particularize it later. I think that will make it easier.

Would you agree, then, that regulation might be necessary in order to afford the public protection against monopoly and to avoid destructive competition? Would those be the two poles?

- Yes, that is right. Α.
- And is that what you have in mind . 0.
- That is what I have in mind. Α.
- . when you talk about maximum rates Q. and minimum rates?
  - A. That is right, Mr. Mann.
- Q. Now, Mr. Hughes, you had quite a discussion -- I think everybody has discussed it with you so far -- about this value of the commodity that you seem to put as a primary consideration in ratemaking. After the barrage that you have been facing in the last few days are you still of the opinon that value of the commodity is the prime consideration in ratemaking, or



has your belief in that been weakened?


A. In fact, it has been strengthened by what Mr. Sinclair said yesterday. He says it goes right through the rate structure -- the value of the commodity; and it was also pointed out that it didn't apply where there is a great deal of competition -- and an obvious example is in piggyback rates; and with the rest of the rate structure, especially in non-competitive groups, it goes all the way through and is one of the reasons why we need a change in rate-making philosophy.

Q. It is your belief, then, that the Canadian Freight Classification, as we presently have it, is primarily based on value of the commodity, and that the other factors that enter into the assignment of a rate are secondary in importance?

A. Yes; and there are many examples of that in the classification.

Q. Well, I would like to read to you a citation of a case decided by the Board of Transport Commissioners, which goes by the unlikely name of Thermos Bottle Company vs. Canadian Freight Association -- 36 C.R.C., page 115. The passage I want to read to you reads as follows:

"The value of a commodity is an important one, although not a controlling element in the determination of classification rating, but very little weight can be attached to a comparison of the percentage



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proportion of freight charged to the value of the commodity."

That is the end of the quote.


You see, there is the Board itself in this case saying that the value of the commodity is an important one, and then you will note the words "... although not a controlling element ... " Now, I find it a little difficult to agree to having the value of the commodity put as a primary element in classification making when the Board itslf feels it is not the controlling one.

A. Well, as I say, you can take many examples out of the classification. There are iron and steel products and wire -- these are some particular examples that I have picked out -- and it goes all the way through; and in the light of what Mr. Edsforth said, he put it at the top of his list; and Mr. Stenason in his book -- I know it was applied to the United States -- but he talked about the value of the commodity pricing riddled right through the rate structure in the United States; and this is one of the main sicknesses of the railways.

- Q. But you say "value-of-commodity pricing."

  I think the reference in the American publications is

  to "value-of-service pricing".
- A. This is what Mr. Stenason means in his book. He is talking about value-of-service pricing and he is meaning value-of-commodity pricing.
  - Q. I don't think I can agree with you, if




you equate the two things. By your own recommendation there is the value of service and value of commodity?

A. Yes; I would put a definite distinction on it. But he says that value of service rate making as now practised -- and he is talking about value of commodity pricing -- value of service rate making is both unnecessary and undesirable. This is what he says, and he is, of course, talking from elements in the classification and throughout the rate structure.

- Q. And you think this reference only refers to the value of the commodity?
- A. Yes; this is quite plain from the reading of the book.
- Q. I just wanted to see whether you had changed your mind or were willing to modify your original statement. You still stand in the belief that value of commodity is the prime element in the assignment of a classification rating in the classification?
- A. Yes; and my belief is strengthened by what Mr. Sinclair said yesterday.
- Q. Well, now, I don't intend to deal with Part 1 of your submission. I think it has been covered very adequately. Our discussion today will be entirely on Part 2.

On page 5 at paragraph 11 you have a sentence:

"No shipper will pay a higher freight rate than the service is worth to him."



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Well, now, would you agree that he would be willing to pay more for the service if the value of the commodity is great because then the freight cost is a relatively small element of the selling price?

A. This would be so assuming there was a

- A. This would be so assuming there was a monopoly for the transportation of that product.
  - Q. Yes?
- A. Assuming there was a monopoly, as soon as we get a monopoly for the carriage of silk -- which is an item I have used frequently -- then the value of the commodity has no relation to the value of transportation service.
- Q. Now, coming to page 12, paragraph 46, you say there:

"It is in the public interest that
the transportation system of Canada be
operated at the lowest possible cost, and
this will be done by the shippers using
the system if they are given free choice
and if prices are based on costs."

Now, am f right in reading this paragraph in this way, that when you talk about the transportation system of Canada you have in mind something that is much larger than the railways alone?

- A. Yes.
- Q. You mean all carriers?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Then, do you have to come to the conclusion that the rates of all the carriers should be based on



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Should reflect cost.

- Yes; well, let me modify that -- should Q. be cost-oriented?
  - A . Yes, they should be cost-oriented.
- Does that mean, in the first instance, that the cost of all carriers must be ascertained by someone?
- A. No, it doesn't mean that. There must be -- let me put this a little better. If you have regulation of two forms of transportation, such as trucking and railways, if they are both regulated by, say, the federal government and there are companies with other modes of competition then somebody has to determine the true costs of each form of transportation, because they may not be telling the truth on it; there may be reasons for it. But if you have one that is unregulated, such as the truckers, there is not the same reason for anybody to get to know their costs. Truckers are usually fairly small operators with very large variable costs, and they naturally work on a cost of service basis, providing that the railways would do the same thing.
- You are familiar with Canadian Pacific and Mr. Sinclair's other subsidiaries. Would you call them very small? Take Smith, for instance?
- A. No; but, of course, they are operating in competition with a lot of shall companies and very largely with private truckers -- which is the main competitor in



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transportation in Canada.

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Q. But your objective, surely, is that we should try in transport -- at least, I gather this from what you said -- we should try in transport to arrive at a system which will lead to optimum allocation of resources?

> Α. Yes.

- Q. Well, now, to the extent that carriers other than the railways -- non-regulated carriers -are not basing their rates, or are not having a costoriented rate structure -- to that extent do you not have the possibility of having misallocation of resources?
- A. That is quite true; but as soon as the railways made their cost of service rate making with this competition then they have to follow suit.
- Q. Well, do you think it is fair for one mode of transportation to be forced into one mould, to be asked to behave according to one standard, and for another to be left entirely free?
- A. Do I think it is fair? Well, I am not really sure which point of view I am supposed to be speaking from. I do think it is fair. There is not the same necessity, if you are talking about trucking -there is not the same necessity to regulate truckers as vigorously as you have to do railreads.
  - Q. Why?
- A. I don't see that truckers do have any captive traffic.
  - Q. Let us take an example. Well, it won't



. .

be an example. Let us take this hypothesis, that
you have an abandonment successfully contested by the
railways and the line is being withdrawn -- the
physical fabilities have been abandoned. The people
along that line are now entirely dependent on the road
services. The provincial authority has only granted
one franchise to one trucker over this route. Would
you have a condition of functional monopoly there?

- A. Yes; as soon as you bring in entrycontrol then you do need maximum rate regulation, because, in effect, you are giving a monopoly.
- Q. And if that were to happen in the Province of British Columbia where you do have entry-control you would then be driven to the conclusion that you should have some protection against monopoly pricing on this particular route?
  - A. Yes
- Q. Then, if that is the case, would you advocate for that particular truck line a cost-oriented structure as to rates?
- A. Yes; because if it is not cost-oriented you will find the grocer goes and buys his own truck and hauls his own goods.
- Q. Let us take the other side of the philosophy that underlies this scheme -- the protection of the public against destructive competition, or the protection of the carriers, for that matter, against destructive competition.

Would a cost-oriented rate structure be better




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suited to present destructure competition by the trucker than the value of service rate structure?

- A. I think so; and the reason is that I draw a distinction between velue of service and other types of rate making; and there is nothing, in my opinion, to present a value of service rate going down below out-of-packet that and the railways could indulge in this predatory pricing.
- Q. Mr. Hughes, you have quoted in Part 2 of your brief several times the United States Department of Commerce study of March, 1960, entitled, "Federal Transportation Policy and Programme." I want to read you something from page 6 of that policy statement, under the heading of "Federal Investment and User Charges," and I would like to find out whether you agree, in general, with what the United States Department of Commerce thinks should be done in the United States and whether it has any application to Canada:

"The government should evolve and keep current a comorehensive plan for its investment in all types of transport facilities. Within each type of facility, it should continue to develop adequate standards of analysis to compare costs with benefits for each project. It should also devise standards by which to compare each primary area of investment ( high-ways, rivers and harbours, airways and



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airports) with the others and with private transportation investment.so that investment decisions can be made upon similar tests of need and public advantage . . . "

This is the passage I want to direct your attention to particularly:


> "User charges should be imposed wherever transportation uses federal facilities. All groups of users should. as an ultimate goal, pay their fair share of operation and maintenance costs. as well as of new Federal investment and interest."

Now, do you think that is a desirable thing in the Canadian context?

A. As a general policy I wouldn't think so. In the Canadian context we have areas -- communities -which, if they had to pay for the full cost of building a road -- they just wouldn't be there.

In the Canadian context I don't think that it would be correct policy.

- Q. It would not be correct policy?
- A. No -- to insist on user charges for all federally-cwned facilities. I know a lot of small docks and harbours and roads which have to be there to keep the communities in existence; and this is in the interest of Canadians as a whole.
  - Q. Then, I take it that you are familiar with



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this "most popular recent textbook" on transportation, by Meyer et al. At page 265:

"There can be little argument with the general principle that wherever possible user cost pricing should be extended eventually to the public provision of transportation facilities. This does not mean that it should be extended immediately to new transportation industries where its early application might stifle proper development. It does mean, though, that a great deal more time, attention and good research should be given to the problem of exactly how much it costs to provide certain transportation facilities and how much the users are currently contributing to defraying these costs. Such knowledge is now usually lacking."

That follows pretty well what the Department of Commerce study shows. The reason I am putting this to you is this, that if you agree that it is generally desirable, for the sake of optimum resources allocation, to have a rate structure for all carriers based on costs, well, then, it becomes imperative that the true cost of these carriers be ascertained? Would that be right?

A. With competing modes of transportation,



- Q. Their own costs?
- I said when the carriers are competing. Α.

But, you see, this is a situation where the railway is much more efficient to carry goods a long way; it is better than the trucks doing this.

- How do you know whether . Q.
- Α. Well, I am saying something hypothetically now.



4 5

Q. Oh, yes.

A. So that the railway under competition is going to get the goods; the goods are going on rail. Now, it is quite valid to subsidize the railway because it already has the goods, providing the traffic is not switching its mode of transportation. Then you still get proper allocation of resources in transportation, if you are subsidizing the one that is going to get the traffic anyway.


Q. I don't think I quite follow you there, and I am sure it is not your fault. What I wanted to find out from you was this: if it is desirable to have a minimum resource outlay on transportation, I suppose it follows that the most efficient carrier will carry the commodities for which it is best suited?

A. Yes.

Q. Well, somewhere along the line one must find out who the most efficient carrier is: how do you propose he be found -- by empirical experience -- empirical testing?


A. In competition I think the shipper would automatically find out. If there was competition, the carriers would automatically gravitate towards coordination. The carrier with the lowest costs would tend to get the traffic, and the shipper could choose the best type of transportation from his own service requirements.

Q. Let me put this hypothesis to you: supposing I have a situation where I give tremendous



operational subsidies, indirect subsidies, to the highway carriers, and I give no subsidy at all to the railways. Well, then, you say you rely on competition, but haven't you obscured the true cost situation as between the two carriers by loading one with a tremendous amount of subsidy, and allowing him, by virtue of that subsidy, to be a relatively low cost carrier?

- A. Yes, but this is a very complex subject. You may actually, by subsidizing the motor carrier -- and you can see this in the air lines -- you may be fostering an infant industry. The eventual cost of the carrier through subsidization now -- and we have seen it with TCA -- by subsidization he may eventually be the low-cost carrier, but in the long run you are obscuring the true economic coordination. The long-term interest is something else again.
- Q. When you have outgrown the infant industry stage and you are dealing with fully matured carriers, how does this subsidy situation look then?
- A. Well, you are obscuring the proper allocation of economic resources. You are misallocating resources, in other words.
- Q. So, it would be desirable to have some knowledge of the true costs of all carriers until this stage of equal maturity of all carriers?
- A. If there is any subsidy programme for any of the carriers, then it is necessary for the subsidizing body to have a knowledge of the costs of the carriers, yes.



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
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On page 16, paragraph 56, you have a Q. discussion on variations in route costs, and you say: "On routes where rail costs are high but rates are low, traffic is attracted from relatively low-cost competitors, thus leading to economic waste."

The example there, or the statement there, is in relation to intermodal competition only. Does it, in your opinion, also hold true on intramodal competition?

> A . Yes.

- Mr. Sinclair, for instance, gave you --0. and you will forgive my reference to the Atlantic provinces, but Mr. Sinclair gave you an example of the three lines through the maritimes which he has discussed before various commissions in the last ten or twelve years, and I think he left you with the impression that the C.P.R. short line through Maine would probably be the lowest cost of the three?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. In that case would you say that optimum resource allocation would require the routing of traffic between certain parts of the maritimes and central Canada over the C.P.R. line?
- A. Yes. Again, it is complex because if you did that, the C.P.R. line would become congested and the out-of-pocket costs would probably rise above the costs of the other two carriers.
- Q. Supposing we had about 60 per cent excess capacity on that line?



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
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Α. Then my proposal would put the traffic on the C.P.R. This is not the proposal, but the minimum rate schedules would reflect that and the railways could do what they wanted above that.

- In other words, what you are saying, then, is that your belief in competition, in the efficacy of competition, extends much further than competition between various modes of transportation; it extends also to much more intensive competition between the railways themselves?
- It does not mecessarily follow as long as the high-cost line is recovering its out-of-pocket costs from the rates; then, there is no reason why the two railways should not be the same.
- Q. I understand that, and we will come back to that a little later.

Mr. Hughes, we might come back to these other questions if we have any time left, but I want to give some consideration as to what would likely disappear under the British Columbia government's proposal for changes in the rate structure. Perhaps we might discuss that for a little while. agree that under your proposal there would be no more class rates as ceilings for all traffic?

- A. That is right.
- Q. Would you also agree that the designation of traffic as "commodity rated" or "competitive rated" would disappear as well?



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
A. Not quite. Costs may differ on particular

The reason for that would be, I suppose, that all rates on non-captive traffic are by definition competitive?

Hughes

(Mann)

- Yes, that is right.
- Q. I want to discuss the effect of your proposal on the long haul-short haul restrictions and the one-and-one-third rule. Would you agree that the long haul-short haul descriptions presently in the Act and one-and-one-third rule would automatically disappear with the adoption of the British Columbia proposal?
  - I am aware of that, yes.
- The reason would be that in competitive conditions which underlie the assumption of your division of traffic in the captive and non-captive -all non-captive traffic is by definition competitive?
  - Yes.
- Then, being cost-oriented, the rates to intermediate points should reflect lower costs and result in lower rates. Hence, one would argue that the protection presently accorded the short haul intermediate traffic moving on class and commodity rates would disappear?
  - Yes
- The next thing I suggest to you that is likely to disappear under your proposal would be equalization as a matter of policy, and the reason for that would be the costs may differ in special rate territories?



routes, but not in rate territories, because you can

There may be high cost routes or low cost

Q. With that qualification as between rate

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under your proposal?

get both in rate territories.

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costs?

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A. That is right.

Q. Would it be right to say that unjust discrimination and undue preference with regard to rates on non-captive traffic would disappear? Let me suggest

territories, equalization would no longer be defensible

why that might be the case: if non-captive traffic is

by definition competitive and cost considerations underlie the allocation of traffic between carriers, can


there be unjust discrimination or undue preference

as long as the railway does not set a rate on non-

A. Above or below long run out-of-pocket costs?

captive traffic which is above long run out-of-pocket

- Q. Yes
- A. I can still see the odd situation arising of undue preference and discrimination, and I would not like to see the provision taken out of the Act until it is seen just what is going to happen. Probably the regulators will become more cost-minded, but at present I would not take the provision out of the Act.
- Q. This is merely a sort of cost attitude on your part, but would you agree that because of the system as a whole you don't really need that in the




long run, given due conditions.

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- A. You don't really need it. It would be very difficult to bring a case of undue preference and discrimination because there would not be any.
- Q. In Britain there is no more undue discrimination?
  - A. That is right.
- Q. Another thing that I suggest to you -and I think Mr. Sinclair has covered it -- that would
  disappear under your rate structure is the experience
  we have today of branch line rates being on the same
  level as main line rates; that will disappear too?
- A. Yes, there are different differentials for route costs. I must say that I am talking about the rate schedules will be different, not necessarily the rates.
- Q. Well, these different cost characteristics would likely require differential rate making for captive traffic and for non-captive traffic moving near long-run out-of-pocket costs on branch lines?
- A. Yes, it could happen, depending on the cost structure.
- Q. Another thing that would vanish from the present rate structure that we have is the equality of rates over different routes on captive and non-captive ptraffic moving at long run out-of-pocket costs.


  Would you agree that would be the case?
- A. If they are both moving at long run outof-pocket costs, then there would be no equality in



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the rates, that is true.

- Is this, that if captive traffic moves at the maximum rate of fully distributed costs on the cheaper of two competitive railways, the higher cost route cannot match the rate of the lower cost route. If non-captive traffic moves over the cheaper of two competitive routes, which is at the level of long run out-of-pocket costs, the higher cost route could not match the rate over the lower cost route, and this would probably lead to the reallocation of some traffic as between the railways which now moves between competitive points at the same rates?
- A. This would be the case: there would be a reallocation of traffic, given the conditions that you postulate -- traffic moving at long run out-of-pocket costs.
- Q. One of the immediate consequences of that might be the need to amend Section 32 of the Transport Act with regard to joint participation in agreed charges by railways serving competitive points?
- A. I can't really see this arising because
  -- well, unless I know what the costs are for agreed
  charge traffic.
  - Q. That is understood.
  - A. That would have to be assumed.
- Q. Yes. Another thing that I wondered whether it would disappear under your rate scheme would be the need of general revenue cases before the Board,



and the reason I am suggesting this to you is as follows:

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
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approval or supervision by the Board will only be necessary for two kinds of rates: one, maximum rates on all traffic, and, two, maximum rates on captive traffic?

- A. Minimum rates.
- I am sorry: minimum rates on all traffic and maximum rates on captive traffic?
- A. Yes, general revenue cases before the Board would disappear.
- Specific rates, while they are filed Q. with the Board, will, under your system, be subject to challenge if they are above the minimum rates on all traffic and above the minimum but below the maximum on captive traffic? There will be no need for approval by the Board of specific rates?
- That is right, subject to the undue preference and discrimination that I should not like to see taken out of the Act.
- That is a gradually disappearing thing, based on experience?
  - Α. Yes.
- Would it be right to say that if the railways need more revenue, all they need to do is increase without Board approval rates in the noncaptive category and/or those in the captive category which are below fully distributed costs?
  - That is right.
  - You agree with that? Q.



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
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- Α. That is right, subject to filing and whatever other regulations there would be.
- Q. I want to explore with you what the area is for the Board's authority in regard to rates in case of the railways' need for increased revenues. Would you agree that the Board's authorization is only required when the railways want to increase their maxima on captive traffic, and in that case they must make a showing of increased costs?
  - That is when it would be needed, yes.
- Q. But there is no need for the railways to apply for authority to increase their minimum cost schedules? These, I suggest to you, can be raised at the discretion of the carriers on anything? I can't quite understand why the railways need have authority to increase their rates above the minima?

(Page 14060 follows)



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A. the railways' costs increase, then If the minimum rate schedules should be increased not by authorization of the Board so much as by order of the Board.

- Correct. In other words, the railways Q. need not apply to the Board, but you think it is the Board's duty to keep itself informed as to little or long-run out-of-pocket costs of the railways?
  - Α. I certainly do, yes.
- And if the Board finds, because of certain factors, the railways' long-run out-of-pocket costs have risen to some appreciable extent, then the Board would authorize an increase in the minimum rate schedule filed but not necessarily published?
  - A. Yes.
- That probably requires an extremely strong cost finding section of the Board or whatever cost section might deal with railway rates?
- Yes, it would need a strong cost finding section; but we have heard that the railways have of costs, and I think control methods quite a lot set up in the light of our present knowledge, could be
- Do you think the railways would be Q. disappearance of general revenue cases? helped by the
- I think so, yes. I am quite sure they would be helped. They would be able to take full advantage of market conditions.
  - Q. Are there other reasons that you might





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be able to suggest?

- A. In general revenue cases I think they will eventually come to a point of decreasing returns, which is, I think, happening now on the normal traffic. The percentages will go up and up and there will be a point when they can't do it any more.
  - Q. What happens then?
- A. Well, they will have to go out and test the market elasticities and go in for cost reduction, and they will have to get rid of their surpluses. A rate increase without any idea of selectivity would not do the railways any good and it would not do the captive shippers any good.
- Q. Supposing the railways were faced -go back to the 17 per cent case -- with an extremely sizeable increase in their wage structure. Do you mean they go to the Board -- and you have read cases, decisions of the Board, and perhaps some proceedings before the Board, and one of the complaints, both in Canada and in the United States, by the railways is that there is a time lag between the time they apply for a rate and get the rate. Now, with the disappearance of the general revenue cases, do you think that the railways will be able to better adjust themselves?
- A. Yes. They could just file a tariff and increase their rates whenever they wanted to. There would not be any need for a lump increase each



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
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29 30 year; it will be an adjustment with the market going on all the time.

- I have a list here, and it is by no means an exhaustive list. There is a point I would like very much to get your opinion on. Do you think that under your system there is any more need for the requirements formula under the Board of Transport Commissioners?
- A. I can't see any need for the requirements formula if this scheme is adopted and if the captive traffic is subjected to rates which we would like to see under the cost of service, there would be no need for the railways' earnings to be limited by a requirements formula.
- Q. With this ease of adjustment to market conditions, the disappearance of going to the Board, the disappearance of the requirements formula, do you think that this would result, in the opinion of the province of British Columbia, in a more rationally located railway system and a railway system that would more readily adjust itself to the situation than now the case?
  - I am quite certain of that. Α.
  - Why do you say that? Q.
- Because we are going to get more competition, and the sooner regulation of the railways is adjusted to competitive positions instead of being based on the idea of railway monopoly, the



BY

THE CHAIRMAN:

Q. Your whole scheme is predicated on the early disappearance of the branch lines?

A. I wouldn't say early disappearance,

sooner we get to that the better, providing we can sufficiently protect the captive traffic.

THE CHAIRMAN: I am afraid we can't allow Mr. Hughes to go unless we cut down on the questions. It is a great pity.

MR. BRAZIER: It certainly is, and it is completely my fault. I knew that Commissioner Mann had some questions that he would want to ask. I had no idea that they were going to be as extensive as they proved to be, and, of course, last night Mr. Sinclair said he would be half an hour and we thought there would be ample time this morning and arrangements were made.

MR. SINCLAIR: I might say before my friend starts that there is one point, seeing that British Columbia is here. I think it should be brought to the attention of the Commission that the railway owned by the province of British Columbia, the Pacific Eastern, has not adopted this concept of ratemaking, and it is wholly within their control to experiment with it as they wish.

THE CHAIRMAN: Just one or two questions, Mr. Hughes.




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but just as soon as possible, as soon as the railways get round to looking at the costs on the lines, then the public interest is sufficiently protected, then we would hope to see a disappearance of and all the low density branch lines,

- Q. . And this scheme is really predicated on that?
- Well, under the factors, Mr. Chairman; Α. lot of modernization factors which may actually bring down costs in other railway operations.
- Q. I am interested in knowing what technique will be, say in the increase in cost for labour alone. Now, you have wiped out all revenues. Now, in whose judgment would rates be raised?
- The rates would be raised entirely in the railways' judgment. They could do exactly as any competitive business does; if their costs increase they can go out and reduce costs in other areas, or they could increase tariffs selectively, and when wages go up in the railways we must not forget that the costs go up in the whole economy, and so the competitors costs will and if the railways put their rates up, then go up, the competitors would, no doubt, put theirs up, too -at least some of them would.
- think that other competitors rates Q. You sympathy with the railway rates? should be in
- This is what has traditionally A. Yes. happened.



Q.

A.

No.

MR. BRAZIER:

Mr. Chairman, I was just going

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
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But you wouldn't suggest regulation then?

to state to yourself and the members of the Commission that particularly the part 2 of our brief which we have put forward is rather novel, we appreciate that, and I am sure the Board is going to hear a great deal of further evidence, either supporting or criticising, and I am quite sure there will be a great deal of criticising of it before the hearings are completed, and we would welcome the opportunity, after the other parties have had their say as to criticism of it, of filing a further submission after the criticism, if that is necessary, so that Mr. Hughes would be available for further questioning. But it will be tested in the hearings of this Commission, and we will come forward not to simply defend our position but to attempt to explain the criticisms which are brought out. I think in that way it will serve a useful purpose for the considerations that the Commission will be giving to this brief.

On that basis, therefore, I would like to formally move today that Canadian Pacific and Canadian National Railways be instructed to give to us the full cost study which they have made in respect to lumber. We know they have made it, they have given us the figures confidentially, and they can't say it



Hughes (Chairman)

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is something that is going to take a great deal of time, and I formally make that motion to the Commission.

MR. FRAWLEY: I would like, of course, to
say with respect to that that I am on record, perhaps
I was going to say longer than my friend Mr. Brazier,
but that isn't important at all -- and I was going
to say that the people I have retained to find the
cost and value of service have found it very
difficult to explore the thing because the information
was not available, and I would move, as Mr. Brazier,
the Commission that there be made available to me
and to the consultants I have retained cost information
showing the relationship between revenue and cost of
a wide variety of traffics which are in the Canadian
freight rate structure.


THE CHAIRMAN: Of course, I refer to the record of yesterday and what Mr. Hughes said in connection with his idea of what B.C's suggestion is in regard to the cost section. At page 13942:

"THE CHAIRMAN: We have had lots of words on costs. As I understand Mr. Hughes he suggested a Costing Section of the Board of Transport, did you not? THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

THE CHAIRMAN: And that it would cost

and have the information there for its

own information?



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that.

2.30.

"THE WITNESS: For its own information,

yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: Not for Mr. Brazier, Mr.

Frawley or anybody else?

THE WITNESS: That is right, sir."

MR. FRAWLEY: Then I must choose to dissociate myself with that kind of hole-in-the-wall cost section which would be of no good to the shippers at all.

THE CHAIRMAN: We will reserve on that.

MR. BRAZIER: There was one point as to the members of the Advisory Committee.

COMMISSIONER MANN: We have already got

THE CHAIRMAN: We will adjourn until





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---On resuming at 2.30 p.m.

THE CHAIRMAN: Order, please.


The Commission is most concerned with making headway and most concerned with getting some settlement to this very vexed question of costing; and the Commission is very concerned to get the information itself.

To the end of shortening things up Mr. Cooper has been instructed by us, and he has met with the railways and he has been in touch also, this morning, with Mr. Mauro, and I may say that the railways reluctantly have more or less abandoned certain rights in cross-examination -- and lengthy cross-examination -- in order to try to get some agreement.

Now, the Commission has made a memorandum, which Mr. Cooper will now read, and this is what we plan on doing.

MR. COOPER: The Commission has given careful consideration to the procedure which should be followed to expedite the disposition of the submissions on costing matters to be presented by the provinces of Alberta and Manitoba and by United Grain Growers Limited and the Wheat Pools.

The Commission is of the opinion that the submissions in these matters to be presented by the various cost experts retained should be referred to and dealt with by a meeting of such experts and those of the railways under the chairmanship of Dr. D. E. Armstrong



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
after the evidence of such experts has been given in chief and before cross-examination thereon.

This meeting will be held in Montreal, commencing on a date to be announced, and will be attended by the Commission as observers. No counsel will be present.

At this meeting: --

- (1) All submissions above referred to will be discussed;
- (2) Areas of agreement and disagreement will be determined and delineated;
- (3) Minutes of the proceedings will be taken and a report made by Dr. Armstrong to the Commission setting out the points of agreement and disagreement between the parties:
- (4) Opportunity for cross-examination of the cost experts for the provinces and the grain trade in public hearing will be afforded by the Commission on dates to be announced. However, cross-examination will be limited to the points of disagreement as reported to the Commission by Dr. Armstrong.

The Commission wishes to make it clear to all concerned that the procedure here set out for dealing with this complicated and difficult area of its work has been arrived at with the objects of saving time and expense and of permitting the submissions to be developed by the experts unfettered in so far as possible by the difficulties of such development through the technique of cross-examination of technical witnesses in public





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hearings.

THE CHAIRMAN: And, Mr. Cooper, you have the further information as to the Montreal hearings.

MR. COOPER: Yes.

This is a schedule of hearings, July and September, 1960.

Within the Peribonca Room, the Queen Elizabeth Hotel, July 4 to 6, the Government of the Province of Quebec.

July 7 to 8, United Grain Growers.

The remaining portion of the time to be spent in Montreal -- there being a total of two weeks -- to be occupied by such other evidence as may be ready for submission before the Commission at that time and which the Commission may determine.

Within the Board of Transport Commissioners hearing room, Union Station, Ottawa:


From September 12 to 30, commencement of hearings of the provincial briefs in the following order:

- (1) Atlantic Provinces
- (2) Saskatchewan
- (3) Manitoba
- (4) Alberta

These briefs are due to be filed with the Commission on August 15, 1960.

Grain marketing organizations will follow the provinces. Submissions of the grain marketing organizations are due August 15, 1960.

The Canadian National and Canadian Pacific



is expected.

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THE CHAIRMAN: Well, then, if that is so

and if you have the Manitoba case ready for Montreal we will have it.

possible for Dr. Borts to be in Montreal?

Railways will follow the grain marketing organizations.

Submissions from the railways are due September 15, 1960.

THE CHAIRMAN: Now, Mr. Frawley, will it be

MR. FRAWLEY: That is not only possible, that

MR. FRAWLEY: The Manitoba case?

THE CHAIRMAN: I think that has been indicated. Is that right, Mr. Gobeil?

COMMISSIONER GOBEIL: Not the whole case, but they might be ready to present part of their evidence in Montreal.

MR. FRAWLEY: Manitoba?

COMMISSIONER GOBEIL: Yes.

MR. SINCLAIR: As I understand it, Dr. Borts will present evidence in chief, and whatever that evidence is will be discussed at the conference under the chairmanship of Dr. Armstrong .


MR. FRAWLEY: No, no.

MR. SINCLAIR: And whatever various disagreements there are in Dr. Borts' testimony I will be given an opportunity at a date . . .

MR. FRAWLEY: As I understand it this is a suggestion.

MR. SINCLAIR: Just a minute.

THE CHAIRMAN: It is more than a suggestion.





We are ruling. We have got to get on with this business some how. We have got to finish this Commission.

MR. SINCLAIR: And you were asking me if that was all right, and my answer to you is that I would like to say that, after I get the areas of disagreement, I would like to have sufficient time from the date I get them to have an opportunity to analyse them.

THE CHAIRMAN: We can cross that bridge when we come to it, Mr. Sinclair.

COMMISSIONER GOBEIL: You mean that with the schedule given to counsel you wouldn't have sufficient time now -- from August 15 to September 15?


MR. SINCLAIR: Well, I don't know when I am going to get the areas of disagreement memoranda.

All I am saying is -- and I am quite sure the Commission will recognize this -- that I should have a little time, or a reasonable time.

THE CHAIRMAN: Both you and Mr. Frawley should have a reasonable time.

MR. FRAWLEY: I was going to ask Mr. Cooper to be good enough to give me the sense of that memorandum now. The meeting of experts which would be under the chairmanship of Dr. Armstrong would be after what, Mr. Cooper?

MR. COOPER: It would be after direct examination of the costing experts retained by the provinces, the United Grain Growers and the Wheat Pools. After their evidence in chief is in and before any cross-examination this meeting would be held. The Commission



has not had all the information to enable it to put a definite date on that meeting now -- among other things because it would depend, to some extent, on the availability of Dr. Armstrong, and, to some extent, on other matters.

MR. SINCLAIR: I would take it, though, that it couldn't be later, in view of what you say, than the 15th of August, because all of the material will be in the hands of people by that time?

THE CHAIRMAN: It will be assumed that it can be arranged.

MR. SINCLAIR: But from what my friend
Mr. Cooper has now said, Dr. Borts may appear in July
to be examined in chief; Mr. Banks may not appear until
October or November and be examined in chief, notwithstanding the fact that the material will have been
available since August.


This, to my mind, with greatest respect, is,

I think, an unecessary delay in the matter, because
this means that the material will all be there but it
is not going to be looked at or dealt with by Dr.

Armstrong until after it has been formally presented
in the box, notwithstanding it has been filed with the
Commission and, presumably, copies given to us.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Frawley, will Mr. Banks be ready?

MR. FRAWLEY: Oh, well, that is a very, very difficult matter -- made difficult, as you know, by the fact that Exhibit 132 was filed, which sent him back to





Washington to rewrite his whole report. I would rather not say anything more than that. That is a very delicate subject -- the whole business.

THE CHAIRMAN: You say, Mr. Frawley, that Dr. Borts will be ready.





MR. FRAWLEY: That is a different matter. I talked to Dr. Borts on the telephone the day before yesterday and again last night. He asked Mr. Stenason for certain information, and he had a telegram from Mr. Stenason saying that it was in the mail, but up to ten-thirty last night it had not arrived. He said after he had that material for a week he could begin to reproduce his memorandum. I would like to understand what happens then. He will presumably appear on the 11th of July and will go into the box and put in his evidence in chief, and he will then be expected to subject himself to a conference of the experts. I may say that there is no reason why I should not tell you what happened on the telephone last night: he objected to that. He does not see any purpose in it. However, if the Commission is ruling on it, I have to look at it in a totally different way.


This statement which Mr. Cooper read said this meeting would be held during the week commencing the 11th of July.

MR. COOPER: No; the statement I have just read, Mr. Chairman ---

MR. FRAWLEY: Oh, it will be just "whenever"

-- in other words, if Mr. Banks was ready, and as Mr.

Sinclair said, supposing he was ready in Ottawa in the middle of September, just to take a date out of the air, then he would present himself in the box. His brief would be taken-- perhaps he would read it or it would be taken as read, and he would go into this conference



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
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with Mr. Armstrong and the railway experts. Dr. Eorts at that time is in London, which is completely unsatisfactory to me. These men have been retained together; these men are together as far as Manitoba and Alberta are concerned, and we are spending a lot of money to talk to them and to have them talk to each other. As far as we are concerned it is Banks and Borts -- not Banks by himself and then Borts some time in September.

Now, I am not going to defy the Commission. I am going to take the Commission's ruling, and then take instructions. Mr. Borts comes up on the 11th of July and then he goes into this conference with Dr. Armstrong and the other costing experts shortly after the 11th of July. Well, Mr. Banks will not be ready on the 11th of July, or anywhere near that time because of Exhibit No. 132. He comes up in, say, the middle of September and goes into the box and goes into the conference with Mr. Armstrong. Then Mr. Saunders does the same -- just those three people; there are no other cost experts to be called by the provinces or the UGG or the Wheat Pools. I don't know about Mr. Saunders, but it will be a piecemeal proposition. There will be several meetings of that Armstrong committee.

THE CHAIRMAN: Well, the one thing is that we do not want people dragging their feet, and we have to get on with the job of finishing it up.

MR. FRAWLEY: Well, Mr. Chairman, I think any



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29 30 suggestion is worth a little questioning and criticism: just what would be gained by this meeting of the cost experts?

THE CHAIRMAN: Well, if you can suggest anything better, we are concerned with getting the thing cleaned up.

MR. FRAWLEY: But, as I understand it, it is the desire to have agreement that is important.

THE CHAIRMAN: To eliminate disagreement.


MR. FRAWLEY: Or, to ascertain the areas of disagreement, and the areas of disagreement would go on for cross-examination. How about the areas of agreement? Would there be ---

THE CHAIRMAN: That would be an admission of facts.

MR. FRAWLEY: Well, if there is an area of agreement, that is not going to be the subject of cross-examination whether we have the experts' conference or not.

THE CHAIRMAN: Well, if the parties can agree, that will be fine.

MR. SINCLAIR: But, very obviously, to get agreement you have to get down and understand back and forth, and I must say, for myself, that I would find it time consuming and difficult to put questions to Dr. Borts in the field in which he is an expert -- the regression field -- and try to have you understand me. I won't say whether you would understand or not. You might understand Dr. Borts, but you may have difficulty






understanding me, when I am quite certain that Dr.

Borts and Dr. Armstrong and some people with a blackboard and a machine or a piece of paper can indicate
among themselves in ten minutes what might take me
two hours, and after I get finished say, "Now, I
understand it. This does this and that". I do
agree wholeheartedly that this technical material is
better handled by what I term the conference method of
experts and advice rather than the examination technique, because it does not lend itself to that.

MR. FRAWLEY: I am sure I will be pardoned for saying the perfectly obvious thing, that it is just all very well to come along with this idea now. After all, I didn't do anything very much in the nature of a high-brow cross-examination, but my colleague Mr. Mauro did, and why should Mr. Mauro have to cross-examine Mr. Stenason and Mr. Bandeen, and Mr. Sinclair not have to cross-examine Dr. Borts? If I may say so, and I am sure there is nothing sinister in this decision, it looks awfully much like changing the rules in the middle of the game.

THE CHAIRMAN: Oh, no.

MR. SINCLAIR: I would look forward to seeing whether I could do the job in this way, and the only way I will do it is by numbers -- one, two, three, four -- and if I make a mistake I will say, "Well, Mr. Chairman, I have made a mistake. Wipe it out and I will start over again." It is bound to be tedious. I would think I could give Dr. Borts maybe a little



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
rougher time in the witness box than he would have explaining his material to a group of experts. may not be that the facts would get out -- and I think that is what the Commission is looking for -- and so far as this costing is concerned, the C.P.R. is anxious to learn any improvement in techniques that we can learn, and if Dr. Borts can show Canadian Pacific a better way of getting costs, a more refined way, a more accurate way, we are glad to have it.

THE CHAIRMAN: Well, as a matter of fact, this idea was not yours.

MR. SINCLAIR: I might have had an advantage, but it would be the advantage of getting out the facts. I think there is too much at stake in this costing, and in the determination of the true costs of handling grain in western Canada to export positions, to think other than this is the best way of getting at it. If we can't agree in the expert field, that is a different matter.

MR. FRAWLEY: Why the hit-and-miss type of examination for us, and the perfectionist type for Mr. Sinclair?

MR. SINCLAIR: You see, Mr. Chairman, from September on our people were available and numerous meetings were held with these experts -- Dr. Borts, Mr. Banks, Mr. Saunders -- and I had a stack of specific questions and answers. All our regression methods were shown to them. No doubt they have run them and tested them. No doubt in view of the





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questions put, most of them were accepted -- or, I must assume they were until I see something to the contrary.

But, I must start on the other assumption, that until we can see what Mr. Borts and Mr. Banks ---

THE CHAIRMAN: Well, the date is to be arranged, and we just want action, and that is the ruling.

Now, in Montreal, we will have Quebec, UGG, Dr. Borts and Mr. Stenason.

COMMISSIONER GOBEIL: Mr. Frawley, I would like to ask you a question on the remarks that you have just made, and I will have the same question for Mr. Sinclair. Do your remarks imply that Alberta will not be prepared to present the submission, as ruled, on August 15th?

MR. FRAWLEY: No. Dr. Banks' report?

COMMISSIONER GOBEIL: No, no; the province?


Your remarks as stated don't mean that Alberta will

arrive on August the 15th and say, "We cannot present
our brief", do they?

MR. FRAWLEY: No, no.

COMMISSIONER GOBEIL: The brief will be there on August 15th?

MR. FRAWLEY: Oh, yes, always excepting Mr. Banks. I don't know what is involved with Mr. Banks in redoing his whole brief, but if you are asking me about the other brief, which is not related to the Crow's Nest Pass matter at all, they will all be filed by the 15th of August.





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THE CHAIRMAN: The only thing is, we want the hearings closed some time.

MR. SINCLAIR: I take it the Commission is ruling ---


COMMISSIONER COBEIL: Excuse me, Mr. Sinclair: In your case it is the same thing: I am not interested in the costing study, but the C.P.R. submission -- you are not implying it would not be ready for September 15th?

MR. SINCLAIR: No, Commissioner Gobeil. understood it was the ruling of the Commission that all material for everyone, other than the railways, was August 15th, and the railways' case was September the 15th. That was the ruling, and we just have to live with it, and we accept it, of course.

MR. FRAWLEY: I would not want any misapprehension about Mr. Banks and his Crow's Nest Pass grain cost study. All I know is, at very great expense to us, he had to re-do his whole brief, and I know he was working on it; he has been working on it since November, and because of the new numbers he got out of Exhibit 132, he has had to re-do that brief.

THE CHAIRMAN: We will recess for fifteen minutes and perhaps counsel can clear off the record any misconception.

---Short recess.





. .

report, Mr. Cooper?

MR. COOPER: No, I have nothing further to report.

THE CHAIRMAN: Well, the Commission has made its rulings, and we will adjourn to Montreal on July 4th, in the Queen Elizabeth Hotel at ten o'clock.

---Adjournment.









